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Preface
My decision to base this thesis project on the role of the major public events in modern
British history originates with my childhood fascination for ceremony. Perhaps because I grew
up in Orlando, Florida, with its many theme parks, I became accustomed at an early age to being
entertained by a certain type of popular spectacle. As I grew older and became far more
enamored with Britain and British history than I had ever been with Mickey Mouse, I found
something very familiar with the British tendency to make a production over royalty, empire, and
culture. After all, theme parks draw on many of the same concepts associated with the British
spectacle—grand street parades, fairytale princes and princesses, nostalgia for bygone eras—to
construct temporary realities for their spectating patrons. So there was from the start something
comfortable and familiar with the idea that public spectacles held real draw for crowds of people.
Over time, and as my private life as an Anglophile received encouragement from fellow
travelers, I grew fascinated with the particulars of what popular spectacles represented in British
history and society. Specifically, I became deeply interested in the ways that contemporary
spectacles continued to reflect upon the now defunct British Empire. It was not, however,
merely certain historical homages within the events that fascinated me; rather, it was the fact that
I saw how contemporary spectacles often built upon precedents established by previous events.
Consequently, I realized that by tracing the evolution of spectacles, I might be able to say
something interesting about the evolution of modern British history, particularly as it concerned
the history of the British Empire. Knowing that my academic program required an
interdisciplinary approach for any thesis project, I became convinced that in addition to
exploring the fundamental historical framework surrounding modern British spectacles, I would
also be able to explore the anthropological, sociological, and philosophical underpinnings
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associated with the major convocations of the British Empire. Broadly speaking, such
explorations constitute the main purpose of this project.
I have focused on what I believe to be the most significant and grand public gatherings of
recent British history, starting with the Great Exhibition. I also consider the implications of the
Jubilees of Queen Victoria, the war memorial movements and commemorations in the aftermath
of the World Wars, the Coronation of Elizabeth II, and the various major events of recent
decades. While this constitutes an expansive period of time, the distance between events allows
for a wide-lens perspective on the rise and fall of the British Empire. I believe that this approach
has benefitted the project, even if it requires the reader to make certain historical leaps forward
with each new chapter. Finally, I have sought to reveal certain elements of propaganda, power,
and discourse present in most of the events this project examines.
While this project constitutes a labor of love, I hope that my approach, purpose, and
scholarship combine to propose some interesting and original ideas for the reader. Because as
long as British spectacles such as Royal Weddings remain global media events, even
disinterested observers will encounter the tradition of Britain’s massive public gatherings. On a
more localized level, large public gatherings in Britain continue to reveal something of
“Britishness” to Britons and non-Britons alike. Indeed, the grand public spectacle represents
nothing less than a key feature of British identity and cultural expression in the modern era. This
project tells of that representation.

Ryan G. Hudnall
Orlando, Florida
November 11, 2014
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Chapter One:
Introduction:
Finding Modern British Ceremonial History

As the news of an extraordinary incident taking place on the evening of October 16, 1834
spread quickly throughout London, throngs of Londoners gathered on the south bank of the
Thames and in the streets of Westminster to witness the spectacle unfold: a massive fire had
engulfed the Houses of the Lords and Commons in the Palace of Westminster.1 As the Times put
it, “the ill news spread rapidly through the town … attract[ing] the attention of not only
passengers in the streets, but if we may judge from the thousands of persons who in a few
minutes were seen hurrying to Westminster, of the vast majority of inhabitants of the
metropolis.”2 Among the members of the crowd who bore witness to the scene was the painter
J.M.W. Turner. Turner sketched the scene as it unfolded, later using his sketches to paint two
masterpieces and numerous watercolors of the conflagration.3 Turner’s paintings of the scene,
both entitled The Burning of the Houses of Lords and Commons, captured the carnival
atmosphere that accompanied the fire (Figs. 1.1, 1.2).4
Painted from two different angles, Turner established different perspectives on the
incident. The painting currently housed in the Philadelphia Museum of Art (Fig. 1.1) shows the

1

“Destruction of Both Houses of Parliament By Fire,” The Times, October 17, 1834.
Ibid.
3
Edward Eigen, “On the Record: J. M. W. Turner's Studies for the "Burning of the Houses of Parliament" and Other
Uncertain Bequests to History,” Grey Room, 31 (2008): 69-70; The Philadelphia Museum of Art: Handbook of the
Collections, ed. Sherry Babbitt (Philadelphia: Philadelphia Museum of Art, 1995), 189; Paul Gallagher, “Mystery of
JMW Turner's famous 'Burning of the Houses of Parliament' solved at last,” The Independent, March 18, 2014,
http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/art/news/mystery-of-jmw-turners-famous-burning-of-the-housesof-parliament-solved-at-last-9200409.html. While scholars continue to agree that the two paintings that Turner made
of the 1834 fire in Parliament do indeed represent attempts to capture that particular event, much debate centers
around whether or not some of Turner’s watercolors of the occasion actually depict the Westminster fire. Tate
Gallery cataloger Matthew Imms recently argued that two of Turner’s watercolors depict an entirely different fire at
the Tower of London in 1841.
4
Since both paintings bear the same name with only the most subtle of variations, this essay will distinguish
between them by identifying the ownership of each painting whenever they are referenced individually.
2

1

fire from a vantage point directly across the Thames. The painting housed in the Cleveland

Fig. 1.1. J.M.W. Turner, The Burning of the Houses of Lords and Commons, October 16, 1834, 1835.5

Fig. 1.2. J.M.W. Turner, The Burning of the Houses of Lords and Commons, 16 October 1834, 1835.6

5
6

For more information, see: http://www.philamuseum.org/collections/permanent/103831.html
For more information, see: http://www.clevelandart.org/art/1942.647
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Museum of Art (Fig. 1.2) presents the scene from a greater distance.7 Turner, while maintaining
the vivid colors of the burning Houses of Parliament as the defining feature of both paintings,
places a good deal of emphasis on the London observers of the fire, especially in the
Philadelphia Museum of Art’s (PMA) painting. The scene is set almost as if in a theater.8 In the
Cleveland Museum of Art’s (CMA) painting, however, Turner pulls back from the fire far
enough to allow the viewer to assume the position of one of the observers who did not venture
into Westminster. In the CMA’s painting, the majority of the spectators appear as either
indistinct figures on boats or along the edges of the painting; the impossibly high flames
dominate both the canvas and the viewer’s attention. By highlighting these perspectival
contrasts, each painting focuses on two different, though equally important, aspects of the event
as it unfolded: the all-consuming nature of the fire itself and the popular observation of the fire
as an unplanned urban spectacle.9 Whereas the CMA’s painting places more emphasis on the
flames, which in turn shows off Turner’s incredible skill with color as well as his artistic and
philosophical respect for the sublime, the PMA’s painting more clearly situates the event within
the context of its broader popular participation and therefore speaks more powerfully to the
history of the occasion.10 Indeed, Turner and the others who gathered on that evening ultimately
saw something more substantial than the burning of an important building. They witnessed a
heavily symbolic event which underscored the fact that the Britain of 1834 was a nation in the
7

David Blaney Brown, Turner in the Tate Collection (London: Tate Publishing, 2002), 145. Brown notes that Turner
observed the fire from several vantage points, including from a boat on the Thames at one point.
8
Peter Ackroyd, London: The Biography (New York: Nan A. Talese, 2000), 212. Ackroyd, in his remarkably
enjoyable biographical sketch of London, points out the London tradition, dating to the Great Fire of 1666, of
rushing to observe fires. In his words, “fire became one of the principal characteristics of the city.” The firebug spell
finally broke in the dark days of the Blitz in 1940.
9
Brown, Turner in the Tate, 145. Some of Turner’s watercolors of the fire in the Tate Collection also focus upon
massed observers in a meaningful way. Clearly, the number of Londoners that turned out to watch the spectacle
unfold made a significant imprint on Turner’s memory of the event.
10
For more information on Turner’s appreciation for the sublime, see: Andrew Wilton, Turner and the Sublime
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). In fairness to Turner, both paintings, regardless of emphasis, serve as
continuing demonstrations of his superior skill as a painter. Indeed, these paintings stand in this humble author’s
opinion as two of Turner’s finest contributions to art.

3

midst of historic transition.
As a matter of sheer coincidence, the Westminster fire came at the dawning of a new era
in British history. It followed the British triumph in the Napoleonic Wars and immediately
preceded the emerging Victorian era. The fire also came during a time of economic transition
away from a system of colonial expansionism built upon the slave trade and towards a new
industrial-capitalist system which supported a far-flung empire and embraced technological and
industrial advancements underwritten by alienated labor. In addition, the old Parliament
buildings burned to the ground after a centuries long, relatively measured shift in power away
from the Crown and to the Parliament. Owing to these overlapping transitions, the Westminster
fire, at least symbolically, represented not so much the tragic demise of a great public building
but the ending of the old Britain.
In the years that followed the fire, the British rebuilt the Palace of Westminster in a neoGothic style.11 The neo-Gothic rebuilding effort symbolically conserved a romanticized
conceptualization of the British past even as the government received a new home.12 Yet even
before the new Parliament building cemented the links between the past and the present, the
crowds that gathered on the banks of the Thames and in the streets of Westminster had served as
witnesses to the obvious transitional symbolism of the occasion. Such gatherings became a
pattern. Just as they did on that October night, Britons afterwards gathered on many subsequent
occasions to observe and participate in the newly unfolding eras of British history. Such
gatherings reflected a broader historical metanarrative about the nature of British spectacles as
11

Sean Sawyer, “Delusions of National Grandeur: Reflections on the Intersection of Architecture and History at the
Palace of Westminster, 1789-1834,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 6, no. 13 (2003): 243. As Sawyer
points out, Sir Charles Barry’s design for the rebuilt Palace of Westminster reflected a growing trend towards the
Gothic as the preferred national architecture stemming from the Napoleonic era: “As Revolutionary France co-opted
the imagery of a mythologised republican Antiquity, a reactionary and assertively monarchical Britain abandoned
Neoclassicism and embraced Gothic as a more sincere and even native style.”
12
Ibid., 238.
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representative expressions of national identity, imperialism, and later the British post-imperial
situation.
Among the many state occasions and other spectacles which marked the evolution of
British history from the Victorian era to the present day, Britons publicly coalesced around
especially notable events including the Great Exhibition of 1851, the Jubilees of Queen Victoria
in 1887 and 1897, the war memorial movement and commemorations following the World Wars,
the Coronation of Elizabeth II in 1953, and latter-day events designed to mark the new
millennium, the Diamond Jubilee of Elizabeth II in 2012, and the London Summer Olympic
Games of 2012. These events, with only occasional exceptions such as the Millennium Dome
debacle, almost always demonstrated popular support for the institutions, personalities, and
values of those agents responsible for their presentation. As such, the institutions of state and
British public life—monarchy, government, industry—regularly sponsored grand national
spectacles in the hopes of accomplishing or securing various ends, including the dissemination of
political propaganda, the self-serving reinforcement of popular support for various British
institutions, and, above all else, the validation of the broader, ongoing British imperial project
that so dominated the Victorian worldview. These convocations of empire, therefore, provide a
glimpse into the British socio-historical situation as it unfolded over time, especially when taken
as a collective series of events. To wit, popular spectacles, particularly when understood as
semi-routine examples of performative “Britishness,” act as visible benchmarks for gradually
evolving political, cultural, and social values and practices. Taken on an individual level,
however, each ceremonial spectacle focused upon the specific circumstances of time and place
particular to each event. Considering these massive events, therefore, means “decoding” them as
individual reflections of Britain at a specific time in history while also recognizing their role as
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touchstone moments within a wider historical metanarrative about the transitional forces at work
in imperial and post-imperial Britain.
The process of decoding British spectacles in order to place them within both their
particular and broader historical contexts requires a mixture of interdisciplinary research and
critical analysis rooted in a deeper understanding of the relevant historical circumstances at play.
In addition to those numerous historians who discuss British ceremonials as part of their research
into particular aspects of modern and contemporary British history, several notable figures
emerge as valuable commentators about the cultural and sociological forces which govern
ceremonial occasions in the public sphere. In particular, the postmodern philosopher Michel
Foucault and the symbolic anthropologist Clifford Geertz represent invaluable voices for any
considered discussion about the role of ceremonies in public life. Additionally, the philosopher
Jürgen Habermas,13 by virtue of defining the modern “public sphere,” and the sociologist
Richard Sennett,14 as a result of his efforts to define the role of “public man,” also lend
significant authority to scholarly discussions and debates about the nature of public life.
Foucault and Geertz’s respective perspectives, however, provide the ultimate framework and
tools by which to explore ceremonies and their place within the historical context.
Foucault’s unique approach to philosophy—in which he probed questions relating to the
dynamics of power, discourse, and oppression, among other topics—provides an invaluable
framework for exploring some of the most substantial implications concerning the role of
ceremonies in public life.15 In addition, Foucault’s efforts to move beyond some of the
traditional understandings of structuralism and hermeneutics illuminate both the various
13

See: Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of
Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991).
14
See: Richard Sennett, The Fall of Public Man (New York: W.W.Norton & Company, 1974).
15
For an excellent, accessible introduction to Foucault’s approach, see: Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish:
The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1977).
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rationales behind the staging of public ceremonies and the transactional experience of those
ceremonies.16 Foucault’s highly critical approach to the role of institutions and structures in
public life, as well as what he perceived as their negative implications for the individual, presents
similar opportunities to critique British ceremonial events, even though Foucault himself never
addressed the topic explicitly. After all, ceremonies, large and expensive affairs on the whole,
constitute efforts on the part of their organizers to appeal to, respond to, or sway popular
sentiment down to the individual level. Any Foucauldian approach, therefore, inevitably asks of
such ceremonies: to what end? Cui bono? As Foucault explains:
My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not
exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to
do. So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper and pessimistic activism. I think
that the ethico-political choice we have to make every day is to determine which is the
main danger.17

Any application of Foucault’s admonition to the topic of popular spectacles, as well as
the subsequent exploration of his broader critiques as a framework for answering the question of
who stands to benefit from public events, invites a critical appreciation of the individual events
in and of themselves. Crucially, however, a Foucauldian framework leaves plenty of space for
the consideration of popular convocations as continuously evolving social constructions.
Spectacles are, after all, organized affairs. Thus, while the Foucauldian approach applies to both
the particular and universal characteristics of the public spectacle, it holds especially powerful
implications insofar as such events reflect a broader, perhaps more insidious, historical
metanarrative about the structures of power within a society. Considering the vastness of the
16

For more information on Foucault’s relationship to structuralism and hermeneutics, see: Hubert L Dreyfus and
Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics: Second Edition with an Afterword by and
an Interview with Michel Foucault (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
17
Michel Foucault, afterword to Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics: Second Edition with an
Afterword by and an Interview with Michel Foucault (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 231-232.
Foucault makes this claim during an interview and after declaring that he would like to create a “genealogy of
problems” in the absences of viable non-Christian ethics. Clearly, he thought big.
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British Empire, such implications reached global proportions.
If the Foucauldian perspective creates a philosophical framework from which to consider
the nature of public spectacles, Geertz’s approach to symbolic anthropology provides more
specific tools for how to interpret public ceremony. Geertz’s famous elucidation of Gilbert
Ryle’s phrase “thick description” about the difference between superficial and substantive
interpretations of individual and cultural behavior provides an example of Geertz’s methodology
in a nutshell.18 Geertz essentially describes the difference between blinking and winking as a
way of introducing his conceptualization of worthwhile ethnography (i.e. the study and recording
of human cultures). According to Geertz, blinking conveys a simple biological response;
winking, however, passes along assigned behavioral meaning to a biological response.19
Obviously the act of implying behavioral meaning represents something worthy of investigation
to Geertz. Importantly, finding “thick description” via the study of behavior also applies to
entire cultures. As Geertz explained:
The point for now is only that ethnography is thick description. What the
ethnographer is in fact faced with … is a multiplicity of complex conceptual structures,
many of them superimposed upon or knotted into one another, which are at once strange,
irregular, and inexplicit, and which he must contrive somehow first to grasp and then to
render.… Culture, this acted document, thus is public, like a burlesqued wink or a mock
sheep raid.… The thing to ask is what their import is: what it is, ridicule or challenge,
irony or anger, snobbery or pride, that, in their occurrence and through their agency. is
getting said.20

Thus the use of Geertzian analysis, a kind of close reading of public practices and events,
provides the essential tools for the critical investigation of cultural and behavioral symbolism
present in public ceremonies. In other words, critical, well-researched examination of public

18

Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays by Clifford Geertz (New York: Basic Books, Inc.,
Publishers, 1973), 6.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid., 9-10.
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spectacles offers up the possibility of finding the so-called “thick description” present in those
events, and alongside that discovery of thick description comes the opportunity to explain “what
is getting said.”
Ultimately, any investigation into the historical role of ceremonies in public life depends
upon an interdisciplinary course that considers anthropology, philosophy, and sociology. Across
this interdisciplinary spectrum, Foucault and Geertz offer up both the strongest framework and
the most powerful tools for excavating the legacy of the recent major British convocations. Yet
the fundamental course of any such investigations remains tied to the historical context from
which individual events emerge. Only by situating an event within the proper historical context
can any inquiry into its purpose, or into the purpose of similar events, receive proper
consideration. Moreover, the purpose of inquiry into modern and contemporary British
convocations stems from the fact that those events act as benchmark reflections of a deliberate,
ongoing project. From 1851 to 2012, Britain’s greatest convocations all dealt with the
implications of first building an empire, then defending their empire, and then finally dealing
with the legacy of that empire.
The British imperial project coming out of the Victorian era completely drives the need
for massive public spectacles, and almost all such events deliberately engage some element of
imperialism—from economic hegemony to racial oppression—in their final presentation. As
such, the orchestration of grand national convocations deliberately invokes the subject of British
history in a glaringly self-aware manner. Even as the contemporary, post-imperial situation of
the present day unfolds, popular ceremonies still comment upon, and actively reinforce, certain
Victorian ideals about class construction, social status, and cultural superiority in sometimes
retrograde fashion. Further to the point, the end result of British spectacles almost always serves
9

to bolster largely conservative ideals and values within British society, government, and
industry. British public ceremonies, in short, simultaneously defend and export a particular kind
of “Britishness” that remains deeply rooted in the imperial past. By tracing the evolution of the
great national events from 1851-2012, the full scope of a historical metanarrative emerges:
British ceremonials consistently reveal deliberately planned efforts to project British culture,
values, and power both at home and throughout the world.
The metanarrative of convocations as important events marking the evolution of the
British Empire truly began with the era-ending transitions symbolized in Turner’s paintings of
the burning Parliament buildings, as well as by the subsequent rebuilding of the Palace of
Westminster as a neo-Gothic monument to the past. The first of the spectacular imperial events
to follow the 1834 fire, however, actively moved the metanarrative firmly into the Victorian era.
The Great Exhibition of 1851 signaled the arrival of a new Britain. At the Exhibition, Britons
and visitors from around the globe queued up time and time again to marvel at the spectacle of
British industrial achievement. The setting, Joseph Paxton’s Crystal Palace, presented new
works of industry as yet another feature of British imperial superiority. Meanwhile, the British
establishment reveled in the popular success of the Exhibition. The Great Exhibition’s
popularity suggested the potential for future British gatherings to triumphantly showcase the
value of empire, industry, and Victorian moral order. Perhaps inevitably, therefore, future
showcases presented to their massed audiences the collective accomplishments—and sometimes
the unexpected failures—of the British Empire project. As a result, Britain’s convocations of
empire, dating from the imperial triumph of the Great Exhibition to the postmodern staging of
the 2012 London Olympic Opening Ceremonies, gave witness to the rise and fall of the single
most powerful global force since the collapse of Rome. Their importance as a part of that
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imperial history presents itself accordingly.
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Chapter Two:
“The Compass of the World”:
The Great Exhibition of 18511

The “Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of all Nations,” held in London from
May to October of 1851, remains a lasting symbol of the Victorian era. Yet, the legacy of the
Great Exhibition represents much more than that of a showcase event ostensibly designed to
celebrate industrial “progress.” The Great Exhibition now broadly emblemizes what W.L. Burn
called the “Age of Equipoise.”2 Coming at the forefront of a period of peace and prosperity, the
Exhibition incorporated into its myriad exhibits the commercial, artistic, and industrial
achievements of the day. Located in Hyde Park and staged in Sir Joseph Paxton’s large steel and
glass “Crystal Palace,” which the popular British press claimed resembled a “cathedral,” patrons
of all walks of life, both foreign and domestic, made something of a mass pilgrimage to see the
Exhibition.3 Many made return visits. In addition to the spirit of public accessibility, the Great
Exhibition displayed what one historian describes as “a rich vein of national self-congratulation
on social and political grounds as well as economic ones.”4 Albert, Prince Consort to Queen
Victoria, and a driving force behind the development and implementation of the Great
Exhibition, used the Exhibition’s State Opening to make clear the goals of the event: “[W]e have
1

Taken from the title page of the Official Catalogue of the Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations
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made diligent inquiry… namely into the best mode of introducing the productions of your
Majesty’s colonies and of foreign countries into this kingdom… The Exhibition is divided into
four great classes of— 1. Raw Materials; 2. Machinery; 3. Manufactures; 4. Sculpture and the
Fine Arts.”5 This fusion of science and aesthetics openly presented to the people of Great
Britain, to Britain’s imperial dominions, and to other competitor nations the burgeoning selfconfidence of a nation enjoying the sort of stability, peace, and prosperity that no other imperial
power possessed during the mid-nineteenth century.
On the other hand, the Great Exhibition did not come into being as a universally
embraced, self-congratulatory event; many concerns were expressed over the Exhibition’s
staging, the access the event granted to foreigners, and public’s response to the event.6 These
moments of trepidation reflected broader worries among Britain’s political elites about the
changing class structures brought on by industrialization, revolutionary political movements at
home and abroad, and the “otherness” of foreigners.7 The planning for the Exhibition came to
reflect and incorporate many of these worries. Indeed, part of the Exhibition’s success stemmed
from the ability of its planners to enfold the pragmatic concerns of entrenched members of the
British establishment into the overriding idealistic optimism that the Prince Consort confidently
expressed in his March 21, 1849 speech backing the Exhibition scheme: “[W]e are living at a
period of most wonderful transition, which tends rapidly to accomplish that great era to which,
indeed, all history points—the realisation of the unity of mankind.”8 By means of balancing
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pragmatic and idealistic interests, the Exhibition became a staging ground for more than just
“works of industry”; the event became an establishment-pleasing celebration of British imperial
power projection and propaganda. So, just as the Great Exhibition managed to achieve an
internalized cohesion that directed its pragmatic and idealistic interests, the broader practices of
British imperial policymaking also found a home within the Exhibition.
The confluence of pragmatic and idealistic influences on the Exhibition remains the key
to understanding both its pervasive contemporary influence and its lasting historical legacy as a
symbol of all things “Victorian.” The Exhibition perfectly blended the early-Victorian values
which one of the great commentators on the Victorian era summarized as “the parallel operation
of Evangelicalism and Utilitarianism.” 9 By bringing these values forward into the public sphere,
the Exhibition built upon this new unity of purpose by centralizing and exhibiting “the religious
experience of a nation undergoing a moral revival, [and] its social experience during a revolution
in the methods of production.”10 Put broadly, the fusion of moral self-certainty and the utility of
economic “progress” became a national effort worthy of display and export, hence the
internationalization of both exhibition space and the invitation of foreign guests.11 The planners
of the Exhibition, for better or worse, resolved to share with the world both the fruits of British
labors and the values that underpinned British stability and self-assuredness. The legacy of this
approach, at least according to another prominent commentator, symbolically allowed for the
Exhibition to represent more than just the sum of its parts: “the Great Exhibition has become the
quintessential postmodernist event, a projection screen for attitudes towards Victorian Britain as
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well as a reflection of broader historical trends.”12 Such ruminations upon the event’s legacy
speak to the success of the event as a deliberately staged spectacle. The showcasing of the
Exhibition effectively synthesized three major propagandistic achievements which fueled its
popularity and cemented its legacy as the ultimum demonstratio of British modernity and
imperial ascendency: the awe-inspiring use of modern construction materials and technologies to
call attention to the staging of the event and to promote its significance to visitors from around
the world, the prominent display of material advancements—economic, industrial, and
technological—to foreign and domestic visitors, and the purposeful juxtaposition of British
cultural achievements with those of “less-developed” or “Oriental” peoples.
The most telling feature of the building that housed the Great Exhibition, its steel and
glass façade, presented to the world the thoroughly modern, utilitarian sensibilities of the
Exhibition. Specifically, Sir Joseph Paxton’s architectural design used revolutionary techniques
to display the new technological and industrial modernity brought on by the Industrial
Revolution. The Crystal Palace became the world’s first freestanding iron-frame building ever
constructed to such a large scale (Fig. 2.1).13 In total, the structure provided around one million
square feet of floor space, comprising some 4500 tons of iron, 293, 655 panes of glass (roughly
900,000 square feet), and 600,000 cubic feet of timber.14 A further 3300 cast-iron columns
supported the roof.15 Reaction to the structure often provoked breathless excitement. Upon first
seeing the Crystal Palace, Queen Victoria wrote to her Belgian uncle: “You will be astounded at
this great work when you see it!—the beauty of the building and the vastness of it all. I can never
thank God enough. I feel so happy, so proud. Our dear guests were much pleased and
12
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impressed.”16 Undoubtedly, the Exhibition’s planners fully intended to make just such an
impression. After all, only a thoroughly modern building could present the progress of “The
Works of Industry of All Nations.” The modern, functional aesthetics of the building also
represented a public shift in mid-Victorian cultural self-perception. As one art historian put it:

Fig. 2.1. The Crystal Palace, Dickensons’ comprehensive pictures of the Great Exhibition of 1851, 1852.17

“Until that time, the Victorian soul had been confined in the airless, lightless, overdecorated
limbo of Neo-Gothic taste. The Crystal Place, through its thousand windows that looked out into
infinity, dared to let the sunlight in.”18 Ergo, just as the newly rebuilt Neo-Gothic Parliament
buildings had referenced continuity with the glories of the British political by means of invoking
an older style of architecture, the Crystal Palace looked to the commercial and industrial future
of the Empire.
Daring to let the sunlight in remained a central goal of event planners throughout the
development and implementation of the Exhibition, both literally and metaphorically.
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Specifically, the Exhibition plans intended to bring a new and accessible utilitarian
conceptualization of modernity into the public sphere. 19 If the Exhibition intended to showcase
new industry and economy, it would do so through maximal openness. Other than Paxton with
his architectural vision, no one person did more to drive the modernization principles behind the
staging of the event than Prince Albert. A hands-on figure, the Prince Consort acted as the
president of a special Royal Commission designed to set the entire enterprise into motion.20
Throughout the preliminary planning of the Exhibition, Albert demonstrated a commitment to
the project’s openness by embracing its internationalization, while simultaneously arguing for
the Exhibition to remain accessible to the public at large.21
Other planners, however, feared that by giving access to the working classes, not to
mention foreigners, the event might quickly transition from a peaceful mingling of peoples and
become a gathering of rebellious Chartist types who could potentially combine with radical
elements coming over from the Continent that carried with them the revolutionary spirit of
1848.22 At times, the anti-foreign sentiment took on a shockingly xenophobic tone. Even some
of the old prejudices re-appeared in advance of the Exhibition’s opening. For example, it fell to
Henry Grattan Jr., a Member of the House of Commons from Dublin, to rebut a concern
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circulating about Irish Catholics attending the Exhibition: “Could they [critics] with any decency
tell the Catholics of Ireland, when they came over to the great Exhibition, that they were
idolaters, and deserved to be stigmatised and reprobated?”23
Nevertheless, with the industrious Albert spearheading the effort, and with the powerful
Royal Commission working to assuage security and establishment concerns, the Exhibition went
forward with the intent to open as an inclusive event.24 Of course, the potential benefits to be
found in a successful showcase for the burgeoning might of the new British industrialization and
its many attendant success stories also weighed heavily in favor of the arguments for more
access to the event. According to one historian, the end result of allowing the Great Exhibition
to go forward as both a fully public and triumphant an event as possible helped to make “the
hungry forties and the radical thirties suddenly [seem] remote. The mid-Victorian calm was
announced and enthusiastically acclaimed.…”25 Such a success story effectively began the day
the Exhibition itself was announced, and subsequently propagandized, to the British public and
to the world by means of a grand State Opening presided over by Queen Victoria and sanctified
by the Archbishop of Canterbury.
Over several centuries of practice, the staging of British Royal ceremonials evolved into a
carefully choreographed and elaborately planned series of spectacles the likes of which few
nations or institutions have ever successfully attempted to rival. On May 1, 1851, the full visual
power of public displays of Royal authority came to bear for the State Opening of the Great
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Exhibition. The Times described the scene thus:
A line of carriages swept past, and then came a troop of Life Guards at the trot, and the
voices of the people hailed the Queen again and again with hearty cheers, as she came by
bowing kindly and graciously. As the cortège drove up to the Palace, the reception of Her
Majesty was enthusiastic, and she entered the building amid a burst of genuine good
feeling from the outside.… More grateful than the Royal flourish of trumpets and the
rolling of drums which announced her arrival. The Queen seemed full of emotion at the
greatness of the occasion and at the welcome.26
Victoria herself later recounted the event as comparable to her Coronation.27 By the time the

Fig. 2.2. Eugène Louis Lami, The Opening of the Great Exhibition, 1851, The Royal Collection, Watercolor, 1851.28

ceremony concluded with the singing of Handel’s “Hallelujah Chorus,” some 25,000 spectators,
the entire Royal Family, and ambassadors from all around the world had witnessed the kind of
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pomp and circumstance reserved for only the most important of national occasions (Fig. 2.2).29
The moment not only served to announce the Exhibition but to legitimize it. Further to this
point, the Archbishop of Canterbury brought another level of legitimization to the event by
bestowing the blessings of God upon the proceedings.30 Thus by the impartation of both divine
grace and Royal assent, the Exhibition began. Questions, however, lingered as to the impact of
the State Opening and its subsequent “good press” for the Exhibition.31 Though judging by the
eager public response and the jaw-dropping attendance figures, the State Opening heralded a
unique and continuously popular attraction.
Visitors to the Exhibition came in astonishing numbers. Over a period of six months, six
million people entered the Crystal Palace for an average of one million visitors a month, or over
thirty thousand a day.32 On one day alone, 109,915 people came to see the Exhibition.33 One
84-year-old fisherwoman living near Penzance walked for five weeks to get to London and see
the spectacle.34 Many travelled by train, while some came by ship from other countries;
however, no integrated public mass transportation grid yet existed on a scale to easily
accommodate the millions who visited.35 In spite of this fact, people crowded into the still
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limited number of new train stations springing up across Britain—another symbol of the
Industrial Revolution at work—while Thomas Cook travel agents further arranged for another
150,000 people to visit the Exhibition.36 Important public figures came, including the Duke of
Wellington, Charlotte Brontë, and, of course, Queen Victoria.37 Charles Dickens, meanwhile,
notably omitted mention of the Great Exhibition in Bleak House, the only major event of 1851 to
escape his notice in that novel.38 Indeed, some Dickens scholars suggest that the title Bleak
House directly contrasts the “Crystal Palace.”39 Dickens, of course, concerned himself greatly
with other facets of British society than those on display under the steel and glass. Though the
denizens of Dickens’ novels remain, in their own way, linked to the same spirit of ‘progress’ that
Paxton’s Palace presented. Karl Marx paid careful attention to the symbolism of the event as the
celebration of industrial power intent upon abolishing national barriers.40 The Times kept up a
steady stream of vivid, largely positive reporting.
Ultimately, however, the affordability of tickets made it possible for many people from
many different walks of life to see for themselves what the Exhibition entailed. Regular patrons
purchased season tickets for three guineas, while general admission was £1 for the first two days,
5s a day until May 24, and then 1s a day until the Exhibition’s close, except for on Sundays
when the building shut to all patrons.41 Affordable access combined with the anticipation driven
by the appearance of Paxton’s modern building, the Exhibition’s grand opening, and the
international exoticism of its displays fueled interest from all classes. As a result, and at its best,
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the Exhibition became a kind of public concourse of social reconciliation.42 As a forum for
peaceful interactions that cut across class, the Exhibition provided what one historian called “the
conviction that the doors of a new world were opening.”43 With the opening of those doors, the
Exhibition planners effectively concluded its first great propaganda coup: the people responded
to the allure of the building, the spectacular State Opening, and the theme of the event. They
came because they wanted to witness, understand, and interact with the new utilitarian and
industrial modernity that pervasively acted as a revolutionary agent in their daily lives. What the
people saw when they walked into the Exhibition was nothing less than the full-scope of the
British Empire on display—a thoroughly modern empire in a thoroughly modern setting.
The second great propagandistic accomplishment of the Great Exhibition centered on the
actual exhibits within the Crystal Palace: those visual representations of the material and
economic triumph of an ascendant British Empire. The industrial “progress” of capitalism as
witnessed by the viewer provided affirmative conceptualizations of the free market, national
interests, and the modern world. As one Marxist historian put it:
If Europe had still lived in the era of baroque princes, it would have been filled with
spectacular masques, processions and operas distributing allegorical representations of
economic triumph and industrial progress at the feet of its rulers. In fact the triumphant
world of capitalism had its equivalent. The era of its global victory was initiated and
punctuated by giant new rituals of self-congratulation, the Great International
Exhibitions, each encased in a princely monument to wealth and technical progress—the
Crystal Palace in London (1851), the Rotunda (‘larger than St. Peter’s in Rome’) in
Vienna, each displaying the growing number and variety of manufactures, each attractive
native and foreign tourists in astronomic quantities.44
These affirmative conceptualizations of the capitalist spirit, the staging of exhibitions, served to
reinforce the policy direction of the state, bolstered social values regarding hard work and piety,
42
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and fostered a sense of public self-assuredness in the utility of the new industrialized modernity.
Of course, both the state and the industrialists needed to make certain affirmative reassurances to
people; the advancements of the new industrial modernity came on the backs of a new proletariat
that worked extremely hard, lived in poor conditions, and did not experience or enjoy
tremendously high economic growth rates by historical standards.45 In light of the times, Marx
commented that “the bourgeoisie of this world is erecting, with this exhibition, its Pantheon in
the modern Rome where it will exhibit its Gods, which it has itself created, with proud selfsatisfaction.”46 That said, the enjoyment of witnessing the spectacle of the Exhibition no doubt
proved a welcome entertainment for many in the working class who wished to share in the
collective “self-satisfaction” Marx referenced. Also, thanks to the internationalization of the
event, Britons gained an opportunity to measure British “progress” against those of competitors
and, at least according to the nineteenth-century mindset, inferiors. The same principle held true
in reverse: other nations and dominions had the option to measure themselves against the might
of the British Empire. Many undoubtedly found themselves wanting.
On the day before the Great Exhibition’s opening, The Times published a guide on what
to expect for visitors.47 The guide provided a broad and useful overlay of the exhibitions
presented within the Crystal Palace. It also provided commentary that demonstrated common
British attitudes about foreign nations:
Having invited the whole world to our Exhibition it was only right that we should share
equally with them such accommodations as we had to offer—accordingly while the
western half of the Crystal Palace has been occupied by the industrial products of the
45
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British Empire, those from other countries have been installed in the eastern division …
the transept was declared the equator of the world in Hyde-Park. On one side India and
the colonies, on the other China, Tunis, the Brazils, Persia, Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt
were grouped around it as the torrid zone. That arrangement, while it harmonized
admirably with the character of the building, destroyed all ideas of preference as to
locality, and any feeling of jealousy founded thereon. Behind the colonies, in the western
division, comes the products of our native industry, and after the foreign states
mentioned, follow in the eastern division the contributions of the great European
communities and of our descendants across the Atlantic.48
It seems clear that the term “share equally” suffers from certain pre-existing attitudes, as does the
suggestion of geographic inequality amongst those nations of the “torrid zone.” Nevertheless,
housed within the Exhibition were examples of industrial and technological inequality between
nations even more vast than the Times suggested. The cover of the Great Exhibition’s official
catalog, which guided visitors to explore the various material and cultural achievements on
display in over 100,000 exhibits as presented by some 14,000 exhibitors, featured a passage from
Psalm 24:1: “The earth is the Lord’s, and all that therein is: the compass of the world and they
that dwell therein.”49 The biblical quote linked Britain’s self-conceptualized progressive
stewardship of global affairs with that of the Lord’s stewardship of the world. Putting this link
on display, at least in the case of the Exhibition, meant that “all that therein is” must inevitably
reveal that mutual divine and temporal stewardship. Consequently, the Great Exhibition focused
on displaying the British section first and foremost.
Those items represented in the British section of the Exhibition included painted glass,
hardware, furniture, woolen products, flax products, furs, cotton products, minerals, carriages,
coal-based machinery, movable machinery, and hardware.50 Some of the more notable items in
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the British section included statuary from the Royal Collection, Sheffield cutlery, a steam
hammer, locomotives, power looms, naval models, surgical models and apparatuses, bees and
beehives, organs, clocks and watches, chemical and pharmaceutical products, hemp materials,
and even the famed “Koh-i-Noor” diamond.51 Essentially, the British section alone contained all
the representative samples that a patron needed to see to get a sense of the material “progress” of
the Industrial Revolution. Materialism and progress effectively represented the same ideal. The
British section of the Exhibition also provided the viewer with wide collection of oddities to
titillate the popular imagination. In these ways, the composition of the British section
deliberately awed, intrigued, and confounded the viewer’s expectations. As one famous cultural
critic asserted: “[the exhibitions] open up a phantasmagoria that people enter to be amused,”
while willingly submitting themselves “to being manipulated while enjoying their alienation
from themselves and others.”52 In other words, a wide-eyed viewer might process the
Exhibition’s displays without truly seeing them for what they symbolized: a modern empire built
on the backs of workers turned wage slaves that was well on its way to becoming the most
advanced industrial power on earth.
If indeed the Crystal Palace acted as a kind of steel and glass cathedral, while the people
behaved as modern day pilgrims coming to pay homage to its various commercial relics, then it
fit for London to serve as the host city for the showcasing of the Great Exhibition. There exists a
unique parallel between London as the geographic nexus of the British Empire and the
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Exhibition as a conflux for commercialization, industry, and free trade. Just as London acted as
the central hub of the United Kingdom, so too did the United Kingdom act as the “Mother
Country” to a far-flung empire. This sort of global geo-political arrangement solidified through
the advancements of the Industrial Revolution. Railroads combined with the steamer and the
telegraph to produce what Marx bemoaned as that “which finally represented the means of
communication adequate to modern means of production.”53 As one Marxist historian further
explained: “the geographical size of the capitalist economy could suddenly multiply as the
intensity of its business transactions increased. The entire globe became part of this economy.
This creation of a single expanded world is probably the most significant development of our
period.”54 Of course, the early globalization of the “single expanded world” was dominated by
the presence of the British Empire. Not until the 1860s did the impact of the Industrial
Revolution influence enough of the so-called “Great Powers” that the economic and geopolitical
trade winds enjoyed by Great Britain for much of the nineteenth century begin to shift.55
By displaying the advancements of the Industrial Revolution, the Great Exhibition
operated according to the movement consistent with an outside-to-inside effect: it drew people
from the fringes to the heart of the empire, both literally and symbolically. The Exhibition
therefore not only highlighted the totality of British material achievements, it showcased the city
of London as the progenitor of the imperial marketplace for free trade. The parallelism between
the roles of the Exhibition and the city represented both a microcosm and macrocosm of the
Victorian world order for patrons of the Exhibition: those who came to London witnessed
material and economic triumph in the displays held within the Crystal Palace while also

53

Qtd. in Hobsbawm, Age of Capital, 33.
Ibid., 33.
55
Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 145.
54

26

observing the outside commerce of the city.56 In keeping with the mood of celebration so
commonly associated with this witnessing, Britons basked in the cultural triumph of their era,
even while many of them bore the brunt of its economic cruelties. This second great
propagandistic triumph of the Exhibition—the clear sense of British industrial triumph over the
material—allowed for the Exhibition to fulfill one last major propagandistic objective: British
cultural triumph over “the other.”
The third great propagandistic triumph of the Great Exhibition, at least according to the
perspective of the mid-Victorians, stemmed from the Exhibition’s ability to project power to
outsiders. Mid-Victorian cultural attitudes towards the subjects of its empire, its competitor
nations, and the “oriental” tended towards the smugly superior. While patriotic nationalism was
hardly unique to the British, a series of British triumphs preceding the mid-Victorian era, the
British triumphs in the Napoleonic wars chief among them, led to a great sense of national
confidence. The words of “Rule Britannia,” that famous unofficial British anthem, offer a
familiar and powerful glimpse into the popular British imagination:
When Britain first, at heaven’s command,
Arose from out the azure main,
This was the charter of the land,
And guardian angels sung this strain—
“Rule, Britannia, rule the waves;
Britons never will be slaves.”
The nations, not so blest as thee,
Must in their turns to tyrants fall;
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While thou shalt flourish great and free,
The dread and envy of them all.
“Rule, Britannia, rule the waves;
Britons never will be slaves.”

Still more majestic shalt thou rise,
More dreadful from each foreign stroke;
As the loud blast that tears the skies
Serves but to root thy native oak.
“Rule, Britannia, rule the waves;
Britons never will be slaves.”57
Written over a hundred years before the Great Exhibition, the overt nationalism implicit in the
words—“the nations not so blest as thee, must in their turn to tyrants fall,” and so on—remain as
succienct and efficient a summary of the British mindset, even during the peaceful equipoise of
the mid-Victorian era, towards non-Britons as at any time since the words were first written. If
anything, the jingoistic attitudes expressed in the song politely underplay the prevailing
sentiment of the era towards foreigners. The unrivaled growth of the Empire made the sentiment
more than aspirational; many Britons simply saw themselves precisely as blessed rulers.
Nevertheless, the Exhibition supposed to demonstrate the “Works of Industry of All Nations,”
and so the event invited the participation of “the other.” Many responded to the invitation.
Participant nations in the Exhibition included a diverse array of British dominion states
and other nationalities. European countries, the United States, Russia, Persia, Turkey, Greece,
Mexico, Brazil, and China represented a far-flung sample of the geographic diversity at the
Exhibition.58 Of the dominion states, none attracted more attention than India.59 Meanwhile,
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some of the participating countries, including Turkey, attended the Exhibition as an extension of
Westernization projects.60 Others came to bear witness to the so-called progress of the Industrial
Revolution even as their own countries gradually began to undergo industrial transformation.
Some, such as the American delegation, came without the cooperation of their governments.61
Still others came with even less official representation—they came as individuals, not as
members of any international delegation. One working-class woman, Lorenza Stevens
Berbineau, travelled from Boston to London in 1851.62 She recorded her experience at the
Exhibition in a series of fragmented descriptions that go on for several pages in her travel diary:
[W]ent to Hyde Park to the great Exhibition It was magnificent I saw things from the
United States handsome lamps mechinery farming implements also [things?] from France
… I saw several things of Carved Ivory they were made in India … there was a good deal
of mechinery from Different parts of the world som [sic] of it was in motion I saw them
make bricks they put the clay in it came out formed into brick … I saw different types of
Ore that was taken from the mines … I was there about 3 hours to day I got very tired
[sic].63
Lorenza Berbineau’s experience at the Exhibition gives some sense of the ground-level
perspective that a foreign visitor had coming to the Crystal Palace. She detailed impressions of
awe at the spectacle, recognition of the internationalism of the event, appreciation for its
technical impressiveness, and exhaustion as a result of trying to process the experience. A
contemporary reader of her diary likely concludes that the Exhibition overwhelmed her.
While Exhibition planners intended to invite foreigners to participate in the Exhibition, it
seems clear that astonishing those visitors with the sheer scope of British material might was an
project can be atomized in such a manner. As I have argued, many diverse aspects of the Exhibition gave the event
its enduring power of propaganda. As such, the Exhibition remains better understood as a holistic event containing
myriad symbolic parts, including the “Koh-i-Noor.”
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additional, inescapable impression which the British were keen to impart. The principle of
overwhelming visitors held particularly true for participating dominion states and those countries
representing “the other.” After all, as the British Empire expanded throughout the nineteenth
century, it pushed into two major global zones previously uncontrolled by Western powers: the
“Dark Continent” of Africa, which became the great hobbyhorse of the late-Victorians, and the
“Orient,” as represented by the eastern peoples and cultures of the Middle East, the Indian
subcontinent, and even parts of Asia.64 The Orient, in particular, saw much of the Empire’s
trade. Consequently, it remained important for the British imperial project to establish
themselves as a not just the political and economic master of the Orient, but also as its cultural
hegemons. Along these lines, Edward Said, in his famous work on the topic of “Orientalism,”
defined the concept of the Orient as “an integral part of European material civilization and
culture. Orientalism expresses and represents that part culturally and even ideologically as a
mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even
colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles.”65 He further asserted that:
Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with
the Orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views on it,
describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western
style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient.
At the core of his argument, therefore, Said contends that the Western powers take complete
control over the Orient by means of establishing not only forms of economic and political control
but also the construction of a power discourse in which the West holds the balance of power. It
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follows from this premise that the Great Exhibition, with its open inclusion of nations from the
Near Middle East, Middle East, and Far East, demonstrated the material and cultural
appropriation of the Orient by the West in a notably concentrated fashion. More importantly,
perhaps, the Great Exhibition served to validate the broader discourse surrounding the Orient in
an experiential sense. Attendees witnessed the juxtaposition of British “progress” with the
otherness of the Orient.
Said’s discussion of “discourse” owes much to Michel Foucault and his post-structural
work on social and historical power dynamics. Said explains:
I have found it useful here to employ Michel Foucault’s notion of a discourse, as
described by him in the Archeology of Knowledge and in Discipline and Punish, to
identify Orientalism. My contention is that without examining Orientalism as a discourse
one cannot possibly understand that the enormously systemic discipline by which
European culture was able to manage—and even produce—the Orient politically,
sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the postEnlightenment period.66
Plainly speaking, Foucauldian discourse analysis deals with the relationship between language
and power and the various levels—individual, social, historical—in which that relationship is
instantiated. Foucault used his work on discourse to analyze particular institutions and structures
of power (e.g. the clinic) with the intention of revealing the ways in which individuals and
societies interacted, sometimes unknowingly, with the centers of power. Said saw the usefulness
of employing a Foucauldian approach to discourse analysis when he considered the ways in
which the imperial West sought to draw a contrast between its own narrative of cultural
superiority, already assumed to be in place, and the narrative of cultural inferiority that the West
assigned to the Orient:
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Orientalism is a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological
distinction made between “the Orient” and (most of the time) “the Occident.” Thus a very
large mass of writers, among whom are poets, novelists, philosophers, political theorists,
economists, and imperial administrators, have accepted the basic distinction between East
and West as the starting point for elaborate theories, epics, novels, social descriptions,
and political accounts concerning the Orient, its people, customs, “mind,” destiny, and so
on.67
Public exhibitions also, of course, present a potential platform for forming an “account
concerning the Orient.” Just as readers of a text respond to the information contained therein,
visitors going to staged attractions actively engage and interact with a deliberately staged
narrative. Those attending the Great Exhibition, therefore, saw among other things a staging of
the Orient, and as they witnessed that staging they became participants in the discourse the West
had imposed upon the Orient and its peoples.
Owing to its internationalization, the Great Exhibition allowed the viewer to form a
comparison between the material progress of nations. Such comparisons proved especially
powerful in forming and reinforcing cultural conceptualizations of the Orient. Writing for the
Inverness Courier, one reviewer of the Great Exhibition noted the following of one such model
of comparison:
I do not think that any one of the compartments of the Exhibition so completely
transports the visitor into the region which it represents as that of Tunis. The figs and
dates and luscious fruits of the land, the rich-scents and the odiferous matting with which
the floor is carpeted, fill the atmosphere with the air of Barbary; and the admirable taste
with which the whole stall is arranged—the prominence given to the skins of wild beasts,
to the dresses of uncouth domestic utensils used by the people, to the natural products of
the soil, the war implements and the riding gear, conjure up at once a picture of the rude,
solitary, half barbarous, half-luxurious life of the modern inhabitants of the ancient
territories of Carthage.68
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This single comment on the Tunisian display at the Exhibition reveals the totality of how the
event reinforced the discourse of the Orient for the patrons. Moreover, the review showed how
Western attitudes towards the Orient remained locked into a kind of ancient, unchanged
conceptualization (e.g. the “air of Barbary” and the “modern inhabitants of the ancient
territories”). In short, comparing the cultural goods of Tunis with that of Britain reinforced the
discourse that one nation had civilized whereas the other had remained perdurable. As Said
explained, “‘Orientals’ for all practical purposes were a Platonic essence…. The crime was that
the Oriental was an Oriental, and it is an accurate sign of how commonly acceptable such a
tautology was that it could be written without even an appeal to European logic or symmetry of
mind.”69 Indeed, the newspaper reporter’s ability to “conjure up at once a picture of the rude,
solitary, half barbarous, half-luxurious life” relies upon his readers to also automatically
“conjure” such an image. It was, perhaps, the expected image: not one of a contemporary people
living in their own lands but of Carthaginians still waiting on the civilizing process to take hold.
The deliberate placement of the industrialized goods of Western nations next to the crafts and
goods of non-industrialized peoples produced such narratives. As a result of such maneuvers,
the Great Exhibition’s narrative legitimized the popular, academic, and official discourse
surrounding the Orient in comparison to the “civilized” West. It was, in short, a propagandistic
triumph for the British Empire project on both a material and cultural level.
The threefold accomplishments of the Great Exhibition—the use of modern construction
materials and technologies which called attention to the event on a global scale, the exhibiting of
“progress” through the lens of material and capitalistic development, and the purposeful
juxtaposition between the cultures and economies of the West and the Orient in accordance with
the dominant Western power discourse—all served to make the Exhibition an event of outsized
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importance in nineteenth-century Britain. The Exhibition, with its vast attendance and well
regarded global publicity, so effectively achieved its goals that it became, effectively, a symbol
not just of its era but of Victorian cultural identity as well. Yet the Great Exhibition did not
serve as a moment from which a newly constructed form of cultural identity emerged; rather, it
perfectly reflected the ongoing imperialization efforts spurned on by both British political
sensibilities and social attitudes. Indeed, for all the internationalization and idealization of
“progress” present within the Crystal Palace, the Great Exhibition ultimately displayed more
about what was central to mid-Victorian identity and values than anything else: self-assuredness,
a commitment to trade and industry, a sense of religious destiny, a rising sense of jingoism, and a
commitment to sharing and spreading Britain’s self-assumed cultural superiority.
Finally, the magnanimous spirit backing the Great Exhibition as a showcase for
international progress in industry did not extend so far as to invite equality between peoples. As
the Great Exhibition unfolded, Britain assumed the dual role of international host and industrial
leviathan with its willful juxtapositions between its achievements and those of others. Indeed,
the British commitment to their own cultural superiority so readily on display within the Crystal
Palace only grew with time. By 1869, Matthew Arnold had proclaimed in a famous work that:
“culture [is] the great help out of our present difficulties; culture being a pursuit of our total
perfection by means of getting to know, on all matters which most concern us, the best which has
been thought and said in the world, and, through this knowledge, turning a stream of fresh and
free thought upon our stock notions and habits.…”70 Arnold’s comments fitted how the British
saw themselves as the conservationists of culture; although, theirs was a culture which also
accommodated a certain conceptualization of progress. Indeed, the Great Exhibition had
modeled the very kind of cultural transmission that Arnold thought so vital, albeit through
70

Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 5.

34

industrial progress rather than learning. Through the exhibition space, the new technology, and
the internationalization of the exhibits, the British revealed what they saw as the best forms of
“progress” the nations had to offer to each other. This also meant that the British, by virtue of
staging the Exhibition, assigned to themselves the role of proprietor for what “progress” meant in
the modern world. On the other hand, this also suggested that the British became an
authoritative voice on what it meant to lack progress in the modern world. It follows from these
privileged positions of authority and power that the British controlled, more than any other
people, the discourse surrounding both the civilized and the uncivilized, the modern and the
archaic, the West and the East. The Great Exhibition, therefore, made into material reality those
modes of discourse from which the British defined their imperial program. It became the first
great modern spectacle of the British Empire by virtue of its imperialistic totality.
The success of the Great Exhibition assured that future grand events which spoke to the
broader discourse of Empire would become a fixture of popular entertainment and patriotic
celebration in Britain. As the mid-Victorian era gave way to the late-Victorian period, the tone
began to shift from one of self-assuredness in British economic and political superiority to that of
growing bellicosity in the face of rising challenges to not just British global dominion but also to
the supremacy of British cultural superiority. The narrative of the great late-Victorian spectacles
changed to reflect these shifting realities. Nevertheless, the Great Exhibition established the
value of the massive popular spectacle as an important cultural, social, and political experience
from which the British would occasionally renew their control over the discourse of empire.
Consequently, and emerging from the success of the Great Exhibition, grand British spectacles
reflected the course of British imperial developments while simultaneously becoming a
loadstone for the broader discourse of empire in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
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Chapter Three:
“Lo, All Our Pomp of Yesterday”:
The Jubilees of Queen Victoria and the Two Families of the World1
As the nineteenth century came to a close, Britons and subjects alike gathered in London
in 1887 and again in 1897 to celebrate the final public spectacles of not just a Sovereign but of
an era: the Golden and Diamond Jubilees of Queen Victoria. By the time of her Diamond
Jubilee, Victoria sat enthroned as the Queen and Empress, Regina Imperatrix, of nearly a fifth of
the earth’s surface.2 The British Empire comprised some twelve million square miles of land and
approximately one quarter of the world’s population.3 Famously, the maps of British
schoolchildren marked out the boundaries of the Empire in pink.4 British civil servants managed
far-flung imperial possessions from Asia to the Americas, while forever plunging British
expeditions deeper and deeper into Africa. At sea, the Royal Navy ruled the waves. As the
Victorian era came to a close, Britain exercised a kind of authority and power throughout the
world seldom seen since the fall of Rome. When the crowds poured into the streets to celebrate
the culmination of Victoria’s reign, the people also did so to mark the end of an unquestionably
British century.
All, however, was not well. By the end of the century Britain had acquired economic and
military rivals. International strife and internal rebellion troubled the imperial dominions.
European countries, meanwhile, began to enjoy the boom times accompanying their rapid turn
towards industrialization. Under these pressures, Britain’s imperial standing gradually began to
1
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slip. If the mid-Victorian era represented a period of industrial-economic expansion and relative
domestic and international peace, then the late-Victorian era represented a period of turbulence
and growing conflict, especially abroad.5 The equipoise of mid-Victorian times found public
expression with the internationally harmonious staging of the Great Exhibition of 1851. Yet
unlike the mid-Victorian calm embodied in the Exhibition, the public response to the growing
change, strain, and decline of the late-Victorian era became apparent with the elaborate staging
of Victoria’s Jubilees. The Jubilees operated according to a much different purpose than did the
Great Exhibition. Whereas the Exhibition intended to showcase the triumph of a new, industrial
modernity set amidst a scene of international cooperation, the events of the Jubilees contended
primarily with a British establishment eager to maintain its carefully cultivated position of
authority over the two great global “families” of the nineteenth century: the fraternity of newlyascendant European nation states and the collection of overseas dominions under Britain’s
imperial control.
Victoria’s Golden and Diamond Jubilees differed substantially in terms of content. The
Golden Jubilee of 1887 celebrated Victoria in her role as a symbolic grand matriarch over an
extended family of mostly harmonious European nation states. Nearly all of these nations found
common interest in shared imperial ambitions, and in many ways the Golden Jubilee events
highlighted imperial glory. The processions through the streets and the events surrounding the
occasion all made reference to the power of Empire in action. It therefore made sense when the
crowned heads of Europe, many of them directly connected to the British Royal Family through
a series of marriages with Victoria’s own children, all converged on London for the Golden
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Jubilee celebrations. The Jubilee acted as a sort of international family reunion. Meanwhile, the
spectacle revealed to viewers the largely-shared values of the Western powers in a gilded family
setting. Taken together, the Golden Jubilee effectively propagandized the British international
vision of empire while simultaneously affirming to the public an air of harmonious good feelings
among relations familiar and distant. Change, however, came rapidly to the family relations on
display in 1887; and by 1897 the sentiments of good feelings gave way to growing international
competition and discord.
The Diamond Jubilee of 1897 recognized Victoria much more exclusively in her role as
the symbolic matriarch of the British imperial family. With the closing of the economic gap
between Britain and the newly industrialized European states, a growing rivalry emerged
between the British and some of the same European nation states which had so happily
participated in the celebrations of 1887. In particular, Germany emerged to follow its own
Sonderweg, or “special path,” in direct challenge to British global hegemony under the
leadership of Kaiser Wilhelm II, the emotionally unstable grandson of Queen Victoria.6 So event
planners in 1897 deliberately gathered representatives from the overseas dominions of the
Empire as replacement figures intended to take the ceremonial places occupied by European
heads of state during the Golden Jubilee. Additionally, the government under the premiership of
the Marquess of Salisbury used the occasion to display its expansionary military policy aimed at
countering challenger nations. The Diamond Jubilee, therefore, in direct contrast with the events
of the Golden Jubilee, revealed to the world the beginnings of nothing less than an imperial
6
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family feud. With the coming of this feud, the events of 1897 also signaled the end of the
Victorian century. Long gone were the days of “Crystal Palaces” and international competition
in the name of collective progress. The glass had given way to the cold grey steel of the
battleship. The ascent of Britain had ended; a century of conflict and imperial regression lay
ahead.
Ultimately, the Jubilees of Victoria acted as public displays which showcased the
changing relations between the established global authority of the British Empire and the
emergence of nascent European powers, particularly Germany.7 As a result, the shift in
programmatic content from the internationally harmonious Golden Jubilee to the more
militaristic and exclusive Diamond Jubilee makes obvious the rapid developments in world
affairs associated with the late-Victorian era. In the course of a decade, the strain and growing
conflict between the two families of the world—the vast but aging British Empire versus their
upstart European neighbors—manifested itself in stark terms through the propaganda of the
Jubilee spectacles.
By the Jubilee decade of 1887-1897, Britain’s global standing appeared dominant in
terms of economic capacity, imperial reach, and power projection; however, each of these
ostensibly secure facets of the overall British imperial structure faced growing background
challenges.8 In general terms, the run-up to 1887 saw the British Empire enter a period of
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increasing geographic expansion undermined by declining economic viability.9 These strains
produced a series of challenging management paradoxes which only grew throughout the Jubilee
Decade. 10 Coming out of the golden decades of the mid-Victorian period, the British economy
depended almost entirely on the successful maintenance and exploitation of its large overseas
empire.11 This arrangement stemmed from the fact that “at no time since the industrial
revolution had the manufactures of the United Kingdom been particularly competitive on the
markets of industrialized economies.… To preserve as much as possible of its privileged access
to the non-European world was therefore a matter of life and death for the British economy.”12
As European competitor nations followed their own periods of industrialization at home with
colonial growth abroad, the British had little choice but to counter such expansion by endless and
costly security reinforcements overseas, as evidenced by the growing naval budgets.13 Such
moves towards enhanced security, however, eventually produced a deleteriously circular effect
on the imperial economy. British imperial objectives started to center not on economic growth
but on defenses against international encroachment on overseas colonial control and
investments.14 The trajectory of ever-increasing military expenditure, especially naval, during
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the late-Victorian period underscored these developments.15 Economic decline throughout the
Empire, therefore, directly led to new defensive postures.
By comparison, British competitor states enjoyed deep-seated internal advantages which
enabled them to expand over time their own economic, and in turn military, capacity and
capabilities. With the conclusion of the Franco-Prussian War and the unification of the German
state in 1871, the British found themselves facing a new European power. By the turn of the
century, the newly unified Germany saw a state-of-the-art industrialized economy go into
overdrive.16 The German economic surge, coupled with a coalescing nationalism, eventually
provided the first true militant challenger to British global authority since Napoleon led France.17
One historian, in noting an important causal explanation for European, specifically German,
ascent running in conjunction to British decline, describes economic (and political)
developmental differences between Britain and Germany thus:
In Germany … capitalism and liberalism were devalued far more than
industrialism, whereas in England it was industrialism and not capitalism or
liberalism whose development was inhibited. In this way, the conjunction of
modernization with an entrenched aristocracy led in Germany to obstructed political
development, and in Britain to inhibited economic development.18

These differences put both nations on the path to the coming military conflicts, but in the lateVictorian era they underscored the gradually shifting economic balance of power between
Britain and Europe.19 Germany also began to expand its interests overseas, cautiously under
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Bismarck at first, and later more aggressively under Wilhelm II.20 Further, Germany’s rise
disrupted the mid-Victorian narrative of a rising, cutting edge, and morally superior empire so
carefully displayed in spectacles like the Great Exhibition. Britain, consequently, found itself in
the troubled position of operating as the world’s only (declining) superpower, a fact recognized
by a growing sense of self-awareness in certain quarters. As Joseph Chamberlain famously
described the late-Victorian predicament: “The weary titan, staggers under the too vast orb of its
fate.”21
Staggering though they may have been, the British remained economically tethered to
their global imperial system no matter the extraordinary military costs associated with
maintaining it.22 The untenable steps towards rebalancing British foreign policy solvency came
at great cost, and as the British system moved ever further away from the equipoise of the midVictorian period, military affairs slowly began to supplant economic and imperial expansion as
the driving force in British policymaking.23 While economic changes caused the global conflicts
between nations, the resulting shift towards increasing militarization dominated the actions of the
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Great Powers in the run up to the bloody years of total war.24 This militarization became the
underpinning focus of Britain’s collective national efforts. The Jubilee decade of 1887-1897 saw
the beginnings of this shift take root.
Because of the costs and efforts associated with the military-based mobilization of
resources, and the desire to retain imperial standing, public support became a necessity. As ever,
national events were opportune moments for propagandizing the benefits of new policy, and a
comparative exploration of the differences between the public celebrations of 1887 and 1897
demonstrates just how rapidly the British publicly responded to the evolving world scene. 25
Indeed, by the end of the Jubilee Decade, the British propaganda model shifted from public selfcongratulation over the empire they had built to the steeled resolve of defending an empire under
threat. Whereas the 1887 Golden Jubilee events tended to harken back to the broad successes of
the earlier part of the century, the 1897 Diamond Jubilee more closely reflected the events of the
decade since 1887. The 1897 celebrations took on a bellicose air, and mood in the London
streets indicated a celebratory but worried nationalistic patriotism. In just ten short years, the
British position weakened to the point where the integration of openly ostentatious military
power demonstrations into public spectacles such as the Diamond Jubilee became a necessary
reflection of the new, costly, and primary focus of British policymaking. Against this backdrop
came the public juxtaposition of the two families of the world on public, ceremonial display: the
slowly declining British Empire and its rapidly ascending European challengers.
Queen Victoria’s Golden Jubilee of 1887 slowly came together as a largely perfunctory,
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even reluctant, affair. The aging Sovereign did not want to celebrate much of anything in her
mournful, latter-days somnolence. The impact of the Prince Consort’s death had never fully
abated in Victoria’s private world; she remained in deep emotional pain for the rest of her life.
Old age brought troublesome health in the form of painful rheumatism.26 She grew obese, and
she often behaved according to erratic moods. In her physically weakened and emotionally
unsteady state, public appearances became taxing, and she attended very few of them. That said,
the decrepitude of old age did not truly account for her withdrawal from public life; Prince
Albert’s death more than any other factor assured her general reclusiveness. Unsurprisingly,
Victoria all but dreaded her own Golden Jubilee, and it took some time to persuade her of the
merits of such an event.27 After all, a state occasion such as a Jubilee demanded much personal
attention. Numerous events for the Jubilee necessarily included delegations from the Empire,
Europe, and across Great Britain. Military celebrations traditionally accompanied any festivities
surrounding the Monarch, especially on state occasions. Perhaps most troubling of all, the
people expected to see their Queen. Nevertheless, Victoria’s personal reluctance aside, tradition
dictated that the fiftieth anniversary of the Sovereign’s Accession to the Throne merited a public
celebration, and on the 21st of June, 1887 Victoria received hers.28
On the day of Victoria’s official Jubilee celebrations in London, The Times published “A
Jubilee Retrospect.”29 The paper welcomed a day that became noteworthy for looking back in
time, not forward: “The long reigns of the Third Henry, the Third Edward, and the Third George,
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were all like that of Victoria, epochs of great and far-reaching transformations.”30 In making this
claim, the Times undoubtedly sought to place the entirety of the Victorian era alongside those of
the ancient, legitimizing past. As late as 1887, the British remained largely unrivaled in terms of
command of the sea, the reach of its empire, and in the scope of its economic advancements.
American and German industrialization, however, posed looming global economic challenges.
In addition, the British economy no longer grew at the breakaway pace as it did during the midVictorian era. Yet these factors still seemed far off in the distance during the mid-summer of
1887. After all, the entire world did not come to London to pay homage to the leader of an
utterly spent British Empire. Both the old lady and her Empire still had a great deal of life and
stubborn vitality left in them.
On the night before the grand London public events took place, June 20th, 1887, an
assortment of some fifty kings, queens, princes, highnesses, and other figures of royalty dined
with Victoria.31 No other nation on earth held the power to engender such symbolic obedience
towards a single figure. Moreover, Victoria’s matriarchal connections to so many European
blood relatives no doubt helped to bolster attendance. Victoria described the evening as “a large
family dinner.”32 This description curiously downplayed description for one of the more elite
family dinners in the history of the world. The dual homage paid to both the Queen and the
occasion, the marking of British collective accomplishments, repeated a week later during a
formal State Banquet that acted as a send-off for the foreign dignitaries.33 In the interim, the
public celebrations crowded the streets of London.
30
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In the late morning light of June 21, 1887, Queen Victoria left Buckingham Palace to
celebrate with her subjects an event the Times described as a moment of “righteous pride: a
ceremonial procession to Westminster Abbey for a Service of National Thanksgiving.”34
Victoria chose to wear a white bonnet, a symbolic nod from the ever-mournful Queen that she
was finally willing to embrace her public role in the Jubilee events fully.35 The Times captured
the scenes which unfolded on the London streets as affirmation of her decision to celebrate the
day in a spirit of optimism: “Hats were thrown up into the air, handkerchiefs were waved in
welcome, everybody vied with his neighbor in active demonstrations of loyalty and delight.”36
The recognition of public loyalty stands as especially noteworthy after Victoria’s many long
public absences.37 Republicanism became a source of growing popular, even political, influence
spurred-on in part by the Queen’s retreat from public duty. As a typical pamphlet on the aims of
Republicanism asserted: “The true Republican is peaceable and law-abiding: his mission is to
eliminate all that is evil from the institutions of his country, and substitute nothing but good in its
place.”38 So in some quarters the perception existed that the Crown did little for either the public
good or the public purse. In terms of public relations, the Golden Jubilee undermined such
claims. As an example of the careful public relations effort, but also the extent to which
negotiating the costs of Monarchy with publicly elected officials in Parliament remained a tricky
issue throughout Victoria’s long reign, the Queen contributed the lion’s share of the outlays for
the Jubilee.39 The total government expenditure on the Golden Jubilee amounted to £16,089; the
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Queen’s personal contribution totaled in excess of £50,000.40 Nothing, however, reinforced the
role of the Crown as an essential, functioning member of government and British life quite like
the symbolic appearance of Victoria at the center of the spectacle.
The orchestrated visuals of the Jubilee procession emphasized the Crown’s centrality by
magnifying Victoria’s status as a family matriarch and an imperial sovereign. The proceedings,
therefore, coalesced around Victoria as a personal celebrant in a larger imperial affair. To the
public, the imperial trappings of the event represented national successes, and the placement of
Victoria as the focus of the celebrations reinforced her part in the totality of nineteenth-century
British triumph. Specifically, the embodied symbolism of Victoria at the middle of the lengthy
parade mirrored the centrality of British involvement in far-reaching world affairs. She was the
national mother of the Mother Country. Britain managed from afar, yet it managed with central
authority. Signaling further parallels with the distant past, the Jubilee events allowed the British
Crown to lend publicly its symbolic imprimatur to British imperial policymaking—all
symbolized through Victoria as Regina Imperatrix—in a similar manner to how the Roman
Senate once transmitted its universal authority through the totemic standards born by the legions
and bearing the watchwords of power: “SPQR: the Senate and the People of Rome.”41 Thus, in
addition to providing a glittering, crowd-pleasing spectacle for patriotic Britons, the Jubilee
informed its observers, both at home and abroad, of the “roles” its participants played according
to their proximal hierarchical standing in relation to the centrally important British Crown.
Specifically, the organizational structure of the ceremonial itself reflected the symbolic hierarchy
of the contemporary powers dominating international matters in 1887; and Britain, as
40
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represented by the Crown, remained at the heart of most global affairs. Victoria’s extended
family played their supporting roles accordingly.
During the Jubilee procession, the Queen’s extended family remained at her side, earning
rapturous adulation from the crowds. As the Times specifically noted:
Surely no nobler sight has ever been witnessed than that of our Queen, accompanied by a
guard of honour composed solely of her kin by blood and her relations by marriage, and
yet representing half the royal families of Europe, as she made her progress through the
Abbey. The English people, who assembled literally in their millions to watch the
gorgeous scene from first to last, have certainly much cause for gratitude to those
illustrious guests of their Queen who have come to honour them and her by their presence
on this occasion of universal jubilee.42

The Times’ allusion to the “gratitude” of the English people, however, did not trump the largely
honorific role that the press, and presumably the flag-waving public, identified the foreign
dignitaries as playing. Victoria’s extended family of European crowned heads “guarded” her in
the sense that they took on a subservient role to her position and status during the Jubilee
ceremonies. While their secondary role in the ceremony submitted to the practices of tradition
and followed according to diplomatic orders of precedence, the nature of the occasion—a
powerful public acclimation of both the British Crown and the British Empire—meant that the
other crowned heads essentially yielded in deference to British standing and authority. The spirit
of deference also extended to Victoria’s subjects; those who came to pay her obedience in the
streets. Finally, it extended to her peoples in the realms across the seas; those subjects of the
Empire. The ceremony reinforced the unmistakable message communicated by all such
symbolic consecrations of regal authority: the notification that British power, authority, and
dignity emanated from the legitimacy of the Crown. Importantly, and unlike other more
localized British spectacles of royalty, the Golden Jubilee notified a global audience that the
42
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Victorian world order remained upon them. The rest of the world, however, already understood
this as reality, and they willingly participated in the show. In part, this willing participation
occurred because the rest of the world powers shared many of the same values as the Victorians,
and many of them sought to emulate those values on the world stage.
Shared values between late-Victorian British imperialists and like-minded aristocratic
imperialists in European nations aligned harmoniously in many ways before the rapid rise of
competing economic aims, and the subsequent rise of militarism, led to direct conflict. These
shared values included similar ideas about the ethnic superiority of the “Occident” over the
“Orient,” a common sense of destiny concerning the economic progress of industrialization, the
retention of varying forms of aristocratic governance in an age of revolution, and a commitment
to alliances through the loose connections of royal marriages and increasingly important political
arrangements. The participation of so many willing European heads of state in the Golden
Jubilee reaffirmed the state of international cooperation along the lines of these shared values.
Yet while these forms of cooperation as driven by values extended far enough to bring everyone
together for a Jubilee parade, other developing tensions quickly began to emerge, especially
between Great Britain and Germany. The Germans, emboldened by national unification and
growing economic vitality, saw themselves as emerging from the nineteenth century shaping
their own ascendant destiny. Indeed, the Germans became committed to the notion of a unique
Sonderweg.
The German Sonderweg, or “special path,” theoretically represents a kind of German
exceptionalism took hold in Germany following the leadership and influence of Bismarck.43 The
Sonderweg thesis, which remains deeply controversial among historians, holds in part that late-
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nineteenth-century German historians believed in a largely positive German destiny shaped by a
powerful constitutional monarchy that anticipated and instituted popular social reforms from
above.44 These special standards contrasted with the so-called “normalized” historical forces
which acted in other nation states, including Great Britain.45 These normalized forces reflected
traditional nation state models that behaved reactively to social pressures originating according
to popular demand “from below.”46 The German Sonderweg, on the other hand, saw the German
polity acting in a kind of universal accord designed to actualize a sense of national destiny
through a dedicated “top-down” approach. Today, historians hotly debate the implications of
whether or not German history hinges upon any “special path,” especially in light of the global
atrocities of the twentieth century and Germany’s critical role in the manifestation of those
events. Nevertheless, late nineteenth-century German historiography did not foresee that the
German “special path” as ultimately contributing to global catastrophe.47 Instead, the notion of a
uniquely positive national destiny paralleled the largely positive currents of German unification
and burgeoning economic industrialization. This is crucial, for as some influential historians
argue, the eventual atrocities associated with German economic rise and subsequent
militarization originated in the special sense of destiny which Kaiser Wilhelm II and his Court
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fully embraced as Weltpolitik following his accession in 1888.48 Accordingly, the slow decline
from Bismarckian stability to the horrors of the twentieth century, culminating through the
terrible genocide of the Holocaust, irreversibly inverted the German Sonderweg from a positive
to negative path.49
Setting aside the future implications of the Sonderweg inversion, German national action
in the 1890s flowed from the belief that a special positive path lay before the nascent German
nation, and that ascendant belief ultimately serves to explain why the Golden Jubilee of 1887
acted as the last symbolic gathering of the two families of the world during a time of harmonious
peace and broadly shared values. The Golden Jubilee also evidenced the last occasion in which
all parties recognized that the British Empire still unquestionably dominated world affairs.
Between the Golden Jubilee in 1887 and the Diamond Jubilee in 1897, German Sonderweg had
taken hold. Simultaneously, British decline continued to take shape. As a perhaps inevitable
reaction to these events, the Diamond Jubilee came to reflect the rapidly changing global
situation far more than mirroring the successful theme international harmony and accord present
during the 1887 events.
Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee far surpassed the Golden Jubilee in terms of scope and
scale, size and cost, effort, and execution. Some historians noted that for all the public relation
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successes of the Golden Jubilee, it actually underwhelmed in terms of execution for an event of
such magnitude. 50 No such issues afflicted the Diamond Jubilee. In fact, the Diamond Jubilee
procession to St. Paul’s Cathedral for a Service of Thanksgiving on June 22, 1897 remains one of
the largest spectacles ever seen in the city of London. Some 46,000 troops drawn from across
the armed services and the Empire escorted a Royal party of seventeen carriages through the
streets.51 Over a quarter million pounds were spent on decorations throughout the capitol.52
According to first-hand accounts, the decorations appeared “more lavish and in better taste than
they had ever been before.”53 Queen Victoria wrote in her diary that the event was “a never-tobe-forgotten day.”54 Andrew Carnegie, a notable spectator, commented to interested audiences
in America:
Certainly the world has never seen such a procession as that which traversed the streets of
London on the 22d day of June in commemoration of the blessings showered upon the
motherland under the reign of Queen Victoria…. Nor is the world likely to see anything
like this again. After viewing such a spectacle no one can question that our Englishspeaking race is the spreading, colonizing, conquering race of the world.55

Carnegie’s impression, full of jingoistic racism and complicated national pride, did not take into
account the full reality of the situation: the German-speaking peoples believed in a different
world order than the absolute supremacy of Anglo spheres of influence. Of course, neither the
English-speaking peoples nor Europeans cared much about the autonomy of those countries the
growing imperial competition subjugated. The challenge to power in the late-nineteenth century
remained a European affair. The Diamond Jubilee’s ambitious scale spoke to this fact. Indeed,
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the 1897 events directly confronted the challenges arising from the fluid European situation in
two ways: reassurance and defiance.
All convocations of empire ultimately seek to reassure the public as to the validity and
importance of imperial projects. Within the English polity, the Monarchy acted as a dignified
focal point around which the coalescence of reassuring and dignifying spectacles occurred.56
Unlike in 1887 when the public streamed onto the streets to celebrate a period of virtually
unrivalled British strength, the 1897 spectacles demanded a greater sense of dignified pomp and
ceremony to reinforce the idea that British imperial policymaking remained a workable source of
stability heading into the post-Victorian era. Through such displays imperial weaknesses could
be masked, at least theoretically. Ironically, such a role for the Diamond Jubilee came about
almost by happenstance. Queen Victoria, primarily for reasons of health, but also in the hopes of
avoiding her vexing grandson, Wilhelm II, became unwilling to entertain her extended family of
European royal relatives as she done in 1887.57 Victoria’s stubbornness provided Lord
Salisbury, then Prime Minister, and Joseph Chamberlin, then Colonial Secretary, the opportunity
to modify the structure of the events from the 1887 model of a celebratory family reunion and
move to redefine them as a true imperial spectacle of Britishness.58 As such, the imperial
dominions all acquired enhanced roles in the Diamond Jubilee, including as contributors to the
vast military contingent.59 The Diamond Jubilee, therefore, was deliberately designed to bolster
public awareness and appreciation for continued British investment in the Empire. In this way,
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the Diamond Jubilee reassured the public of imperial stability under the auspices of royal
dignity.
The other great purpose of the Diamond Jubilee centered on a defiant projection of
strength to competitor nations, especially Germany. To accomplish this goal, the planners
embraced a theme with a decidedly militaristic edge. As the Times explained: “Rain would have
marred the splendor of the military pageant, which had been made military not because the
glories of the Victorian era had been principally military, but because soldiery make a brave
show.”60 In reality, the brave show signaled a real concern that while the glories of the Victorian
era had not come from armed triumph, the security of the Empire going forward likely required
armed deterrence, even open conflict on a global scale. So, the grand procession this time saw
the sunlight glistening off of the breastplates and swords of tens of thousands of troops dedicated
to the task of defending the Empire. British policy mandarins paid careful attention to the
reaction of the German ruling class to the Jubilee displays, and the Times dutifully reproduced
what the Prussian newspaper of record, the Kreuz Zeitung, published:
England is the land which is most closely akin to us in civilization, morality, and
religion, and that we are to-day in the position of her opponent in many questions is
chiefly due to the fact that we are not yet strong enough … The present opposition
will continue until a compromise has been affected against which all the instincts of
our English cousins are to-day up in arms.61
The special correspondent reporting from Berlin noted that the German newspaper also admitted
the British imperial position remained largely impenetrable thanks to the strength of the Royal
Navy, and also that any attacks on India by German forces “are far easier to plan than to
execute.”62 The reporting demonstrates competing propaganda efforts in action. For the
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Germans, the message conveyed an ever-increasing desire for military strength and
confrontation. For the British, the reporting reflected the anxiety over the German challenge
while simultaneously justifying the show of force incorporated into the Diamond Jubilee events.
Moreover, while the troops in the streets certainly contributed to the projection of British
military might, everyone in the world knew where British military strength truly rested: the
combined firepower of the Royal Navy.
As an integral part of the history of the island nation, the Royal Navy traditionally
fulfilled both a defense and ceremonial role, and five days after the London procession came the
single most important ceremonial event of the late-Victorian period: the Jubilee Review of the
Fleet at Spithead.63 On June 27, 1897, the Royal Navy mustered a massive fleet for the Prince of
Wales, the future King Edward VII, to review in the name of the infirm and grounded Queen.64
Faithfully patriotic in its reporting of such events, the Times described the scene in gloating
detail:
The splendid panorama is all in perfect harmony, and one almost forgets the vast forces
which are latent in this peaceful assemblage of warships. The white ensign flies from 165
vessels, ranging from the torpedo-boat to the Majestic of nearly 15,000 tons. No smoke
shows from the forest of funnels; but on board 130 vessels only more than 914,000 horsepower can be brought into full play in a few hours. About 38,000 highly-trained officers
and men, with an organization the most complete that mankind has devised, are under the
orders of the Commander-in-Chief. Yet this unique naval display has not entailed the
withdrawal of a single ship from foreign stations, wither indeed two vessels have very
lately been despatched.65
The ships assembled in four long allées to give the Royal salute and face inspection (Fig. 3.1).66
Yet unlike the Jubilee events in London, the watery nature of the Spithead review did not allow
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for throngs of spectators to witness the naval review in person; the vast majority of the public
necessarily learned of the details through media sources. Nevertheless, the Spithead review
played an important propaganda role in terms of national reassurance. Even more importantly,
the strength of the British Navy, as acknowledged in the German newspapers, affirmed what the
British wanted to remind the world: no one challenged British naval supremacy with ease. The
lessons of British history informed this prideful naval policymaking. Dating back to 1588 and
the defeat of the Spanish Armada, and in some instances even before that, the Royal Navy
provided the essential line of defense against invasion67. By the late-Victorian era, the Royal
Navy had globalized that role to assure the security of the entire Empire. British power flowed
through the navy. The Spithead review served notice that the British intended to continue their
long tradition of maritime dominance, and that the navy remained virtually unassailable. Massed
British naval strength did not however stop Britons from casting their eyes towards Germany and
wondering: “would it all last?”
Concerns over British naval capacity to resist German and European shipbuilding
expansion regularly surfaced throughout the 1880s. These worries reached a fever pitch in the
summer of 1888 when fears over budget cuts to the Royal Navy prompted no less a figure than
Queen Victoria to question the Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, about the matter.68 Salisbury’s
government reversed course dramatically, instituting a series of recommendations brought
forward by a Parliamentary committee headed by the First Lord of the Admiralty and tasked with
reviewing British naval capabilities.69 Britain began a five-year building program which funded
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the construction of ten battleships, forty-two cruisers, and eighteen torpedo boats.70 According

Fig. 3.1. Plan Showing the Berths of the Men-of-War and the Track for Yachts at the Jubilee Naval Review
on June 26, The Times, 1897.71

to one naval historian, this program resulted in not only a massively upgraded navy but a new
national defense policy:
For the first time government officials laid out a standard against which their efforts, and
those of future governments, could be judged. In the process they also created a
compressed, shorthand means of measuring sea power that eventually figured
prominently in all naval debates and disputes in the run-up to the First World War.72
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Power Standard.”73 The justification for the cost of such a standard relied upon the idea that no
other country dared challenge British naval supremacy if the Royal Navy maintained strength
greater than its next two largest rivals. Britain acted to position that strength strategically around
the world. This owed to both the far-flung nature of the Empire’s colonial possessions and the
vast ocean tracts dominated by British-controlled shipping. A map showing the trade routes of
the British Empire in the year 1886 demonstrates the extent of the commercial reach of the
Empire (Fig. 3.2). In the map, British shipping lanes are depicted spider webbing across the
globe, connecting distant outposts of the British Empire to key trading cities. At the foot of the
map rests images of the various “native” peoples in service to the Empire, and many of their
homelands are reduced to serving as nothing more than outposts for the commercial arms of the
vast British imperial economy.
Whereas all roads once led to Rome, in the British Empire all shipping lanes eventually
led back to the Mother Country. In order to secure these commercial interests, the British based
their navy in deep-water ports located throughout the various regions operating under British
influence. As one historian pointed out: “By her possession of an enormous colonial empire,
Britain enjoyed the strategical benefits of the most important collection of naval bases
throughout the world: ‘Five strategic keys lock up the globe!’, gloated Admiral Fisher, and they
(Dover, Gibraltar, the Cape, Alexandria, Singapore) were all in British hands.”74 From these
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regional security hubs, the Royal Navy effectively ruled the waves.
By the late nineteenth century, the Royal Navy rotated roughly ten first-line battleships to
the Mediterranean Fleet, three to the Far East, and individual battleships to the Cape and
American squadron, all supplemented by numerous other battle-worthy ships of varying
capability spread across the globe.75 Additionally, the Royal Navy operated a Channel Fleet
based at Gibraltar which comprised some eight first-line battle ships as well as a Reserve Fleet of
some eleven second-class battleships which patrolled the North Sea.76 As the Times noted, none

Fig. 3.2 J.C.R. Colomb, Imperial Federation Map of the World Showing the Extent of the British Empire in 1886,
1886, The Boston Public Library.77
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of the global navy assets required reassignment for the Diamond Jubilee Naval Review.78
In order to maintain these extensive commitments and operate according to the TwoPower Standard, British naval expenditure remained on an upward trajectory throughout the lateVictorian era. From 1885 to 1896, naval expenditures soared from roughly 13% of the entire
national budget to 19%.79 These increases in costs mirrored the growth in size of the surface
fleet, which effectively doubled in terms of tonnage from 1880 to 1900 (see Fig. 3.3). With
Warship Tonnage of the Great Powers, 1880-1914
1880
1890
1900
1910
Britain
650,000 679,000 1,065,000 2,174,000
France
271,000 319,000 499,000
725,000
Russia
200,000 180,000 383,000
401,000
USA
169,000 240,000 333,000
824,000
Italy
100,000 242,000 245,000
327,000
Germany
88,000 190,000 285,000
964,000
Austria60,000 66,000 87,000
210,000
Hungary
Japan
15,000 41,000 187,000
496,000

1914
2,714,000
900,000
679,000
985,000
498,000
1,305,000
372,000
700,000

Fig. 3.3 Warship Tonnage of the Great Powers, 1880-191480

these investments, the British maintained the ability to influence global affairs through naval
deterrence.81 Lingering doubts, however, remained firmly implanted in the British bureaucratic
psyche about various military shortcomings previously exposed during the Crimean War.82
Allaying these concerns provided yet another reason for Whitehall to spend liberally on farreaching military capabilities. Yet such investments exacerbated the paradox of heavy spending
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designed to secure a less-profitable empire.83 Also, the deterrent logic of the Two-Power
Standard and the strategic placement of British naval forces around the globe did not stop other
nations, especially the Germans, from launching their own shipbuilding programs. So began a
costly, and ultimately deadly, arms race in spite of all the far-reaching naval policies the British
put in place.
The defiant choice to face-down the rising German threat had its coming out party at the
Diamond Jubilee Naval Review. The message sent by the Admiralty was unmistakable: anyone
wishing to challenge the British Empire had to go through the most powerful fleet assembled in
human history. Implicit in the message, a dare: “good luck!” Such defiance, however, came
with tremendous costs that extended beyond the financial. The rising militancy ended the “Pax
Britannica” for all time; the peace and stability of the British era increasingly gave way to the
spectre of confrontation. Fittingly, the last major event of the Diamond Jubilee ended on a
triumphantly discordant note: the endless rows of battleships all lined up in symbolic, ominous
defiance towards the nation led by the Queen’s grandson. Thus the Jubilee decade ended not in
the grand triumph of Victorian ideals but in their failure.
What started as a happy, golden family reunion in 1887 gave way to an imperial
proclamation of feuding defiance in 1897. The planners of the Diamond Jubilee intended it as a
defining spectacle of the Victorian Century. It did not, however, celebrate any of the true virtues
of the era as the Great Exhibition of 1851 managed to do.84 By making a triumphalist
declaration of military might, the British effectively abandoned those ideals which made the rise
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of the Victorian world order possible. The establishment of the British Empire provided, for
good or ill, a dominating force in world affairs. At its best, it provided a period of political
stability, economic expansion, religious conviction, and moral order. At its worst, it excluded
minorities from the political process, built economic expansion on the backs of the working poor
and non-whites, failed to respect the beliefs and values of other cultures, and enforced draconian
moral restrictions on societies everywhere. Nevertheless, the mid-Victorian era, for all its faults,
managed to usher in a period of unusual peace and prosperity around much of the world. The
late Victorians saw challenges to these ideals. Rather than rise to those challenges by following
the path of cooperative peace and economic inclusion that brought about the high-idealism on
display in the Great Exhibition, the late Victorians abandoned those principles and confronted
rising nations as emergent threats.
Whether or not British policymakers had any choice but to react in an aggressive manner
in the face of German militancy remains a hotly debated point of contention among historians.
Regardless, the divorce of nations happened, and the international differences on display
between the Golden Jubilee and the Diamond Jubilee provide historians with landmark events to
trace the break. What came next did not arrive in the form of glorious remembrances of past
accomplishments. The coming convocations of empire centered on the dedication of war
memorials and cemeteries. They would be funerals of tragedy, not triumphs of peace and
prosperity. For Great Britain, the slow demise of empire had begun.
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Chapter Four:
After the Flood:
Public War Memorials and Postwar Memory in Modern Britain
Writing in Brideshead Revisited, Evelyn Waugh articulated a problem that many of his
readers in postwar Britain undoubtedly wondered: “where can we hide in fair weather, we
orphans of the storm?” 1 From 1914 to 1918, and again from 1939 to 1945, Britons endured the
horrors of total war. The interwar and postwar years did little to lessen the tragedies reaped by
the twin whirlwinds of conflict. Soldiers returned with shellshock; an entire generation fell in
the bloody trenches; the “Blitz” reduced parts of London to rubble; the imperial economy
deteriorated; austerity caused localized economic strain for many households. These myriad
problems lingered throughout the years of shaky peace which preceded and followed the two
conflicts. The wars also irreversibly damaged the arrangement of a global empire nurtured and
maintained by Great Britain for over a century. The eventual emergence of the United States and
Soviet Russia as new global superpowers assured the end of British imperial ambition. In sum,
the cumulative effects of the World Wars acted not so much as a turning point in British history,
but as a shatter point. Reflecting the demise of British global authority, Britons no longer rallied,
as they had done so many times before, to celebrate the pomp and circumstance associated with
imperial power.
Throughout the years of Britain’s imperial ascent, major national spectacles retained a
largely affirmative air about them. The Great Exhibition of 1851 signaled the twin rise of
industrial modernity in Britain and British leadership around the globe, while the Jubilees of
Victoria affirmed British commitment towards remaining the hegemonic masters of international
affairs. With these events, British government officials basked in their ability to inspire mass
1
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celebrations which encompassed Britons and British subjects from all walks of life.
Furthermore, Whitehall mandarins succeeded in using imperial spectacles to promote various
propaganda ends, both at home and abroad. Propaganda successes associated with these events
allowed British citizens to see them as comforting measures of security and progress, while
competitor nations correctly interpreted national celebrations as displays of British industrial and
military might. These precedents, however, poorly suited the postwar realities that came about
after 1918 and 1945. After all, what was left to celebrate? Instead, Britons forged a new kind of
public response to the tragedy of the wars: old models of government-led national celebrations of
British imperial glory gave way to communities of mourners commemorating the tragedies of
war in solemn occasions, both on national and local levels.
Interwar and postwar commemoration events more carefully reflected the new mood of
their public participants. This transition did not come about as a result of any preemptory
anticipation by the government; rather, thanks to public repossession of key elements of
commemoration events, often most clearly visible in small towns.2 Spontaneous public
responses during national events also reflected the clear shift from attendees as celebrants to
mourners. For example, during the national commemorations following the end of the First
World War, those who came to pay their respects began unexpectedly to lay wreaths and
mementos at the base of a temporary memorial erected in Whitehall.3 In response to the
unexpected outpouring of grief that took place at this temporary monument, the government
commissioned a permanent replacement.4 The significance of this example, and others like it,
2
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offers a clear juxtaposition of how spectacles of empire came to function in the postwar
environment versus their previous incarnations. While propagandistic notions of service and
duty remained core to official efforts at commemoration, these values did not necessarily conflict
with the fact that where spectacles once transmitted to the public messages of imperial
validation, postwar gatherings now inverted the model. The new national mood born out of the
horrors of global conflict still respected concepts of national pride, but it held almost no place for
blatant imperial nostalgia. Instead, public reaction during occasions of interwar and postwar war
commemorations reflected new sets of values and priorities, with the national opinion
increasingly interested in replacing the old imperial war footing with renewed efforts at peace,
reconstruction, and social security. Symbolizing this shift, the national commemorations
surrounding the Cenotaph and Tomb of the Unknown Warrior in London, as well as the local
events which dedicated war memorials in towns all across Great Britain, indicated the new kind
of solemn public mourning for war casualties, but also a poignant, symbolic closing to the
bygone days of actively celebrating imperial glories no longer relevant to the new postwar
reality.
The First World War utterly demolished any remaining vestiges of the Victorian world’s
Pax Britannica, as nearly an entire generation of young British men experienced the protracted
slaughter on the Western Front.5 Once there, No Man’s Land consumed them. One British
military chaplain, Rev. C. Lomax, C.F., offered a typical firsthand account of the Western Front
experience:
Last time over the bags was rather terrible. The few who managed to pull themselves out
of the waist deep mud had to stand on the top & pull others who were stuck out of the
5

J.M. Winter, “Britain’s ‘Lost Generation’ of the First World War,” Population Studies 31, no. 3 (1977), 450.
Winter points out that “roughly 58 percent of all Scotsmen, Welshmen, and Englishmen aged 15-49 in 1911 served
in the war.” He adds that while Irish participation was not as widespread, some 15 percent of the Irish population
also served.

65

trenches. Imagine doing that with machine guns hard at work, to say nothing of snipers.
One man I know of was drowned in the mud. Another was only extricated by eight men.
Naturally no supports or rations could come up, & after gaining their objective in some
cases, in others being thrown down at once they had to retire. I have had to make this
trench too wide.6
Up and down the Front, the experience Lomax described remained remarkably consistent. One
historian writing about the Flanders Campaign referred the Western Front as a graveyard where
“each shell-hole with blood on its water usually meant another corpse entombed below.”7 Each
time the boys went “over the top,” they flung themselves onto muddy flats stung with barbed
wire. The ones that survived the machine guns and the exploding shells sometimes contended
with the fog of poison gas. Those who improbably made it to the other side impaled themselves
on the steel of sharpened bayonets. This destructive process repeated over and over for four
long, bloody years. According to one statistical analysis, one in eight soldiers were killed, one in
four were wounded, and some forty percent of those “at risk” to experience combat suffered
casualties.8 Entire strategic campaigns effectively turned into large scale exercises in meat
grinding as the exposed flesh of the foot soldier met the industrial human shredder that was
modern, post-industrialization warfare. Ezra Pound summed the situation up succinctly: "Died
some, pro patria, non dulce non et decor.”9 At least the earthworms flourished.
The torments that met the soldiers in the trenches did not remain solely in No Man’s
Land. The front sucked dry supplies and forced soldiers into absurd living conditions away from
the trenches. Even French soldiers fighting on their home soil got little relief from the war
strain. One French officer recounted the struggle of living and serving through the war:
6
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One of our huts [away from the front lines], the one occupied by the second half platoon,
had collapsed … The rains had gradually eroded the soil of the small slope … Under a
heap of tangled beams, branches, and clods of mud, the wounded groaned and cried for
help.… It was already too late to save all our comrades.… My good friend F. was among
the dead.… In the afternoon we buried the pathetic victims of this absurd accident. I
realized that they too, in their fashion, had fallen in the field of honor. Still, I would have
felt less grief if they had succumbed to the enemy.10
In Britain, meanwhile, the home front also saw the strain, and those that survived dealt with the
aftermath of injuries, both physical and mental. War wounds came in many gruesome forms:
amputated limbs, blindness, burns, lung damage, and disfigurements. In short, many survivors
suffered from the entirely predictable damage done to the human body by bullets, shrapnel,
barbed wire, and poison gas. Others returned in poor health thanks to the generally unsanitary
conditions of the trenches, the poor facilities available at field hospitals, and the spread of
diseases among the men. Everything from a massive influenza outbreak to venereal disease hit
the ranks.11 In addition to these common afflictions of the body, many troops carried home with
them lingering afflictions of the mind. Shell-shock, now more commonly understood as an
extreme form of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, remained a silent debilitation for some war
survivors for the rest of their lives.12 These conditions strained reintegration for many of those
coming home to near breaking points.
Virginia Woolf famously raised public awareness of the troubles facing returning
serviceman in Mrs. Dalloway. One of the novels primary characters, Septimus Warren Smith,
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comes home from the Western Front suffering from shell shock. Woolf describes his journey as
one of patriotic hope obliterated by war: “[Septimus] went to France to save an England which
consisted almost entirely of Shakespeare’s plays and Miss Isabel Pole in a green dress walking in
a square.”13 In this sense, the character of Septimus Warren Smith mirrored the real-to-life
memories of many in Britain who grew up celebrating a heavily romanticized conceptualization
of a Royal and Merry Olde England. Robert Graves, one of the scholarly and literary titans of
his era, later reflected in his autobiography that his two earliest childhood memories came from
watching Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee procession in the streets of Cambridge and
discovering his family’s Shakespeare collection.14 Graves’ own romanticization of this forgotten
Britain later succumbed to the strain of postwar disillusionment. Woolf’s character of Septimus,
the pre-war embodiment of the glories of Britain past, so similar in design to Graves and
countless others in real life, came home transformed into a man: “aged about thirty, pale-faced,
beak-nosed, wearing brown shoes and a shabby overcoat, with hazel eyes which had that look of
apprehension in them which makes complete strangers apprehensive too. The world had raised
its whip; where will it descend.”15 To Woolf, Septimus embodied a new class of everyman
populating postwar Britain: the living victims of a lovely war gone wrong. Whereas the war
dead held a special place in the national memory as patriots who died pro patria, First World
War survivors simply did not fit the traditional narrative of returning conquerors. Instead, the
returning troops all too often were stigmatized as the insane survivors of an insane conflict, with
many of them being treated as such by medical authorities.16 Using Woolf’s Septimus as a
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literary metaphor for the postwar reality of survival, one scholar explains: “In war, Septimus
Smith became a military automaton; in peace, he must be secluded as a lunatic.”17 The longstanding narrative of empire, the idea that “England expects that every man will do his duty,”
was undermined by the return of so many irreparably damaged survivors.18 The survivors
became living reminders of horrors the nation could not forget.
Another kind of survivor populated Britain after the conflicts ended: the widows and
widowers of war. These survivors found company with those mothers and fathers who lost
children to the battlefield, as well as those who lost friends and other loved ones. Perhaps no one
expressed the perpetual grief of such losses better than Vera Brittain, a volunteer nurse who lost
two close friends, her fiancé, and her brother to the trenches.19 Writing to her brother Edward
shortly after her fiancé lost his life, Brittain lamented:
In my mind I have lived through his death so many times that now it has really happened
it seems scarcely any different from the many other occasions in which the only
difference was that it was not an actual fact. In fact I don’t believe even now that I have
felt such an utter desperation of renouncement as I did the first time he went to the front.
I think my subconscious must have told me then that I should not have him for long, in
spite of my apparent belief, originated I suppose by my wish, that I should.…20
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Such comments reflect the uncertainty of war at its worst. These expressions, however, also
signal the unbearable quality of loss, that ineffable yet inevitable sense that war obliterates not
just corporeal existence but the possibilities associated with living in future times. The returning
sufferers of the conflicts, the widows and widowers, bereft friends and relatives, neighbors, and
co-workers all became a collective of uncoffined survivors.21 These survivors dealt not just with
death but with an end to shared experiences—past, present, and potentially of the future—which
were particular to those who had died. Against this horrifying new backdrop of living with the
consequences of total war, the British nation began the painful process of coming to grips with a
new national memory closely associated with absence and loss.
The new collective memory that came to the fore in the postwar environment also
contended with the coming of what Robert Graves, that key chronicler of the age, termed the
“Two Britains.”22 According to Graves, “the two Britains were: the Fighting Forces, meaning
literally the soldiers and sailors who had fought, as opposed to garrison and line-ofcommunication troops, and the Rest, including the Government.”23 Graves’ contention expanded
beyond the simple distinctions of war survivorship. To Graves, the Two Britains suffered a
fundamental breakdown in trust and understanding, with the most of the blame residing with the
“Rest”:
In the end, the disasters of war taught them [the Fighting Forces] a gradual disgust for the
‘muddle-through’ politicians who spoke in the name of Britain; bitter anger against the
General Staff, who from safe billets behind the Line condemned hundreds of thousands
of men to useless butchery; and a contempt, mixed with envy, for all fit males of military
age, even technicians in key-industries, who had escaped their share of front-line
service.24
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Such pronouncements described a soured mood between the servants of the Empire and the
masters of war. The firsthand experience of war meant that its weary participants no longer
valued the vainglorious praise ascribed by the “Rest” to the system of imperial warfare,
especially while the old war masters persisted in their hold on the levers of governmental power
and worked tirelessly to maintain class-rigid cultural authority. The imperial pomp and
pageantry so often a source of national celebration in British history held no place in the
collective imagination of those who had lived in the mud, nor did the endless political
gamesmanship presented by the Rest as a series of propaganda guises with the intent to lionize
the victorious dead not as fallen individuals but as self-sacrificing servants of the state.
Before he lost his own life, Vera Brittain’s fiancé, Roland Leighton, had written to her in an
attempt to explain the new wartime reality from the perspective of the “Fighting Forces”:
Let him who thinks War is a glorious golden thing, who loves to roll forth stirring words
of exhortation, invoking Honour and Praise and Valour and Love of Country with as
thoughtless and fervid a faith as inspired the priests of Baal to call on their own
slumbering deity, let him look at a little pile of sodden grey rags that cover half a skull
and a shin bone and what might have been Its ribs, or at this skeleton lying on its side,
resting half crouching as it fell, supported on one arm, perfect but that it is headless, and
with the tattered clothing still draped around it; and let him realize how grand & glorious
a thing it is to have distilled all Youth and Joy and Life into a foetid heap of hideous
putrescence. Who is there who has known & seen who can say that Victory is worth the
death of even one of these?25
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Thus with the new attitude of disillusioned service prevalent amongst the ranks of the “Fighting
Forces,” any efforts to commemorate the war experience necessarily took on a dual purpose: the
praising of service to the nation—a traditional requirement of the old guard—without insulting
the terrible sense of loss and betrayal felt by so many different kinds of survivors. Yet even as
Graves’ representatives of the Two Britains, along with other war survivors, struggled to find an
equitable balance along these lines, the postwar commemoration process, by virtue of public
participation, ultimately lessened the burden of survivorship while simultaneously enshrining a
new set of loss-driven war memories into British history. Moreover, this enshrinement served to
signal the start of post-imperial British history.
In many ways, the process of establishing a new post-imperial national memory in the
aftermath of the First World War came about as the result of communities and organizations all
across Britain constructing war memorials. The Imperial War Museum estimates that some
100,000 war memorials exist in the United Kingdom today, with the cumulative total
representing conflicts throughout history.26 The Imperial War Museum defines war memorials
thus: “We consider a war memorial to be any tangible object which has been erected or dedicated
to commemorate those killed as a result of war, conflict or peacekeeping; who served in war or
conflict; or who died whilst engaged in military service.”27 This post-hoc definition undoubtedly
reflects the sheer number of war memorials in existence in addition to the fact that many
memorials feature individual designs complimented by stand-alone features. With such a broad
meaning, it became clear in the postwar aftermath that war memorials did not stand simply to
throughout the duration of the war. Only as the devastating postwar reality of loss began to sink in did attitudes start
to shift in any substantial fashion in Britain.
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mourn the dead; rather, their broader purpose also included memorializing all those who served.
In this way, the historical tradition of propagandizing national service as a form of noble patriotic
sacrifice remained a viable part of the new postwar reality. As one historian comments: “[war
memorials] are monuments of mourning, not of triumph: all of them, even those of the victors,
depict the [First World War] as a tragedy, rather than—as is often the case with the Second
World War—a triumphant crusade. They emphasize sacrifice rather than achievement.”28 Yet
these propagandizing efforts, as surely any monument or gathering which served the dual
function of memorial and patriotic beacon represented, often underwent a kind of public
reappropriation from any original intent by the “Rest” to focus on war’s glory or national
sacrifice.
The public need for reframing the traditional conceptualizations of the war became
evident in a number of ways. An exhibition in the summer of 1919 at the Victoria and Albert
Museum on war memorials demonstrated the ill-fitting characteristics of many traditional models
of war against contemporary developments.29 The exhibition reflected on the nature of
memorials throughout history; however, its ultimate relevancy likely served to do little other than
to reassure those uncritical persons comforted by the familiar security of tradition, while
demonstrating to many others the utter uselessness of tradition in the face of a conflict as
devastating as the First World War.30 As one historian put it: “a roll of Honour suitable for a
public school; a memorial window for Gresham’s School in Norfolk; another window, ‘The
Sacrifice of Motherhood’, designed for a mothers’ war memorial; endless St Georges and
soldier-saints and enameled angels—how could one relate those images to the dead at Bourlon
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Wood and Sedd-el-Bahr?"31 Considering the myriad forms of grieving and survivorship present
in postwar Britain, no single national monument, or even other traditional memorials, sufficed to
satisfy postwar commemoration, and those monuments that did focus national attention often
reflected a new understated simplicity in their form and structure. In particular, the Whitehall
Cenotaph, and its unique association with the Tomb of the Unknown Warrior in Westminster
Abbey, best exemplified the public desire for a new kind of sensitivity for national war
commemoration.
The Cenotaph remains to this day a permanent relic of a solemn victory parade held on
July 19, 1919 in Central London to celebrate the end of war. The Times of London explained the
event as a “triumph … not to be compared with any of the great military triumphs of history.”32
The Times continued:
In the midst of life we are in death—the words had a new meaning for us as we watched
the living victors march by—and our rejoicing would have been like the laughter of fools
if we had not remembered in the midst of it those who have died so that we may rejoice.33

Considering the somber backdrop for the occasion, the victory parade only resembled the
previous military processions through the streets of London in terms of its basic ceremonial
aspects: soldiers marched, bands played, and the troops received a Royal Salute.34 Instead, the
focal point of the entire event unexpectedly became a temporary structure in the form of a
Cenotaph in Whitehall (Fig. 4.1). Designed by Sir Edwin Lutyens, the original Cenotaph
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35

Fig 4.1. The Cenotaph in Whitehall, London, 1920.

Monument, literally representing an empty tomb, was made of wood and plaster.36 The
government intended for the parade itself, and the staging area for the Royal Salute, to receive
the majority of attention from the crowds on the day of the parade.37 As the event unfolded,
however, Lutyens’ Cenotaph quickly captured the public’s attention. As reported in Dundee’s
Evening Telegraph: “The saluting at this memorial and the paying of reverent tribute by the
crowds thrilled the vast crowds of spectators, and Londoners and visitors have taken to heart the
lesson of this temporary monument.”38 Within the first hour of the Victory Parade, people began
waiting in long lines to pile wreaths at the base of the Cenotaph in anticipation of some 15,000
troops marching past to give the salute later in the day.39 The newspaper of record
acknowledged the gravitation of the viewing public towards the Cenotaph: “The new Cenotaph
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erected in Whitehall to the memory of “the glorious dead” was the centre of what was perhaps
the principal, as it was certainly the most moving, portion of Saturday’s triumphal procession.”40
The Evening Telegraph confirmed this sentiment:
The popular feeling seems to be that London’s permanent memorial should be simple and
accessible, and that it should be a shrine round which poor and rich should meet to pay
tribute “to the glorious dead.” The simple pillar at Whitehall for the time at least has
dissipated ideas of costly and ornate erections, which would become mere show places or
be kept closed to the many.41
The mass appeal of the Cenotaph meant that unlike previous major national ceremonies, the
choreography of a national convocation succumbed to an unpredictable public response. While
government planners for the Great Exhibition openly sought mass public attendance, and
cheering crowds gave added enthusiasm to the military glamour of Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee,
the unexpected public fixation with the Cenotaph signaled a popular yearning for a different kind
of convocation experience for Britons.
The public approval of the temporary Cenotaph structure continued after the parade, with
many people writing to the government, including Lutyens himself, in the hopes that the
monument might become a Whitehall fixture.42 Under pressure, the Cabinet decided to bow to
the wishes of the public, approving plans for a permanent stone replica to appear in essentially
the same fashion and location as the temporary Cenotaph had on the day of the parade.43 The
government wisely took into consideration Lutyens’ input on the project going forward,
deferring to his judgment on several occasions, with the result showing a great deal of similarity
40
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between the temporary Cenotaph design and its permanent replacement.44 While a good deal of
newspaper attention focused on the appeal of the Cenotaph resting with the straightforward and
largely simple features present on the monument, including the inscribed words “The Glorious
Dead,” the defining characteristic of the temporary monument remained its symbolic depiction
of an empty tomb. Moreover, while public response to the monument certainly respected its
patriotic inscription, it seems clear that the symbolism of an empty tomb captured the collective
sense of loss associated with the First World War better than any of the other organized aspects
of the victory parade. This fact represented a sea change in public attitude from the scenes
witnessed on the streets during Victoria’s Jubilees. The stark contrast between the militaristic
fervor that greeted the grand imperial celebrations of 1887 and 1897, during which Britain
demonstrated its presumption of continuing dominance, and the somber coalescing around a
simple monument to the dead sons and daughters lost in the vain competition between empires
exemplifies the difference between pre-war and post-war British reality. What was left to
celebrate about after such devastating, even hollow, victories?

Nevertheless, features of the

1919 victory parade ostensibly demonstrated more straightforward and predictable
representations of patriotism: troops on parade, the King taking the salute, fireworks in the
evening.45 The show must go on.
The visual impact of an empty tomb presented a more complicated narrative as the focal
point for a postwar celebration. Lutyens and government officials eventually embraced the
symbolic incongruity. Recognizing that the monument appealed to new postwar public
memories overwhelmingly associated with loss better than the pomp and circumstance of a
44
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lovely parade, the somber rededication ceremony of the permanent Cenotaph monument on
Armistice Day (November 11) the following year better reflected the dual symbolism of a
monument dedicated to both glory and loss. After all, elected government officials seldom resist
shifting public opinion on popular causes. Acutely sensitive to public pressure, government
officials reluctantly began to consider the rededication ceremony of the Cenotaph as a vehicle for
satisfying the unanticipated desire for a new kind of people’s war memorial.
Once it became clear that a permanent monument would help to satisfy the public
response an unveiling by the King of the permanent memorial seemed inevitable; however, an
unexpected push by the Dean of Westminster Abbey complicated matters for government
planners of the Cenotaph project. The Dean proposed the exhumation of the body of an
unknown soldier from the battlefields in France, the honorable return of that body to Britain, and
the subsequent burial of the unknown soldier in Westminster Abbey as a way of permanently
memorializing the First World War in the Abbey.46 Government ministers objected that the
Dean’s plans faced two crucial challenges: “It’s too late” (i.e. not enough time to plan the
memorial) and “that it is sensational.”47 The same officials overcame these objections by
combining the Dean of Westminster’s plan with the preexisting plans for the Cenotaph unveiling
and by acknowledging that “any appeal to national sentiment is subject to this charge
[sensationalism].”48 Even more shrewdly, the Cabinet decided that combining the Cenotaph
unveiling with the burial of the unknown “warrior”—the term decided on by the Cabinet so as to
not favor any one service branch of the military over the other—held the following additional
benefits:
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The advantages would be that it would generally be acceptable to the people; that it
would do honour to the great class of fighting men; that it would furnish a Memorial to
them in Westminster Abbey, without signaling out for such distinction any one known
man. At present Westminster Abbey has no memorial of the Great War.49
Thus, the government found a way to comfortably propagandize their response to public pressure
surrounding the Cenotaph with a ceremony designed to appeal to the new national mood for
memorialization while simultaneously reinforcing the preexisting narrative of patriotic sacrifice
in the name of the state.50 Yet this partial patriotic reclamation of the public sphere away from
the mourning public remained an act of acquiescence by government officials to new public
demands; the 1920 Armistice Day events stayed centrally focused on remembering the costs of
imperial conflict, not on justifying them.
Before the funeral of the Unknown Warrior, the coffin bearing the anonymous soldier’s
remains first paused along the parade route to the Abbey for the unveiling of the permanent
Cenotaph monument.51 In the middle of Whitehall stood the new monument, an empty tomb
symbolically ready to hold the bodies of those that had fallen on foreign lands, side by side with
a coffin holding an unidentified British soldier who had come home for burial among the
revered. In this ceremony, the anonymous merited the postwar national focus, not an otherwise
identifiable person whose deeds of heroic valor reserved their own marble plinth. The King, an
honor guard of one hundred recipients of the Victoria Cross, and countless mourners lining the
streets saluted the scene together.52 Afterwards, the mourners stayed behind, waiting in
Whitehall for coffins to bring home their own forgotten sons, while the leaders of the nation
49
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went off to the Abbey to salvage some semblance of heroic honor from a largely dishonorable
war.
The gravestone of the Unknown Warrior describes the soldier as simply “A British
Warrior Unknown By Name Or Rank Brought From France (Fig 4.2).”53 The effort to bring an
unknown soldier to Westminster Abbey for burial among the kings ostensibly served to make

Fig. 4.2. The Tomb of the Unknown Warrior, Westminster Abbey, London, U.K., 1920.54

BENEATH THIS STONE RESTS THE BODY
OF A BRITISH WARRIOR
UNKNOWN BY NAME OR RANK
BROUGHT FROM FRANCE TO LIE AMONG
THE MOST ILLUSTRIOUS OF THE LAND
AND BURIED HERE ON ARMISTICE DAY
11 NOV: 1920, IN THE PRESENCE OF
HIS MAJESTY KING GEORGE V
HIS MINISTERS OF STATE
THE CHIEFS OF HIS FORCES
AND A VAST CONCOURSE OF THE NATION
THUS ARE COMMEMORATED THE MANY
MULTITUDES WHO DURING THE GREAT
WAR OF 1914-1918 GAVE THE MOST THAT
MAN CAN GIVE LIFE ITSELF
FOR GOD
FOR KING AND COUNTRY
53
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FOR LOVED ONES HOME AND EMPIRE
FOR THE SACRED CAUSE OF JUSTICE AND
THE FREEDOM OF THE WORLD
THEY BURIED HIM AMONG THE KINGS BECAUSE HE
HAD DONE GOOD TOWARD GOD AND TOWARD
HIS HOUSE

equal the sacrifice of all the sons of Britain. As the Times reported: “The unknown were those
who died far out, holding some desperate outpost against hopeless odds … somewhere where no
comrades or stretcher-bearers could reach them nor burial parties do their work.”55 The return of
one of those bodies afforded the opportunity to sing “Abide with Me” and say prayers for one of
those unknown losses.56 More cynically, one cultural historian suggests that “one inhibition on
the truth … was the British tendency towards heroic grandiosity about all their wars.… It is
significant that what the Americans call “The Unknown Soldier” the British elevate to “The
Unknown Warrior.”57 Such elevation, however, belies the fact that no single funeral, even one
as brilliantly contrived as a piece of justificatory propaganda as the funeral for the Unknown
Warrior, could mask the vast devastation of the conflict that preceded it. The anonymity
associated with the “Unknown Warrior” remained a concession to the needs of mourners;
otherwise, any old war hero would have sufficed. The elevation of an ordinary soldier to a place
of such rare national honor mattered symbolically on multiple levels, especially insofar as it
further reflected a new weariness for the kinds of “heroic grandiosity” responsible for the
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millions left dead on the battlefield.58 The ceremony allowed for the nation to mourn together
for fallen, ordinary soldiers, not to celebrate the empty causes of imperial warfare. Certainly,
patriotic language infused the ritual, but the structure of the ceremony, so different than in
antecedent events such as the Jubilees of Victoria, reflected a fundamental shift in British public
attitude towards the project of defending the Empire. If the unveiling of a permanent Cenotaph
and the burial of the Unknown Warrior signified a turning away from the old triumphalism of
public convocations and towards a new kind of remembrance for the past, the replication of these
grand national spectacles on a smaller level in towns all across Britain reinforced the transition.
In nearly every town and village across Britain, communities set aside public space for
war memorials.59 The pervasive nature of the postwar memorialization movement reflected the
truly national shift in attitude regarding remembrance that the London memorial ceremonies
displayed. Each local memorial effort came about as the result of community actors doing the
sort of work that all development projects require: securing space, raising funds, garnering
political support, forging consensus on a design. In short, communities worked together in order
to participate in the shared experience of postwar remembrance, though each community
necessarily differed in approach according to the particular needs and aspirations of locals.60 A
good example of this community effort comes out of the Cambridge war memorial movement.
The Lord Lieutenant of Cambridgeshire encouraged the mayor of Cambridge to form a
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committee with representatives from the broader county as well as the Isle of Ely.61 The
establishment of a cooperative effort at the start of the planning process undoubtedly encouraged
the kind of lateral, or “bottom-up,” public input initially absent from the “top-down”
commemoration efforts planned in London by high-ranking government officials. Reflective of
this spirit of wide involvement, the University at Cambridge later became involved in the
planning process.62 Even disputes over the particular type of war memorial to construct were
eventually resolved to reflect a genuinely inclusive approach; the County of Cambridgeshire
agreed to build several different types monuments in order to commemorate war dead, survivors,
and ultimate victory.63 Of course, such resolutions did not come about without significant
debate, and the Cambridgeshire planners took several years to navigate local disputes of process
before finally realizing their plans; nevertheless, the Cambridge war memorial movement reflects
both the commonplace nature of public cooperation and pressure to make memorials a reality.
Once completed, local communities often celebrated the dedication of new war
memorials in a spirit of both satisfaction and deep solemnity. In Polesworth, a village in
Warwickshire, the dedication of the community war memorial on April 22, 1921 merited an
appearance by the Earl Ferrers, an influential Tory peer.64 The local newspaper, the Tamworth
Herald, recorded the scene:
Earl Ferrers asked, did it seem odd to that just a common layman should be asked to
unveil that memorial? He did not think it did. It was just for common laymen that those
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memorials existed. The men who died did not need the memorial. They went out not
thinking of themselves … It was the common laymen who needed the memorial.65
Ferrers’ recognition of the event’s true audience, those community participants who worked to
establish the memorial, mirrors the attitudinal shift revealed by the Armistice Day
commemorations in London the preceding year. Also reflecting the London model of mourning
underpinned with elements of patriotism, the Polesworth war memorial featured a plaque bearing
the following inscription:
To the Glory of Christ Crucified
and to the Memory of Men
who made the Great Sacrifice
in the World War
1914-1919.
These nobly played their part,
They heard the call,
For God, for King, and Country.
They gave their all.66
Such language linked Polesworth’s collective mourning experience to the broader war effort
while simultaneously achieving a balance between remembrance and patriotism. In this sense,
Polesworth achieved in one memorial what Cambridge required more than one memorial to
define: a multifaceted response to the different kinds of mourning and remembrance concerns
present in postwar public life.
Indeed, satisfying competing public needs remained the necessary goal of the postwar
memorial movement throughout Britain. The actualization of memorial projects satisfied
multiple objectives: they symbolized the victorious outcome of the conflict; they allowed
survivors to come together in order to construct a new collective memory of the war experience
for the living; they employed nationalistic language to dignify the memorialization of the war
dead. In London, Cambridge, and Polesworth—a large metropolis, a county seat, a small
65
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town—the tripartite conditions of survivorship, memorialization, and triumph remained
continuously present in the commemoration process. Memorial movements, therefore,
demonstrated these fundamental changes in postwar British life. From state occasions to quiet
local gatherings, the collective response to war’s end transformed the public sphere. As a result
of that transformation, popular opinion shifted away from wartime as a cause of national
celebration in aid of broader imperial goals and towards war as result of overreach and failure.
The glittering gold of the Jubilee celebrations became a distant memory; the cold, grey marble
slabs dedicated to the hollow victory better colored the postwar public mood. Regret at the
courses of action which led to the Great War gave way to much anti-war sentiment in the
interwar years, which in turn gave way to the infamous policies of appeasement towards the
Nazi’s as a means of avoiding a second great conflict. War came again regardless.
The titanic struggle of the Second World War, Britain’s “finest hour,” returned some of
the old triumphalist feelings to the fore of public sentiment. Whereas the First World War
embraced senseless and vain slaughter in the name of imperial glory, the Second World War saw
Britain facing down the more legitimate threat of unbridled tyranny.67 Certainly popular
conceptions of the war effort shifted to reflect overjoyed pride at the overcoming of an enemy as
threatening as Nazi Germany. From Churchill’s claim that “never in the field of human conflict
was so much owed by so many to so few” about the airmen of the Royal Air Force who fought
so gallantly during the Blitz to the jubilant crowds that took to the streets of London on V-E Day,
Britons more clearly expressed the role of victor in the aftermath of the Second World War than

I recognize the potentially controversial stance in declaring one war more valid than another, especially
considering the dubious validity of warfare in general, but it seems clear that the threat of Hitler was severe enough
towards many democracies that the collective efforts to overcome Nazi aggression remain understandable and
probably justifiable.
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they had done following the First World War.68 Yet just as with the aftermath of the First World
War, memoirs and recollections of the unvarnished wartime experience began to reveal a conflict
that simply did not match up to public pride in the war’s outcome. In the words of one historian,
these war memoirs “generate a subtle, historically conscious irony by juxtaposing traditional
intellectual or artistic images of transcendence against an unflinching, fully mature registration
of wartime barbarism.”69 The truth about the barbarity of total war, however, hardly needed
legitimization through publication; the everyday empirical unavoidability of bomb damage,
human displacement, economic devastation, and loss remained a new constant in postwar life for
many years after the cessation of hostilities.70 Additionally, the deep freeze of cold war and the
threat of nuclear annihilation between the West and the Soviet Union settled heavily over the
heads of Britons eager to rebuild their lives. Most troubling of all, the wartime draining of
British resources and the subsequent waning of global political influence resulted in the eventual
dissolution of the British Empire. Perhaps because of these bleak future prospects, the war
memorial effort following the Second World War continued to reflect many of the same
expressions of remembrance as established in the aftermath of the First World War. Armistice
Day commemorations carried on throughout Britain the same as ever, now accommodating war
losses for two World Wars. The preexisting war memorials sometimes got new plaques or
inscriptions listing deaths; although, sometimes communities built memorials dedicated
specifically to those who died in the Second World War, including those who had died on the
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home front.71 Churchill and some of the other captains of the war effort eventually got their
statues in London.72 Mostly, however, new construction projects aimed to rebuild war damaged
houses and buildings, not erect a whole new infrastructure of war memorials. After all, the war
memorials of the First World War were all less than thirty years old, and the primary national
enemy remained unchanged between the two conflicts.
Instead of endless elaborate additions to the already extensive network of physical war
memorials scattered across Britain, a more diverse form of collective cultural commemoration
that had its origins in the interwar years gained many notable additions following the end of the
Second World War. This diverse form of cultural commemoration, called “anti-monuments” by
one historian, came about as “an alternative version of [war’s] meaning.”73 This alternative
version of meaning included:
[A]ll the other forms in which judgments and conclusions about war could be expressed:
paintings, poems, novels, histories, plays, music. These were works that rendered the war
without the value-bearing abstractions, without the glory, and without the large-scale
grandeur. Often they were conscious, aggressive rejections of the monument-making
principles; they turned away from celebration, in search of war’s reality.74

Adding to the existing contributions of “anti-monument” voices from the First World War came
a collection of post-colonial writers, filmmakers willing to depict postwar life in Britain in
unsparing terms, new playwrights who explored both absurd and hard-edged realist perspectives
present in postwar society, painters that embraced confrontational and antiwar forms of art, and a
new generation of musicians who ushered in an era of protest music against elements of the old
imperial norms. Taken collectively, these “anti-monument” voices laid the foundations of a new
71
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post-imperial (counter) culture that Britain continues to contend with and respond to in the
present day, with much of their work stretching on decades after the end of the wars and yet still
responding to the imperial, war-torn past.75 Further, they represent the redefining of the British
public sphere away from the self-assuredness of the Victorian and Edwardian eras and towards a
less certain conceptualization of modern Britishness. Victorious in war but drained and bereft of
empire, Britons needed to forge an entirely new national identity in the aftermath of decades of
conflict.
At the end of each of the two World Wars, Britons across the nation endured the harsh
reality of wartime loss. From small towns to big cities, war memorial movements served to
create new experiences of remembrance. Whether Britons adopted monuments or antimonuments as their memorials depended on the type of loss experienced by individuals and by
communities. Collectively, Britons commemorated survival, memorialized loved ones, and
reservedly celebrated hard-won victories. Unlike the national spectacles of the imperial past, the
popular experience of national remembrance contained genuine elements of spontaneity and the
“ground-up” exertion of public will. Such exertion of public influence did not undermine all of
the traditional practices of memorialization and commemoration. Rather, the will of the people
to create a new kind of war memory caused the gentle reshaping of national public ceremonies to
better reflect on concepts of duty and honor in an age of unimaginable suffering and absence. In
local communities, public will imposed an even more prominent influence over the types of
plans for memorials and commemoration. For some individuals, the option to engage various

As a specific example, and one dear to the author, the seminal and incredibly popular rock album Dark Side of the
Moon (1973) by the Pink Floyd makes several references to the First World War in particular (“and the general sat,
and the lines on the map moved from side to side”), and the band often featured First World War footage in its
public performances of songs from Dark Side of the Moon, especially during the song, “Brain Damage.” To say that
the references to the conflict were critical seems an understatement. That one of the most commercially successful
music releases of all time grapples with the aftereffects of a conflict that ended 55 years earlier is a testament to the
ongoing influence of the First World War upon the popular imagination well into the postmodern era.
75

88

“anti-monument” movements remained a possibility. Either way, the postwar environment
invited mass participation in a public sphere reshaped by conflict. Remembrance was a shared
act.
Out of all the forms of collective remembrance, the most popular symbol became the
poppy.76 As one commentator observed of the little paper poppies sold each year in Britain on
November 11 to benefit the British Legion:
[They] can be conceived as emblems at once of oblivion and remembrance … These little
paper simulacra came from pastoral elegy (Milton’s Arcadian valleys “purple all the
ground with vernal flowers”), pass through Victorian male sentimental poetry, flesh
themselves out in the actual blossoms of Flanders, and come back to be worn in the
buttonholes on Remembrance Day.77
So it came to pass that a fragile flower symbolizing both death and renewal and worn on the
coats of war’s survivors replaced all the other symbols of imperial glory so often adorned and
paraded through the streets during the halcyon days of imperial celebration. All that glittered in
the streets was not golden anymore. Any glittering in the postwar streets of Britain came from
the glistening tears of those who came to lay a wreath at the Cenotaph in Whitehall, or to pay
their respects at the Tomb of the Unknown Warrior in Westminster Abbey, or to remember an
entire generation of lost students at the Cambridge War Memorial, or to pray in remembrance at
the small stone cross erected in the town of Polesworth. By constructing and consecrating these
public spaces and many others like them, Britons built a new postwar memory for the nation.
In the troubling years that followed the end of the World Wars, Britain slowly began to
rebuild their nation and their lives. The wars, however, permanently changed the course of
British involvement with the rest of the world. As the British began to grapple with these
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changes and struggled to define a new role for the nation in the postwar world, unique challenges
and opportunities presented themselves to a weary public growing ever more accustomed to
embracing the memory of war and simultaneously seeking respite from it. The constricting pain
of economic and household austerity dragged on for years. Yet with the ascension of Elizabeth
II, hopes arose that a national rebirth from the ashes of conflict had finally happened and with it
the ushering in of a new Elizabethan Age. Such dreams, made temporarily manifest by the
spectacular Coronation of 1953, soon gave way to the harsh reality of crisis in the Suez and the
continuing devolution of Britain’s empire. At home, social and economic conflict emerged
along with battles over the role of the welfare state. All the while, the Cold War polarized ideas
and ideologies.
The postwar situation faded cultural memory from the Victorian era. Long gone were the
glories of the Great Exhibition, that triumph of imperial progress. Meanwhile, the postwar
perspective brought into new relief the excited crowds of people who had lined the streets to
witness Victoria make her way to not one but two Jubilees of imperial self-congratulation and
national reassurance. To the postwar historical onlooker, those celebrants surely began to
resemble not so much the jubilant late Victorians confident in their security and state as they did
the lambs lining up for the slaughter. Indeed, it is in the painful evolution of public spectacles
from the Crystal Palace to the Jubilees of Victoria to the Cenotaph that Britain’s long, slow
retreat from its former role as global hegemon appears most vividly. In forthcoming events,
including the fairytale Coronation of Elizabeth II and the modern day gatherings designed to
celebrate the new millennium and the 2012 Olympic Games, the slow arc of British decline
continues. Yet the consecration of the war memorials and the Cenotaph in particular remain the
key transitional public moments which symbolized the loss of the Victorian world order and the
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gloomy establishment of modern Britain. Fittingly, therefore, it is in the inevitable gloom and
grey of every November 11th morning, the nation’s Remembrance Day, that Britons collectively
pin their poppies, bow their heads, and reflect for two long, silent minutes on all that was lost
forever.

91

Chapter Five
A Queen Is Crowned:
The Fairytale Coronation of Elizabeth II and the False Promise of Conservative Redemption1

Unlike public spectacles staged to reflect contemporary affairs, coronations in Great
Britain represent a virtually unbroken chain of hereditary succession spanning nearly a thousand
years. As such, the habits and peculiarities of the coronation ceremony itself reference many
medieval customs: anointing, oath taking, proclaiming. These historical allusions, however, do
not present a merely retrograde exploration of British values; rather, coronations exist as
spectacles of continuity and renewal, specifically as transmitted through the embodiment of
temporal power within the personage of a sovereign. A coronation spectacle publicly invests
each sovereign with their authority. Yet these spectacles only occur following the death or
abdication of the preceding sovereign. Coronations, therefore, literally come to symbolize the
periodic renewal of the public body through the crowing of the new head of state: “The King is
dead. Long live the Queen!” Occasionally, the line of royal continuity witnesses eras of great
transformation—the Elizabethan or Victorian eras—and these times enter into public
imagination as golden ages of British history. Other reigns witness more fraught periods in
British history; these remain less-celebrated eras. Regardless, the conservative view of British
history, and of the British Royal Family, is nothing if not imbued with a carefully cultivated
historical romanticism; it holds that each royal succession offers up the possibility for a new era
of cautious progress that builds upon the timeless institutions and principles of the British state.
So it was in 1952 when King George VI, who led the British Empire through the Second World
War, died at the relatively young age of 56.
In the years following the Second World War, including during Elizabeth’s coronation
1
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year of 1953, Britain struggled to recover from the totality of the conflict. For the second time in
the first half of the twentieth century, Britain found itself regrouping from a devastating war.
Not only did Britain once again undergo a period of public commemoration and memorialization
for lost lives similar to the period of deep mourning that followed the First World War—though
with less self-doubt about the purpose of the war than the previous generation experienced—
many parts of the country required physical rebuilding. London in particular remained a
bombed-out city slowly recovering from German aerial attacks, which started in earnest in1940
and continued off and on throughout the war. While the partial obliteration of London presented
a major obstacle for postwar Britain to overcome, the state of the broader British economy
seemed even worse. Bankrupted by the war effort, Britain formally began dissolving the British
Empire, most significantly by granting Indian independence in 1947.2 At home, the government
continued a carefully planned national economic system, featuring expansive austerity programs,
as first established to support the war effort.3 As a result of these lingering hardships of war, the
decade following the Second World War saw Britain experiencing a period of unavoidable
national reconstruction set against weakened economic capacity and diminishing global
2
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influence. Amidst the gloom, however, two major spectacles directly associated in the popular
imagination with principles of revitalization came about by virtual happenstance: the marriage of
Princess Elizabeth, the then heir to the throne, in 1947, and the even more significant coronation
of Elizabeth as Queen in 1953.
Several institutions of power stood to gain from shaping the public discourse surrounding
both the popular romance with the young Elizabeth and the solemn tributes to her wartime
father.4 These institutions ranged from the Monarchy itself to the Church of England to the
Conservative Party. By stoking the fires of popular imagination surrounding the major royal
events of 1947-1953, these establishment institutions provided a powerful narrative
counterexample to the harsh realities of the postwar scene. Further, royal affairs brought about
by the normal course of family life ended up serving as timely, exploitable propaganda exercises
for not just the postwar British recovery, but for the hope of a genuine return to the conservative
principles of the establishment. The postwar environment had threatened a radical structural
realignment in British institutions. Immediately following the conclusion of the Second World
War, the voters gave power to the Labour Party on a platform of broadly socialist ideas.
Meanwhile, wartime planning efforts transformed into postwar reconstruction models as all
across the public sector services underwent nationalization.5 To the establishment, the prospects
of a new Elizabethan era in which Britain completed the task of postwar reconstruction along
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more traditional economic lines while reasserting itself on the world scene undoubtedly offered a
compelling discursive narrative to counter the popular desire for socio-political structural
change. Contrary to hopes and expectations, however, the crowning of a new Queen did not
usher in a new “Elizabethan Age.”
Ultimately, the public spectacle of the Coronation of Elizabeth II represented the last
gasp of imperial celebration before the sun finally set on the British Empire. The coronation’s
performativity as an event geared towards transmitting to the public—including for the first time
via live television—a vision of contemporary national renewal as romanticized through the
historic institution of monarchy. The spectacle, meticulously organized by the Conservative
government, also sought to reestablish largely Victorian ideals of faith, duty, country, and empire
at the core of the renewal project. For a time, the spectacle succeeded: the “New Elizabethans”
were born. Yet any new golden age of British postwar rebirth never grew into anything more
than the fairytale myth played out with perfect military precision on Coronation Day, June 2,
1953. Within a few short years the coronation illusion of postwar imperial restoration shattered,
leaving Britain, for the rest of Elizabeth II’s long and continuing reign, to struggle with how to
move beyond the centuries-old metanarrative of imperial destiny that dominated its national
character.
In the eight years between the end of the Second World War and Elizabeth II’s
coronation, Britain underwent a period of remarkable change. Indeed, the immediate postwar
situation in Britain likely began with the structural transformation of Britain to a wartime footing
starting in the late-1930s.6 As early as May, 1940 the government passed the Emergency Powers
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Bill through Parliament over the course of one day of debate, thus assuring that the government
held “complete power of control over persons and property for the prosecution of the war.”7
Major newspapers around the country allowed the words of Clement Attlee, the then Deputy
Leader of the Coalition Government, to make the government’s case, printing key passages from
his address to the House of Commons introducing the Bill: “The Government are convinced that
now is the time that we must mobilize to the full the whole resources of the country. We must
throw all our weight into this struggle. Every private interest must give way to the urgent needs
of the community.”8 From there it followed that various war and supply councils took direct
control over wartime economic planning.
The measures exercised by the government represented a sweeping, and genuinely
desperate, choice to put the war effort before all other considerations. That the Emergency
Powers Bill met so little opposition, either public or political, demonstrated both the direness of
the situation and the national will to meet a common purpose: survival in the face of total war.
The effect of these broad measures likely had an unintended effect. Out of seeming wartime
necessity, the public-at-large began to accept the role of government-led central planning as a
part of daily life. It did not take long for policymakers to recognize the impact of this shift
towards national planning. Indeed, as emergency planning measures took hold, attention
amongst some policymakers shifted at an early stage of the war to considering the question of
structural reconstruction once the conflict ended. The publication of the landmark Beveridge
Report in 1942 ambitiously attempted to tackle the “five giant evils of want, disease, ignorance,
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squalor, and idleness” by establishing, in the words of one historian, “a comprehensive post-war
system of social security, in effect laying the foundations for the ‘classic’ welfare state.”9
Eventually the Beveridge Report, along with other like-minded policy proposals, evolved into
mainstream thinking on postwar planning. Unsurprisingly, the Labour Party ran an ambitious
national campaign in 1945 based in large part on national planning as a palliative for a country
badly in need of reconstruction.
With Labour’s victory in the 1945 election, Clement Attlee’s party began implementing
myriad structural reforms along broad lines. Labour’s plans, however, reflected a doubling down
on wartime planning; many of Labour’s election manifesto promises harkened back to pre-war
realities.10 The postwar scene looked much different from an economic standpoint: exports some
30% lower than prewar levels, overseas debt balances, budget deficits, an import-export
imbalance, high military expenditures overseas, massive numbers of military personnel still on
the payroll, and an economy totally geared towards the war effort.11 Nevertheless, Labour’s
election came with a clear mandate for planning, a fact not lost on the new Prime Minister, who
proclaimed: “It will enable us to implement the policy of the Socialist Party. It is a very
remarkable and gratifying result which shows that the electorate will respond to a clear and
definite policy based on principles and on the application of principles to the needs of the present
day.”12 As one Attlee biographer noted, Attlee forged ahead with Labour’s socialist plans by
“[keeping] the government moving consistently and simultaneously in several major areas: social
services expansion, economic planning and restructuring, colonial development (and selective
9
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decolonisation), foreign policy redirection, and global strategic reappraisals.”13 Looking back on
his premiership, Attlee said: “It wasn’t just nationalisation for nationalisation’s sake but the
policy in which we believed: that fundamental things—central banking, transport, fuel and
power—must be taken over by the nation as a basis on which the rest of the re-organisation of
the country would depend.”14 Yet with Labour enjoying only six years in charge of the
government before the Conservatives returned to power, it seems clear that public trust in
government planning as a means to national reconstruction had its limits. Regardless, the public
mandate given to Labour in the 1945 elections signaled a fundamental shift towards a lasting
welfare state as a means of securing broad social security in postwar Britain.15 With that shift
came a further upsetting of the old imperial systems which had effectively governed British life
since at least the Victorian era.
In the end, Labour’s six years of power from 1945-1951 proved neither fully decisive, as
Britain did not emerge as a permanent socialist nation, nor a failure. A host of reforms took
hold, and a great deal of planned nationalization occurred. Yet the very crisis which swept
Labour to power, the urgent need to rebuild while simultaneously providing fundamental social
security to civilians, began to drag on the fortunes of Labour’s efforts.16 With each successive
year of continuing austerity and financial crisis, British voters grew steadily wearier of planning
13
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as a kind of panacea to solve the problems of the difficult postwar environment.17 The promised
reorganization of Britain to include a new safety net for all in the form of the welfare state had
begun, but ordinary Britons continued to feel the pinch of wartime pain. Not unexpectedly, this
produced a reduced majority for Labour in the 1950 elections.18 Within a year, the
Conservatives found a path back to power. Nevertheless, the Conservative victory in the general
election of 1951 did not signal a massive repudiation of the 1945 election mandate won by
Labour. Rather, the 1951 election produced, at least on the surface, a surprisingly minimalized
transition along ideological lines.
The Conservative return to power did not come about as a result of promises for
immediate retrenchment from the welfare state. Instead, Conservatives largely acquiesced to the
idea of a mixed economy moving forward.19 Conservative acceptance of a mixed economy,
however, did not mean the Tories suddenly embraced a fully socialist economic model for
Britain. Nor did it mean that Conservatives worried any less about the “menace” of the rising
power of the Soviet Union.20 Nor did it mean that Conservatives appreciated Labour’s lack of
sentimentality towards the Empire. To highlight the differences, Conservatives inclined
themselves towards accepting many of the policies that Labour’s election in 1945 put in place,
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while simultaneously drawing the line on any further expansion of those policies.21 In particular,
the Tories refused to support nationalizing the British steel industry.22 Conservatives, in other
words, showed pragmatic political adroitness in realizing that public will demanded social
security in a time of reconstruction, but crucially the Conservatives refused to shed their
overarching ideological commitments going forward. Starting with providing political
protection to the privatized steel industry, Conservatives set about defending a workable status
quo, while focusing on restoring British national pride and global standing. At least this position
effectively became the party platform for the general elections of 1950 and 1951.23 Yet,
according to the analysis of political scientists at the time, the 1950 and 1951 General Elections
did not produce a clear mandate for a return to either High Toryism or even the new political
pragmatism associated with tolerating Labour’s reforms; instead, the polling and survey opinions
from the elections showed that: “If there was a mandate emerging from the election it was one
based on housing, full employment, and cost of living, and only with reference to the second of
these is a clear-cut opinion discernable. It appears that the illusory ‘mandate’ insofar as public
opinion survey data are concerned, must be stated in general and qualified terms.”24 It follows
that the Conservatives needed to establish public support if not for their political project—
presumably an election victory signaled such support—but for a return to broader conservative
ideology. Such an opportunity to begin re-shaping public opinion in their favor came about by
circumstance with the death of King George VI, just mere months after the Conservatives
returned to power. The romance of a royal succession, after all, fires the conservative
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imagination.
By the time an electorally triumphant Churchill came to Buckingham Palace on October
26, 1951, the King’s health was failing.25 Churchill knew that the King, who continued to
recover from a major operation to remove his left lung, suffered declining health because of lung
cancer.26 In his address to the nation after the King’s subsequent death on February 6, 1952,
Churchill acknowledged this fact: “During these last months the King walked with death, as if
death were a companion, an acquaintance, whom he recognized and did not fear.… [T]he
newspapers and photographs of modern times have made vast numbers of his subjects able to
watch with emotion the last months of his pilgrimage. We all saw him approach his journey’s
end.”27 Churchill and the King had enjoyed a wartime bond that while strained at times grew
strong in common purpose by the war’s conclusion.28 Perhaps ironically, the evolution of
Churchill’s bond with George VI mirrored the public’s gradual acceptance of a stuttering King
who had come to them as the result of abdication.
It did not take long for Churchill’s deeply-held Victorian sentimentalism to reveal itself
as he considered the implications of the King’s death upon the nation:
There is no doubt that of all the institutions which have grown up among us over the
centuries, or sprung up into being in our lifetime, the constitutional monarchy is the most
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deeply founded and dearly cherished by the whole association of our peoples. In the
present generation it has acquired a meaning incomparably more powerful than anyone
had ever dreamed possible in former times. The Crown has become the mysterious link—
indeed, I may say, the magic link—which united our loosely bound but strongly
interwoven Commonwealth of nations, States and races.29
Churchill’s appeal to sentimentality seems, at first blush, the ramblings of a well-meaning but
slightly dotty old man. Yet his tribute to the “magic” of the monarchy, especially as it stands as
an institution, reveals that the sentiment runs deeper than mere affection and senility. Monarchy,
especially in the deeply metaphorical sense that Churchill ascribes to it, powerfully symbolizes a
link between the present and the past.30 As Churchill’s radio eulogy for the King continued, he
made this historical connection explicit:
Now I must leave the treasures of the past and turn to the future. Famous have been the
reigns of our Queens. Some of the greatest periods in our history have unfolded under
their scepters. Now that we have the Second Queen Elizabeth, also ascending to the
Throne in her twenty-sixth year, our thoughts are carried back nearly 400 years to the
magnificent figure who presided over, and in many ways embodied and inspired, the
grandeur and genius of the Elizabethan Age … I, whose youth was passed in the august,
unchallenged and tranquil glories of the Victorian Era, may well feel a thrill in invoking,
once more, the prayer and the Anthem, “God Save the Queen!”31

Churchill’s florid romanticization of the Crown’s transition from George VI to Elizabeth II
signaled the restoration of the past to the present, in this case the potential for a rebirth of the
golden age of Elizabeth. Thus, Churchill’s heartfelt speech indicated the powerful dual purpose
associated with a Succession: simultaneous rebirth and restoration. It also indicated the pending
political gift sent from the heavens: a coronation.
Public fascination for the coronation ran high almost from the start. Unsurprisingly, early
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interest in the spectacle came not just from patriotic Britons but from businesses eager to make a
profit off of the event. A mere two months after George VI’s funeral, a local company in
Dundee took out an advertisement in the Dundee Courier to encourage potential patrons to order
television receivers for their homes so that people might watch the celebrations.32 The
advertisement claimed the following: “We have been warned of a reduction in supplies due to
the steel shortage. If you want to be sure of possessing a TV Receiver for this particular
occasion, we advise you to join our Coronation Viewing Circle. Book yourself a front seat at
your own fireside.”33 Such clever entrepreneurship demonstrated the extent to which the
coronation generated not just fascination but financial commitment on the part of ordinary
Britons wanting to serve as more than passive observers. Austerity budgets, after all, did not
leave much room for household technology luxuries. Nonetheless, demonstrable demand by the
public to participate as witnesses dovetailed nicely with the availability of new technologies.
Where feasible, businesses eagerly stepped in to help satisfy that demand. Thus, representatives
of every class of British society, from political leaders to the business class to ordinary workers,
sought out roles as witnessing participants in the coronation.
The Dundee Courier advertisement also signaled the growing power of mass media as
the means of satiating the widespread public investment in the proceedings. Between television
and radio, many households suddenly gained potential access to real-time engagement with a
royal spectacle in a way hitherto unexplored (Fig. 5.1).34 So while life and death circumstances
brought about the coronation, the circumstances surrounding the timing, the rise in cross-class
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Fig. 5.1, The BBC’s Filming of the Coronation Procession, June 2, 1953.35

participation possibilities, and widespread audio-visual access to the event all aligned perfectly
to motivate national power interests to stage a truly memorable occasion.
On the surface, a major public spectacle serves, with much overt pomp and ceremony, to
fulfill a specific public need (i.e. a coronation reaffirms the viability of the existing structure of
the British constitutional monarchy). In practice, however, public spectacles widely influence,
though sometimes with great subtlety, many disparate facets of society, economics, culture, and
so on. 36 Additionally, many different public and private institutions also stand to benefit, or in
some cases lose, from the staging of such large scale events (e.g. businesses, political parties). In
the specific case of the 1953 coronation, the continuing emergence of one such institution, mass
media, cut across class boundaries to bring the coronation, and thus the implicit propagandistic
message of the coronation, into ordinary people’s homes. The act of bringing the coronation into
For more information, see: http://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/proginfo/2013/23/coronation.html
Careful historical review, as an aspect of what Foucault broadly termed “archeology,” associated with public
spectacles effectively reveals not just the incentives for power interests to engage with the public in grand events,
but also a number of hidden incentives-turned-influences at play.
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the homes of ordinary Britons ultimately enhanced the participatory complicity of the public
towards accepting the messaging associated with the event, as all good propaganda must.
Further to the point, various commercial institutions (e.g. commercial broadcasters, retailers)
stood to gain from making such mass media transmissions readily available throughout the
British Isles. The transmission of the coronation thus could be seen as a series of pervasive
communication “ripples” continuing along the timeframe surrounding the planning of the event,
the event itself, and the aftermath of the event. Mass media communications did not represent
the only kinds of wide-scale influences upon the public which emanated from the coronation;
some of the effects emerging from grand spectacles remain hidden.
In the case of Elizabeth II’s coronation, transmissions rippling outward from the spectacle
simultaneously carried both a direct affirmation of the British monarchy and a more obscured,
complex root message which reaffirmed the benefits to maintaining the continuity of
longstanding British socio-politico structures. The scenario played out thusly:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

George VI died.
The state organized the ceremonial accession of the new monarch, Elizabeth II.
Public interest grew for the coming coronation.
The public sought to participate as spectators of the coronation.
Public and private sector means of participation were provided to the public (i.e. media).
The event itself featured widespread observation and participation through the media.
Mass observation and participation reaffirmed the public’s active support for the
monarchy.
By affirming support for the institution of monarchy, the public effectively pledged to
continue supporting the hierarchical nature of existing British socio-politico structures.

Of course, the final successive step for how it all played out remains the most important,
especially in light of the postwar public shift away from many of the traditional imperial values
and ideas associated with the Victorian Era and towards a modern welfare state. Yet, the root
message of the coronation—not the crowning of a new Queen, but rather the affirmation of
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existing socio-politico structures—remained indirectly obscured from observers. The pomp and
circumstance of the event, the “fairytale” qualities of the crowning that enraptured the public,
ceremonially validated not just the monarchy but the fact that monarchy represented the
aristocratic pinnacle of a deeply entrenched, rigidly class-bound Britain.
By participating in coronation fever, either in the streets or by watching on television at
home, the British public acted as unwitting participants in reinforcing the very structures they
had seen fit to begin reforming in the postwar aftermath.37 This argument centers upon a largely
Foucauldian construct: the idea that power structures ultimately produce a kind of willing selfconfinement on the part of individuals. In this case, the confinement in question reflected a
certain halt to the postwar expansion of a planned “welfare” state. So in an era in which shifting
values sway public affection away from the historical reality of the way things were to the
idealistic promise of way things ought to be in society, the coronation becomes an event of
outsized importance. The influence of the coronation’s core and highly propagandistic message
on the broader discourse served both to enhance and undermine competing political ideologies,
just as it affirmed certain values over others, and, perhaps most significantly, evoked historical
continuity in an age of global political discontinuity. Once again, however, these influences
presented themselves as partially obscured in the visible ceremonial components of the
coronation. Only with the benefit of post-hoc “archeological” investigation can we begin to see
how the coronation influenced the broader discourse of the era.
Put another way, the public’s “reading” of the coronation spectacle—or really of any
massive public spectacle—precipitated a kind of deeper sociological interpretation of the event
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that served to reinforce the historically ingrained cultural values on display.38 More concretely,
at least in regards to the politics of the event, the coronation actualized a unique public display of
both institutional and structural conservation at a moment when conservative power interests
needed reinforcement, especially in light of the growing public mood for socialist policymaking.
This is not to say that the coronation alone brought about specific counter-revolutionary effects;
rather, it simply affirms that the coronation reflected and reinforced the conservative reaction by
various British power interests to halt the advance of a new postwar socio-politico structure in
the form of the welfare state. Of course those primarily aristocratic institutions which stood to
gain the most from halting the postwar changes tasked themselves with the direct responsibility
for bringing the coronation to life: the Church of England, the Royal Household, and the
Conservative government.
For both the Church of England and the House of Windsor, the institutional benefits of a
large and successful coronation ceremony seem transparently obvious. For the Royal Family, a
coronation meant the literal renewal of the seemingly timeless institution of a hereditary
monarchy. For the Church of England, a coronation symbolized the fundamental importance of
38
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the church as an institution to the state. Moreover, in the face of the twentieth century’s
gradually rising tide of modernity and secularism, both the Royals and the church stood to gain
from the public relations boon of a coronation spectacle acting to encourage public sympathy for
the ancient principles and values associated with each institution. Finally, the scope and scale of
a grand performance event like a coronation served to generate, including within the institutions
themselves, an aura of excitement that might otherwise get lost in banal competency of day-today operations. In other words, if a coronation did nothing else it caused the public-at-large to
pay more attention to the Monarchy and to the Church of England as working participants in the
affairs of state.
On the other hand, the role of the Conservative government in staging the coronation
proved more complex for reasons somewhat beyond its control. Unlike many of the successful
Royal events of the recent past (e.g. the Great Exhibition, Victoria’s Jubilees), coronations
allowed for far less tailoring to the specific circumstances associated with the times in which
they occurred. While this did little to lessen either Churchill or the Conservative’s commitment
to the project—even a cursory review of Cabinet papers shows that the coronation occupied
substantial discussion time at the highest levels of the government—they remained somewhat
constrained by the traditional protocol associated with the event. Over 900 years of ceremonial
precedent simply did not give way very easily to contemporary public relations expediency.
George VI’s 1937 coronation provided the most relevant template for the staging of Elizabeth’s
crowning. 39 In a published Coronation Commentary on the 1937 event, the explanation of the
carefully considered arrangements for the ceremony referenced extensive historical precedents:
It is a rite that in its fundamentals you cannot change much. It is very rarely
39
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performed: forty times or so these thousand years. We the English have never
much wanted to change it.
Wise adaptations to political fact and development there have been; and
and changes of stress. Crown, in place of Orb or Sceptre, has come to be considered
the chief token of regal power. The placing of it upon the king’s head has, instead of
the divine anointing, come to be considered—by the layman, the majority—the
principal part of the solemnity, and as far back as the Middle ages gave its name to
the whole series of ceremonies of which it is but a part.40

So while the government held little sway over the ceremonial ritual in the Abbey, it did influence
all of the peripheral events associated with the coronation. The totality of the event, after all,
included more than just a self-contained religious service taking place in Westminster Abbey.
Additionally, Churchill’s government managed the crucial tasks of providing financial and
logistical support, and questions of access. The Conservatives used their influence along these
lines to provide greater public access to the coronation and to enhance the scope and scale of
coronation activities beyond the service itself.
The various Cabinet papers show that in the months immediately following George VI’s
death, government ministers addressed questions pertaining to the size of the coronation. 41 In
the first direct set of recommendations about the scale of events, the Cabinet committee tasked
with reviewing the situation indicated that they operated “on the assumption that Her Majesty’s
Coronation would be on broadly the same scale (as George VI’s coronation).” 42 Further, the
committee noted that cost differential from 1937 to 1953 seemed likely to at least double from
some one million pounds to two million pounds if the government decided to also pay for new
dress military uniforms for the participating troops and to fund military service reviews to mark
40
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the occasion.43 Eager not to deviate from the 1937 baseline in any substantial way, such
additions were almost inevitably tacked on, and cost estimate potentials grew to “well over” two
and a half million pounds by the end of 1952.44 While the various minutes and memoranda of
Cabinet meetings suggest ministers, including Churchill, sometimes paid lip service to austerity
constraints, political will backing a very large spectacle remained consistent throughout the
planning phase.45 Meanwhile, Churchill’s nearly unbridled enthusiasm for the grandness of the
occasion, evident from the start, at times reduced him to a caricature status that more closely
resembled a modern wedding planner than a British Prime Minister. At one point, he argued in a
Cabinet meeting that any Peer in possession of a carriage ought to receive permission to drive
them to the Abbey on Coronation Day.46 For Churchill, it seemed, the more the merrier. With
so few expenses spared, and with high ranking government ministers taking nearly every
opportunity afforded to them to scrutinize the planning, attention quickly turned to questions of
public access and participation.
With mass media taking a prominent role in providing the public at large access to realtime viewing of the proceedings, the government initially felt obliged to control the extent of that
access. After all, conservatives, while eager in the instance of Elizabeth II’s coronation to stage
a large spectacle, traditionally tend to take a dim view towards altering the operations of
monarchy.47 Disputes, therefore, over the proper role of television in the coronation proved
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complicated and controversial.48 Different members of the establishment, ever wary of the
encroachment of modernity, nearly missed out on the new, incredible public relations
opportunity by stubbornly resisting the use of television cameras to film the most crucial
moments of the service in Westminster Abbey.49 Eventually, Churchill pushed back, but only
after holding informal discussions with the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Royal Household,
claiming “public disappointment” should the event not receive full television coverage.50 In
choosing to take a stand on the issue, Churchill very likely maintained the widespread public
interest in the event he so hoped to see a success. Whether or not Churchill understood the
technology in question mattered little; he remained, until the very end, a political opportunist
eager to serve both the public and his own interests. Churchill and others in positions of
authority ultimately remembered, though perhaps a little slowly, this fact when it came to the
matter of television. The Government also showed similar savvy when it came to questions over
access along the processional route. Aware that television cameras would show the processional
route more clearly than ever before, the Cabinet instructed that the majority of decoration funds
go along the main route.51 Ministers also planned a lengthy procession through London in order
to allow many Londoners an in-person viewing experience (Fig. 5. 2). All total, Elizabeth II’s
coronation

48

Cabinet Meeting Minutes, “67th Conclusions,” July 10, 1952, NA, CAB 128:25. See Also:
http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/D7663520
49
Ibid. Presumably Churchill backed the initial cabinet decision to exclude television; he chaired the meeting which
confirmed the decision to bar cameras from parts of the Abbey. Someone in the Cabinet meeting, however, proved
savvy enough to recognize the possibility of a political firestorm over the decision. The Cabinet minutes include the
following note of caution: “It was thought, however, that there might be wide demand for television of the
ceremony, and that political pressure in favour of this might be brought to bear on the Government.”
50
Memorandum from the Prime Minister to the Cabinet, “Television at the Coronation: Memorandum by the Prime
Minister,” October 27, 1952, NA, CAB 129:56. The fact that Churchill consulted with both the Royal Household
and the Archbishop of Canterbury reinforces the point that the government, the church, and the Royal Household
worked in harmony over the proceedings, even if they at times had disputes over the details of the event.
51
Cabinet Meeting Minutes, “61st Conclusions,” June 19, 1952, NA, CAB 128:25

111

Fig.5.2. Official Souvenir Program for the Coronation of Elizabeth II, June 2, 195352

included over a year’s worth of meticulous planning. The major establishment forces
responsible for bringing the coronation went to great lengths to defy austerity budgets, and also
to work carefully around certain ceremonial traditions, so as to make the event a massively
successful affair. The planning culminated with an entire day’s worth of grand celebration—
complete with all of the old imperial trimmings—strategically spread throughout London.
With many thousands lining the streets, and millions more tuning in on television and
radio around the world, Coronation Day began as almost all important British royal ceremonials
start: with a massive procession. While most royal occasions enjoy a certain precise and wellfunded performativity, the rarity of a coronation meant that the staged performance mattered all
the more.53 For the journey to Westminster Abbey to celebrate the coronation service, some five
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distinct processions assembled, with each accompanied by an extensive military escort. These
five processions included colonial rulers, prime ministers, princes and princesses, the Queen
Mother, and finally the State Procession of the Queen.54 The Queen’s procession alone might
have impressed no less a character than Louis XIV in its somewhat preposterous length. It
consisted of four divisions of the Sovereign’s escort formed by the Life Guards, four massed
bands, two detachments of Foot Guards, the King’s Troop of the Royal Horse Artillery, aides-decamp of the military services, chaplains of the military services, the combined staffs of service,
flag officers of the Home Command, the Marshalls of the Royal Air Force, the Admirals of the
Fleet, the Chiefs of Staff of the United Kingdom, escorts of officers from colonial and
Commonwealth nations, the Colonels-in-Chief of the Royal regiments, the personal aides-decamp to the Queen, and, of course, the Queen and the Duke of Edinburgh in the Golden State
Coach, which was drawn by eight massive Windsor Grey horses.55 As the grand procession
made its way to Westminster Abbey for the coronation service, they passed under the lavish
street decorations insisted upon by both private businesses and the government in active defiance
of the postwar gloom.56 The scale of the procession, the attention to detail, and the precision
with which it all came together finally revealed, in spectacular fashion, the efforts of the planners
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coming to fruition. Once the procession arrived at the Abbey, the politicians and other
dignitaries could finally content themselves, at least for a few hours, with allowing God to play
His part in the proceedings, too.
The start of the coronation ceremony set in motion another set of processions, this time
with religious solemnity, through Westminster Abbey to begin the ancient, complex rite. Taken
from the text of Psalm 122, the hymn “I Was Glad” played as the Queen entered:
I was glad when they said unto me:
We will go into the house of the Lord.
Our feet shall stand in thy gates:
O Jerusalem.
Jerusalem is built as a city:
that is at unity in itself.
O pray for the peace of Jerusalem:
they shall prosper that love thee.
Peace be within thy walls:
and plenteousness within thy palaces.57

As with much of the symbolism associated with the occasion, the hymn represented more than
just another musical or liturgical element; in fact, the choice of “I Was Glad” connected the
sacred and the temporal through historical allusion, with the holy city of Jerusalem reconstituted
as modern day London. Such symbolic representationalism indicates the idea that, in the words
of one famous anthropologist, “subjectivity does not properly exist until it is thus organized,
(and) art forms generate and regenerate the very subjectivity they pretend to display.”58 Thus
even in musical consecration, temporal politics intruded. As the anthem ended, cries rang out of
“Vivat, vivat Regina Elizabetha!”59 As with the language of “I Was Glad,” the acclamation of
the people validated the timelessness of the occasion through the symbolic usage of the ancient
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language of medieval rite. Such self-aware symbolic acts as these made clear that through the
continuity of renewal implicit in the coronation service not only would Elizabeth take formal
possession of her kingdom, but also that the British nation would, once again, share in the
possession of historical destiny that the divinely-granted royal embodiment revealed. “Long
Live the Queen!,” but also “Long Live Great Britain!”
As the hours-long ceremony unfolded, some seventeen distinct elements of the service
played out, including the oath, the anointing, the homages, and, of course, the crowning.60 The
act of crowning undoubtedly evoked the emotional high point of the entire coronation, and the
heavily anticipated act of placing the crown upon the Sovereign’s head summoned not only
direct historical links to the past, but mythical connotations as well. Indeed, it seems clear that
the entire structure of the service leading up to the crowning intended to demonstrate a kind of
religious, symbolic rebirth in real world practice.61 Before the crowning itself, the act of
anointing the head of the Sovereign with holy oils served to reify the divine connection between
the Royal personage and their unique authority. 62 As a potent symbol of authority, the crown
itself further solidified this link by making visible the Sovereign’s divinely-granted temporal
power in glittering fashion. Put another way, the crown acts as the material instantiation of the
conflux between the sacred and the profane, and the moment of crowning signals the climax of
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the coronation’s mythical-historical narrative. At the climactic moment of Elizabeth’s crowning,
the assembled peers and peeresses of all shouted “God Save the Queen!” while guns
simultaneously fired from The Tower of London.63
Once the lengthy service concluded, the newly crowned Queen left the Abbey to ride
through the streets to greet her people, this time in a procession even grander than what bore her
to the crowning. With the sacred solemnity left behind at the Abbey, the rest of the day took on
the form of one giant, gilded street party. Coronation Day ended with repeated appearances by
the Royal Family on the balcony of Buckingham Palace and a royal urbi et orbi media
broadcast.64 On the whole, it all amounted to a lavish, costly, glittering, powerful, and utterly
unavoidable celebration of the British establishment. As one biographer of Elizabeth II put it:
“In [the] street parties and church services people could recapture the wartime sense of
community lost in the years of austerity … [The coronation] left a warm glow in its aftermath.”65
Churchill was triumphant. Broadcasting to the nation, he declared:
Let it not be thought that the age of chivalry belongs to the past. Here, at the summit of
our world-wide community, is the lady whom we respect because she is our Queen and
whom we love because she is herself. Gracious and noble are words familiar to us all in
courtly phrasing. To-night they have a new ring in them, because we know they are true
about the gleaming figure whom Providence has brought to us and brought to us in times
where the present is hard and the future is veiled.66
By these lights, the coronation thus redeemed the conservative vision for Britain.
Amidst the sentimentality, however, a deeper truth appeared. To Churchill, indeed to all
those who wished to conserve the past glories of the Britain they once knew, the young
Elizabeth, “the gleaming figure whom Providence has brought to us,” symbolized not just the
sort of continuity with those values that a coronation reaffirms, but a figure providing certainty
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“when the present is hard” and “the future is veiled.” Churchill’s idea of Britain, not the Britain
of wearily-embraced austerity and socialism, but the Britain of empire and equipoise, once again
had a new life. Out of these hopes, and with a fool’s rush of post-coronation romantic naïveté,
the New Elizabethans arrived. The euphoria of the early summer modern triumph with all of its
evocative images of divinely-inherited grandeur, with its liturgy and music, with its crowns and
coronets, with its gilded coaches and grand processions, with its power and glory gilded the lily.
Whereas in the past, the true magic of royal ceremonial occasions either derived from the empire
or from the need to defiantly proclaim the empire in the face of adversaries, the Britain of 1953
had only the fairytale myth to fall back upon at the end of the day. Westminster glittered on
coronation day, but London remained a bombed out, blackened place. The British Empire fared
no better. One by one, nations left to form a “Commonwealth” that had very little in common
and even less wealth to show for it. The nation’s finances remained perched on the edge of ruin,
and countless households shared in a similar fate.67 Even the indefatigable Churchill, so active
during the war years, tottered into living antiquity. Yet, amidst these stark realities, the New
Elizabethans sprang forth as living embodiments of the hopefulness inspired by the coronation
spectacle. They were to be a new generation of postwar Britons, born into a country eager and
ready to reclaim its past glory. Within three years, however, this false promise was consigned to
the graveyard of history.
The Suez Crisis of 1956, in which Egyptian nationalists seized the Suez Canal and
effectively undermined Britain’s military and economic role in the Middle East, served to
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completely destabilize the narrative of a resurgent Britain.68 The fact that Britain’s effective
control over the Suez became a source of strategic weakness caused trouble both at home and
abroad. Most crucially, Britain’s attempt to restore order to the situation resulted in absolute
national humiliation and served to obliterate any post-coronation metanarrative of Britain reborn
anew. For the true “crisis” aspect of the Suez Crisis stemmed from Britain’s response to the
situation as much as it did to the fact that Britain “lost” the Suez in the first place. Acting in
concert with the French, the British hoped to restore the Suez to if not direct British control than
at least some sort of favorable international oversight.69 The Americans, however, remained
reluctant to engage in any war games that smacked of colonialism; and when Britain and France
acted with military action on their own, President Eisenhower refused to back the operation.70
Whereas some in the government saw Suez as a chance to reestablish British imperial control
over the Middle East, and thus over one of the vital economic lifelines long associated with the
British Empire, the lack of American backing for the project sealed its fate in the new postwar
environment.71 Without America, Britain no longer held enough international clout or power to
manage wide-ranging international actions. So if the coronation had represented a symbolic
desire by the conservative British establishment to retain structural continuity with the authority
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of the past, the Suez action indicated an effort to put that past authority on trial. Staging a
flawless royal spectacle proved safer. Anthony Eden, Churchill’s successor, resigned in disgrace
as a result of the crisis.72 Moreover, while the Conservative Party managed to remain in power
in spite of the misadventure, the lessons of the debacle seemed clear: Britain no longer mattered
on the global stage as it once did. While the gradual decline of influence had been decades in the
making, the Suez Crisis crystalized a new, stark psychological humiliation associated with
having no choice but to finally own up to irreversible imperial decline.
A thousand days after the coronation promised continuity with a glorious past, the
dreaded “veiled future” Churchill worried over arrived in earnest. Perhaps the overwhelming
public “buy in” to the coronation’s promise of structural continuity with the past motivated in
British power interests a false sense of security in the years that followed? This seems like a
realistic possibility. Regardless, the misadventure in Egypt highlighted the continuing
dissolution of the Empire, the stubborn structural weaknesses repressing the economy, the
dawning of a terrifying new atomic age which placed the United Kingdom between two new
superpowers, and the slow rebuilding from two devastating wars. The reality of decline finally
caught up to Britain. Consequently, it now seems clear that Elizabeth II’s coronation shared
certain inescapable parallels with the 1897 Diamond Jubilee of Queen Victoria. While the 1897
Jubilee came to represent an Empire under strain, so too did the 1953 Coronation. In another
similarity, both events served to signal the illusion of imperial destiny and continuity. The 1897
Jubilee reassured the public that the Empire would go on; the 1953 Coronation reassured the
public that imperial Britain would make a comeback. In both cases, these reassurances proved
false. The Empire did not continue in perpetuity, and while the British nation endures, it only
does so as a country that continues to ebb global clout and influence with seemingly each passing
72
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year. In light of this contemporary reality, the grand convocations that continue to dot the
landscape of British history no longer retain many of the same defining values that once
underpinned their existence. Contemporary spectacles now serve to address an evolving
existential problem: defining what it means to be British in a post-imperial world.
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Chapter Six
From An Empty Tent to a “Five-Ring Opening Circus”:
A Survey of Post-Imperial British Convocations in Contemporary British History1
Dating to the Great Exhibition of 1851, major public convocations in Britain appealed to
a set of broadly Victorian ideals such as security, continuity, progress, and, above all else,
empire. These organized appeals to Pax Britannica values served to reward the imperial state, as
well as some of its major stakeholders, with popular support. Indeed, the broad formula for
imperial spectacles remained largely unaltered, with each major event presenting its own
commentary upon the matters of the day, so long as Britain maintained a viable global empire.
Quixotically, however, this same Victorian era formula carried over into postwar and postimperial British history. Major British national celebrations included Royal ceremonials such as
the decidedly anachronistic Investiture of the Prince of Wales in 1969, a coronation throwback in
the form of the Queen’s Silver Jubilee in 1977, and the blockbuster production of the Royal
Wedding of Charles and Diana in 1981. Yet outside of the Royal Family as a national
institution, the British had few occasions to celebrate on the scale of the imperial gatherings of
the past. The British Empire had begun its transition into a Commonwealth, a largely symbolic
affiliation between Britain and its former colonies, following the Second World War. Moreover,
Britain’s postwar standing in global affairs remained overshadowed by the United States and the
Soviet Union as the Cold War unfolded. On the domestic front, British politics turned to debates
over the role of the welfare state and Britain’s role within Europe; in effect, the political gaze
shifted inward. Put simply, the second half of the twentieth century marked a time of shifting
national identity for Britain. Spectacles of “Britishness,” at least outside of the Royal
1
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ceremonials, remained few and far between.
The close of the twentieth century saw the fallout from the Thatcher-led reforms of the
welfare state and subsequent bitter socio-economic class divisions, the Royal Family suffer the
humiliation of scandal and divorce, and the centrist politics of Tony Blair’s “New Labour” party
sweep to victory in the 1997 General Election. Each of these developments signaled the
continuing domestication of British affairs. Perhaps nothing, however, symbolized the inwardlooking search for national identity like the public reaction to the death of Diana, the Princess of
Wales.2 Diana’s unique ability to transcend fashion while simultaneously maintaining her
common touch with the public made her a wildly popular figure, even as the Royal Family
sought to expel her from the “Firm” after her marriage with Prince Charles, the heir-apparent,
failed. When Diana died in a car crash in Paris in the summer of 1997, the public mood, already
soured on the Royal Family after the bitter breakup between Charles and Diana, grew
increasingly hostile. Diana’s funeral attracted global attention, with large numbers of Britons
using the occasion to celebrate Diana’s trendsetting values over the tradition-bound, some argued
moribund, Royal Family. For the first time since the abdication crisis of 1936, the Royal Family
endured a substantially negative shift in public fortune.
The popular rupture with the Royal Family did not represent the only major shift in
public attitudes. With Labour’s ascent into power came a commitment to certain principles of
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devolution politics.3 Various longstanding cornerstones of the British state—e.g. the Act of
Union, the House of Lords—became subject to an election manifesto that promised reform or
devolved power back to local authorities.4 In effect, the inward shift away from global affairs
and towards popular structural reforms on the national level began in earnest with the twin
upheavals of 1997: Labour’s transformative election cycle and the public backlash against the
Royal Family following Diana’s death. This shift, however, raised certain questions about the
nature of British identity: what might the “new” Britain represent? The question brooked
uncertainty. For better or worse, Britons knew their place as masters in the realms domestic and
international affairs dating from the Victorians through Churchill. One needs look no further
than the major British spectacles of empire going back to the Great Exhibition of 1851, and in
some instances even before that, to see examples of self-assured Britishness on public display.
For contemporary Britain, however, spectacles held during the 1997-2012 period, especially
those during 2000 and 2012, indicated a shifting environment towards a more postmodern
mindset.
The millennium celebrations for the year 2000, highlighted by an ongoing exhibition
staged in the specially built Millennium Dome in London, intended to usher in a new era of
optimism and progress for a so-called “Cool Britannia.” In the words of Prime Minister Tony
Blair, the Dome presented “a triumph of confidence over cynicism, boldness over blandness,
excellence over mediocrity.”5 Bringing this aspirational but amorphous vision to life involved
Dome visitors going through commercially-sponsored attractions (called “zones”) which
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presented a theme relating to time and the human experience, as well as, in the words of one
government planner, giving guests the opportunity to “reflect and take stock of ourselves: who
we are, what we do, and where we live.”6 Such promises aside, it remained unclear through
much of the planning process what sponsors actually intended to display in the Dome.7 In spite
of confusion over the project’s identity, the Dome opened to the public on January 1, 2000 at a
cost of over £600 million.8 Serving as a kind of historical successor to exhibitions of yore, the
Millennium Dome failed to live up to its roots. Put bluntly, the project flopped.9 The Dome
project lost money, suffered low attendance, and was derelict of occupancy after a year. One
newspaper declared that a trip to the Dome was “like rubbernecking at the scene of a car
crash.”10 Hardly the cornerstone project of a new era! The Dome debacle ultimately meant that
Britons continued to wait on a showcase event to publicly emblemize the ongoing process of
coming to grips with the new reality of their diminished, post-imperial standing.
Whereas the events of 2000 represented a resounding failure in terms of capturing the
public imagination and reflecting a new Britain, the events of 2012—specifically the Queen’s
Diamond Jubilee and the Summer Olympics—proved a resounding success. They served to
strike a balance between newer postmodern and post-imperial sensibilities and the traditional

6

Philippa Carling and Antony Seely, “The Millennium Dome,” House of Commons Research Paper 98/32, Business
and Transport Section, House of Commons Library, March 12, 1998.
7
Ibid. This background paper compiled for Members of Parliament on the Dome project devotes several pages to
Members’ concerns about the lack of clarity in terms of the actual attractions within the Dome once it opened to the
public.
8
For a detailed breakdown on costs associated with the Dome project, see: “The Millennium Dome: Report by the
Comptroller and Auditor General, Executive Summary,” National Audit Office, November 9, 2000,
https://www.nao.org.uk/report/the-millennium-dome/
9 While the British media almost universally savaged the Dome project, I intend to highlight those left-leaning media
institutions, especially The Guardian and The Independent newspapers, which generally held more support and
sympathy for the Blair project than right-leaning media institutions. The criticism from such left-leaning media
outlets, therefore, suggests both cross-spectrum disillusionment with the Dome project as well as the extent of the
Dome’s failure to advance New Labour ideals.
10
“Last days of the dome,” The Guardian, December 28, 2000,
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2000/dec/29/dome.guardianleaders

124

elements of the British spectacle as a reflection of British values and traditions. The Diamond
Jubilee, itself an extension of an ongoing rehabilitation effort by the House of Windsor after the
death of Diana, affirmed the vitality of a remodeled Royal Family with glowing press reviews
and widespread public participation at its events. Mirroring the Royal Family’s return to
prominence, the eyes of the world turned to London to see how post-imperial Britain would
handle the global spotlight as host of the Summer Olympic Games in London. In light of the
colossal failure of the millennium celebrations, it remained an open question as to whether or not
Britons held a clear enough sense of their own national identity to plan an event about
contemporary meaning and identity in British life, let alone whether they knew how to share any
such reflection with the world. Yet Britain passed the test, conveying through the Olympic
Opening Ceremonies what one international commentator called “a nation secure in its own postempire identity, whatever that actually is.… [N]either a nostalgic sweep through the past nor a
bold vision of a brave new future. Rather … a sometimes slightly insane portrait of a country that
has changed almost beyond measure since the last time it hosted the Games, in the grim postwar
summer of 1948.”11 The Olympics, therefore, acted as a kind of focusing agent, proving not just
to the world but to Britons themselves that the nation had finally come to grips with its legacy of
Empire and its new future as an internationally diminished, and perhaps even unremarkable,
nation state. In this sense, the events of 2012 renewed and updated the British spectacle as a
familiar reflection of both Britain’s historical identity and of contemporary British life.
Ultimately, the major public events of 1997-2012 allowed Britain the opportunity,
painfully at first, more comfortably over time, to reveal its new post-imperial identity to the
wider world, and also to Britons themselves. Whereas the millennium celebrations displayed a
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nation still uncertain in its postmodern, inward-looking gaze, the events of 2012 revealed a
country finally embracing a new kind of post-imperial Britishness. The events of 2012 also
presented a nation that remained willing, even eager, to continue to showcase itself by sharing its
beliefs, values, and culture through the formula of the grand spectacle. Thus, even as the
metanarrative of contemporary British history slowly evolves away from empire, the pomp and
ceremony so long a part of public British life remains a constant, even expected, ongoing aspect
of national identity.
Heading into the 1997 General Election, the Labour Party, relegated to the wilderness
during the Thatcher years, rebranded itself as a viable alternative to Conservative rule with a
one-word pledge: “new.” Prior to the General Election, the Labour Party released a manifesto
entitled: “New Labour, New Life for Britain.” 12 The manifesto represented a move to the
center; it included centrist pledges on education, crime, health, jobs, and economic stability.13
The move to the center, however, did not just represent a shift in rhetoric or political positioning;
New Labour deliberately backed away from the party’s socialist roots.14 While New Labour’s
centrism did not offer up a dramatic break with the Thatcher era’s turn to the right, it did present
a noticeably different tone for the political arena. Whereas Thatcherism gave to Britain the
tough-love policies of an “Iron Lady,” Blair’s New Labour project, infused with all the boyish,
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smiling enthusiasm that Tony could muster, promised to soften the hard edges of reform.15 New
Labour coasted to a huge political victory on election night with a Commons majority of over
150 seats and with voters clearly embracing Blair’s vision as a needed change and a breath of
fresh air.16 As the left-leaning Guardian editorialized the next day: “Things can only get
better.”17
The New Labour program connected with voters in a way that few other Labour
campaigns managed. As the Independent pointed out after the election results became apparent,
“the Conservatives [had] held office for 59 of the 79 years since the modern party system
emerged in 1918.”18 In the face of such historical headwinds, the 1997 election certainly offered
up a transformative model for effective political communication. The New Labour rebranding
also came at a time when other “new” forces dominated the zeitgeist; namely, the emergence of
the internet and the pending calendar transition to a new millennium. Yet even as these
developing events took hold of the popular and political imagination, an incident widely viewed
as an international tragedy struck: the death of Diana, Princess of Wales. The resulting public
response to Diana’s death served to reshape further national sentiment about government. It also
triggered a popular reevaluation of the ongoing public interest associated with maintaining a
15
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constitutional monarchy.
Few figures in contemporary British history proved more popular, or more controversial,
than Diana, Princess of Wales. A towering media figure, Diana became one of the world’s most
recognizable figures after her marriage to Prince Charles, the future King of Great Britain. She
combined a new sense of fashion and media savvy with a series of populist outreach campaigns.
Diana’s persona also came to represent a generational rupture within the institution of monarchy
itself; she displayed little of the characteristic Windsor reserve in public, and her open demeanor
sometimes stood in sharp contrast with that of both her husband and the Queen. When Charles
and Diana separated, an all-out public relations war erupted between the two parties with
allegations of adultery airing on primetime British television.19 Yet in spite of the war between
the Windsors, Diana iconic image did not dissipate. To a large extent, she wrested away from
the Royal Family the public face of monarchy, presenting to the British people an alternative
model for how the ancient institution might behave. Her unexpected death after a car chase with
paparazzi in Paris on August 30, 1997 stunned the world. Moreover, it shook British national
confidence in a profound way. As one writer noted: “The public life of Diana Spencer was
bound at two ends by spectacle: her marriage and her funeral.”20 The funeral spectacle became
an occasion of unusually high public drama for Britain.
Histrionics is a characteristic seldom associated with the British people. Largely thanks
to the symbolic resolve embodied by famous Britons such as Elizabeth I, the Lord Admiral
Horatio Nelson, and Sir Winston Churchill, popular conceptions of British national identity often
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remain tied to exemplars of defiance and noble fortitude during challenging times. The stern
morality of the Victorians, synonymous with the British Empire at its height, also undergirded
the perception of Britons as an emotionally reserved people. Yet upon hearing the news of
Princess Diana’s death, millions of Britons entered into a period of very public grieving. 21
While the Blair government moved quickly to respond to the massive outpouring of grief by
famously declaring Diana “the People’s Princess,” the Royal Family, perhaps indifferent after
the years of infighting with Diana, attempted to remain above the public response even as they
themselves became the subject of widespread criticism.22
Refusing to return to London from the Queen’s estate at Balmoral in Scotland to lead the
national mourning, the Royals justified their absence from public life at the time as needed space
for family grieving.23 The press, catching the mood of the public, savaged the Royals, including
the Queen personally (Fig. 6.1). Finally, the Queen relented to the public pressure and returned
to London to lead the national grieving. Addressing the nation on the eve of Diana’s funeral, the
Queen declared: “I hope that tomorrow we can all, wherever we are, join in expressing our grief
at Diana's loss, and gratitude for her all-too-short life. It is a chance to show to the whole world
21
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the British nation united in grief and respect.”24 In spite of the Queen finally bowing to public
pressure and showing some emotionality, the Royal Family themselves became an

Fig. 6.1. Tabloid Headlines from September 4, 1997.25

unflattering part of the retrospective narrative on Diana as a result of their slow response to
public sentiment.26 More significantly, the public criticism of the Royal Family revealed that the
Windsors had failed to realize that Diana’s brand of populist leadership-by-example resonated
strongly in the late-1990s public sphere.
24
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The backlash against the Royal Family reflected a certain institutional sclerosis that had
come to define the aloof Windsors, but it also came about as a reflection that the Windsors no
longer embodied memory and meaning in Britain in the way that they once had. Looking back
on the events surrounding Diana’s death ten years after the fact, the Guardian declared:
As only a great public occasion can, the Diana event let us see what Britain now looked
like.… Many of the political themes that would dominate for the next decade could draw
upon that week for their legitimacy. Whether it was a more relaxed attitude to gay rights,
attempts to make Britain more ethnically inclusive or an assumption that the age of
deference was over, much was predicated on what had been witnessed after Diana's
death. And the politics did not end there. For one thing, Tony Blair added to the electoral
mandate he had gained on May 1 a kind of emotional mandate, forging a bond with the
nation that Sunday morning when he correctly intuited the public reaction to the death of
the princess—a connection that kept him riding high until the Iraq war [2003].27
In other words, the sort of social anthropology on display during the Diana event revealed the
extent to which the iconic Diana reflected the changing social realities of the “new” Britain.
Through ritualistically examining the person of Diana via her death and funeral, Britons
discovered something core to their own collective values and identity. The emotional reaction to
Diana’s death, the overwhelming outpouring of grief, suggests that this common identification
did not begin as a retrospective; rather, Diana had generated an inward-looking popular
reflection for many years. Diana’s death served to make what she embodied into a broader, even
more powerful iconography. As one social anthropologist put it:
Diana, however, belongs to a very different category; she is very much real and authentic
precisely because she is perceived as not being created by the media or the public, whose
attention she antecedes and whom she transcends, in that her status derived from her
claims to royalty, which was divinely bestowed at her marriage and which conferred on
her all the relevant representational and reflective symbolic privileges.28
Of course, her populist attitudes and seemingly authentic behavior after her marriage also
27
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mattered a great deal. Diana cultivated her popularity, but it was genuinely bestowed upon her
by popular acclaim in response to her widely-perceived authenticity as a person. As such,
Blair’s comment that Diana was “the People’s Princess” seems accurate, and with her death the
values that she embodied and that Britons shared transferred away from the Royal Family and
became entangled in the broader socio-political move towards a more introspective, post-modern
“new” Britain. The events of 1997, therefore, signaled that an era of change was beginning in
earnest. By historical circumstance, the coming of New Britain coincided with the dawning of a
new millennium.
Those invested in seeing through the vision for a New Britain embraced, almost by
political necessity, the pending calendar arrival of a new millennium as an occasion for
celebrating the solidification of the post-imperial, post-modern era. After all, the passage from
one millennium to the next represents one of the most powerful symbolic transitions possible
from one era to another. For politicians, such an opportunity begged for a carefully
choreographed public celebration and spectacle; the potential political rewards for successfully
staging such an occasion proved too great to ignore. The Blair government was no exception to
the rule. With the Tories badly damaged by the recent election, and with the House of Windsor
still reeling from the backlash over Diana’s death, it fell to New Labour to not only make the
arrangements for ushering in the new millennium, but to establish a lasting popular vision for the
occasion. Further, the millennium celebrations suggested an opportunity for Britons to connect
with a set of new ideals and institutions that optimistically represented a more inclusive future.
Yet the emergence of New Labour and the events surrounding Diana’s death suggested the
makings of a soft public evolution, not a bloody revolution towards public institutions, national
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values, and cultural identity.29 The Tories were banished by the voters, not vanquished; the
Queen rebuked by her subjects, not beheaded. Moreover, New Labour’s centrist vision for a
New Britain veered well from the beaten path when it came to British ceremonial precedents,
especially since so many grand British spectacles in the past referenced imperial triumph.
Perhaps inevitably, therefore, the millennium celebrations, underpinned as they were by just as
many naïve hopes as realistic sociological reflections, turned into a national convocation without
genuine expression or meaning.
At the center of Britain’s millennium celebrations stood the Millennium Dome (Fig. 6.2),
a nascent project undertaken by the Conservative government that New Labour inherited with its
election victory.30 According to an extensive research report on the Dome presented to Members
of the House of Commons:
The Millennium Dome is the centrepiece of the exhibition to be held in Greenwich in the
year 2000 celebrating the millennium. The project is expected to cost £758 million in
total, of which £399 million will be provided by a grant from the Millennium
Commission - one of the five distributors of the proceeds from the National Lottery. In
June 1997 the Labour Government reaffirmed its support for the Greenwich Exhibition,
and Peter Mandelson, the Minister without Portfolio, was given overall responsibility for
the project. Twelve million people are expected to visit the exhibition during its lifetime
(31 December 1999 to 31 December 2000).31
Though it represented the “centerpiece” of the millennium celebrations, the thematic purpose of
the Dome itself proved more challenging to ascertain. News reports emerged after the Dome
struggles became public which suggested that New Labour had trouble finding consensus for the
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Fig. 6.2 The Millennium Dome32

purpose of the project.33 Some ministers supported turning the Dome into a smaller event while
others supported a more educational program.34 Whether the debates signaled a carefully
considered internal dialogue over the Dome’s programming or, more likely, an indecisive power
struggle over the pressing need to actualize a pre-existing, economically significant project
remains a subject of tedious political debate more so than a matter for urgent historical
investigation. Rather, the final decision to present the project as a staged reflection of the
Blairite version of a new Britain seems the more significant aspect of the Dome project. Tony
Image located at: http://i.telegraph.co.uk/multimedia/archive/01925/dome_1925235i.jpg
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Blair, speaking at the Dome prior to its opening, displayed utter confidence in the government’s
vision for the project: “It will last for generations to come. It will not be torn down, it will be a
lasting asset for the country.”35 Blair promised more than he delivered.
A few years after his disgraced resignation as the main “creative director” of the
Millennium Dome project, Stephen Bayley, armed with more than a few axes to grind, pointed at
the design of the “Tent” and the Blairite vision for the project as the beginning of the Dome’s
downfall:
[I]t was not an intelligent design, even if it was an impressive structure. It produced a
space so vast it hobbled the imagination of those charged with filling it. Choose your own
tabloid imagery: the Eiffel Tower, laid on its side, would sit comfortably in the Tent.
There are the 18,000 customary double-decker buses. Or 12 football pitches … [B]ut
New Labour abhorred a vacuum so it was filled with patronising rubbish. And when that
was cleared away, it was left in pitiable desuetude.… Tony Blair said the Tent would be
on the first page of his second manifesto, one of many claims later economised. Instead it
became an embarrassment, more an annoying pustule than an imperious duomo.36
Bayley’s “patronizing rubbish,” the thematic content of the Dome, consisted of a central staging
area for a show to introduce the Dome experience, and various “zones” for patrons to explore
afterwards (Fig 6.3).37 The Dome’s zones, each featuring several sponsored attractions, centered
around three major themes: “Who We Are,” “What We Do,” and “Where We Live.”38 For
example, in the “Who We Are” zone, ninety-foot sculptures “reverberated” to a heartbeat pulse
at 120 beats per minute.39 Another exhibition in the “Explore Area” of the same “Who We Are”
zone allowed visitors, somewhat strangely, to manipulate digitally an image of Margaret
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Thatcher’s face.40 As a Dome spokesperson explained: “People can shape Mrs Thatcher's face as
they like. They can make her look like a modern beauty or they can give her a pre-Raphaelite
look."41 Dome visitors had the opportunity to redraw, quite literally, the face of the recent
political past. Indeed, the use of such symbolic displays loosely arranged around an amorphous
thematic structure provided a form of definition for the Dome experience. That definition, in
turn, seemed to reveal a largely diffuse, post-national take on answering the broader questions

Fig. 6.3 Interior “Zones” of the Millennium Dome: “The Millennium Experience”42

posed by the zone themes. Nevertheless, the instantiation of the project demonstrated the
timeless problem of putting theory to practice.
Further symbolizing the failure of the Dome project to match its idealism with
experience, the nondescript, commercially-sponsored zones inside the Dome proved troublesome
“Blair hails ‘incredible’ dome,” The Guardian, December 14, 1999.
Ibid.
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to stage. As Jennifer Page related after her dismissal as the Chief Executive of the Dome’s “New
Millennium Experience”:
We had very quickly to earn respect from our stakeholders, while struggling with the fact
that we could not satisfy all their requirements. The sponsor representatives and the
millennium commission staff and the politicians and civil servants made up a wider circle
of essential participants. At times, the different business cultures could get in the way …
We struggled to balance the overall coherence of the dome while each area and sponsor
kept their individuality and got value for money. We obviously did not satisfy everyone
all the time. Increasingly, sponsors began to act together to exert pressure on the
company.43
In light of such competing governmental and commercial interests, the Dome emerged as a
peculiar hybrid between theme park, interactive museum, and mall. Whereas the Millennium
Commission had once declared the Dome “will be London’s answer to the Eiffel Tower,” the
artistic director of the Salzburg Festival sniffed, “A triumph of insignificance. Las Vegas does
this sort of thing much better.”44 The British press, meanwhile, offered up perhaps the most
scathing and apt comparison of them all: “Not so much the millennium's Crystal Palace, more a
post-modern hedgehog.”45 Indeed, the Blairite postmodernity of the Dome, both in terms of its
aesthetics and content, provided some genuine hindrances to its overall performativity; however,
it remains a paradoxical fact that such elements of postmodernity simultaneously and
authentically reflected the broader socio-political shift away from Britain’s imperial past.
Despite the critical backlash, the design and content the Millennium Dome defined its era
in similar ways to how the Great Exhibition of 1851, the most famous of all British exhibitions,
defined the mid-Victorians. The Great Exhibition featured the “Works of Industry of All
Nations,” which befitted Britain’s industrial and imperial rise in the nineteenth century. Further,
43
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the Exhibition’s Crystal Palace, with its steel and glass, effectively symbolized the emergence of
the new industrialization. The Millennium Dome, while unpopular by comparison, 46 also
typified the zeitgeist of 1990s Britain: it actualized a deliberately anodyne and highly
commercialized rumination on the diversity of life, meaning, and belief in modern Britain. Yet
even with the sanitized commercialism of the Blairite turn towards the political and social center,
such attempts to transform the public sphere inevitably bring about hermeneutics of discontinuity
with the past. Even the Dome’s grand opening, which took place on Millennium Eve, signaled
the awkwardness inherent in attempting to publicly reconcile the legacy of past exhibitionism in
Britain with the new trends. Shortly after midnight, Tony Blair linked hands with the Queen and
together they attempted to sing “Auld Lang Syne” to bring in the New Year (Fig. 6.4). The

Fig. 6.4. Prince Philip, the Queen and the Blairs singing Auld Lang Syne at the [Dome’s] opening47

pictures of the occasion broadcast not just the generational divide between the Monarch and her
subjects, but also the rupture between those representing the tradition-bound institutions of the

46 The Millennium Dome avoided at least one great failing of the Great Exhibition. The Dome project did not
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state and Blair’s “Cool Britannia” project. Ironically, the Queen’s confusion over the first
Blairite spectacle of the new millennium, while typical of the House of Windsor’s overall
remove from popular culture up to that point, proved indicative of the public’s reaction to the
Dome as well.
Almost immediately, attendance at the Dome failed to meet expectations. Official
government estimates suggested that some twelve million visitors would come to the Dome, but
roughly half that number actually visited.48 The lack of attendance nearly caused the entire
project to go bankrupt.49 According to the National Audit Office report on the Dome, “as is well
known, the Company has experienced severe financial difficulties during the year of operation
… Sponsorship income has been received more slowly than the Company had expected.”50
Large cash infusions from the government followed to keep the project afloat, but the trajectory
of the Dome’s failure became painfully clear just a few months into its existence.51 Tony Blair,
facing the reality of the situation, accepted responsibility for the Dome’s failure:
It's not been the runaway success we had hoped but neither has it been the disaster that's
been portrayed in some parts of the media. What I'm saying is that probably, if I had
known then what I know now about governments trying to run a visitor attraction, it was
too ambitious. These things do take time to settle down but there's something else to put
on the other side of the balance sheet.52
For the New Labour, the Dome’s failure represented necessitated a rebranding. Whereas the
Dome once symbolized “a triumph of confidence over cynicism, boldness over blandness,
48
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excellence over mediocrity,” it now stood as a “visitor attraction.”53 While moves to rebrand
political failures normally suggest politics as usual, Blair’s excuses for the shortcomings of the
Dome project hold a grain of truth. Spectacles of empire appeal to a concentrated form of
nationalism and patriotism. The post-imperial Millennium Dome appealed to a diffuse set of
evolving values. At the time of the Great Exhibition, the British socio-political gaze looked
outward to an ever-expanding empire. When that same socio-political gaze turned inward, it
beheld the rapid change of the Industrial Revolution. Until the latter half of the twentieth
century, major spectacles of Britishness continued this formula of engaging external affairs and
assessing matters of internal strength and security. By contrast, the new Millennium scene
featured little to no external focus, while the increasingly inward-looking gaze of British politics
reflected the post-imperial diversification of British culture, society, and values. This
postmodern turn did not occur overnight. While the twin events of 1997—the rise of New
Labour and the death of Diana—brought to the fore the beginnings of a broader sociological shift
in Britain away from the old imperial models, there was no rapid, massive societal revolution
under way by 2000. Perhaps because of this gradual sociological coming to terms with the postimperial world, Britons simply did not know enough about who they were anymore to stage a
spectacle of Britishness. As one opinion columnist put it to a bewildered readership: “Miles of
verbiage and armies of consultants, up to the very millennial moment, addressed the question of
content and purpose, but none was able to improve on [one government official’s] best shot: ‘It's
going to be quite wonderful but don't ask me how’. They still can't. Made manifest before our
eyes, the dome declared its irretrievable emptiness.”54
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To some extent, the Dome’s great failure suggests that the preexisting metamessage of
the British ceremonial, the expression of a national identity based upon imperial ambition and
triumph, had finally succumbed to the historical realities of the twentieth century. Seeing as
though Britain no longer maintained an empire, the continuing celebration of one no longer
sufficed. The Dome, with its Blairite vision for the future of Britain, attempted to refocus the
national discourse towards both the health and happiness of the individual and the benefits of a
more diverse, pluralistic, and welcoming society. While this reorientation made sense on a
number of levels, it failed to take into account the ways in which the more conservative approach
to staging grand national convocations—the appeals to patriotism, militarism, industry,
commerce, jingoism, British exceptionalism, and so forth—had become enshrined in the
discourse. The Millennium Dome never succeeded as a worthy successor to the legacy of the
Great Exhibition in large part because it did not attempt to build upon certain key features of the
Great Exhibition. Nor did the Dome attempt to build upon the legacy of imperial convocations
established in the aftermath of the Great Exhibition’s success. Indeed, only the upheavals caused
by the World Wars, and reflected in the postwar memorial movements, interrupted the idea of
the grand national convocation as something permanently triumphalist. The polite naval gazing
inherent to the Dome project, while presented with only the best of (political) intentions, simply
did not tell a story which appealed to glory. Combined with utter mismanagement on a day-today basis, this failure of narrative led to a collapse of support for the entire project. In all
likelihood, some counterfactual notion likely exists that the collapse of the Dome project could
have brought about the collapse of the national spectacle as an institution of Britishness. Such a
collapse did not, however, occur. In fact, in the years following the Dome debacle, the national
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spectacle as an institution of Britishness gained new life through the rejuvenation of the Royal
Family in the public eye, and also by means of a more subtle approach to the ways in which the
contemporary postmodern and post-imperial environment reflect upon the recent past.
Restoring the British popular ceremonial to the center of the national imagination, for
better or worse, required moving beyond the “irretrievable emptiness” of the Millennium Dome,
not to mention the sometimes hollow postmodern sentiments of New Labour. Two grand
national convocations fulfilled this task: the popular reconciliation between the House of
Windsor and the British people and the return of the Olympic Games to London. While critics of
the British Monarchy hold plenty of ammunition—they often claim that the House of Windsor
sponges off the taxpayer, providing little but perpetuating a great deal of class division—the
Royal Family, more so than any other institution, remains at the heart of the British ceremonial
tradition. The “king’s two bodies,” to use a famous phrase, provides a human face to the affairs
of state within the public sphere.55 The rupture between the House of Windsor and ordinary
Britons in the aftermath of Diana’s death, as well as the emerging contrasts between the
Windsor’s tradition-minded performativity and new postmodern sensibilities that took hold in
the wake of 1997, effectively exiled the Monarchy from successfully embodying its performative
role in popular life. Slowly but surely, however, the public relations rehabilitation of the
Windsors began. After a series of events slowly started to return the Windsors to their traditional
place at the heart of national ceremonies, namely the heartfelt tributes to the Queen Mother upon
her passing and the successful celebrations for the Queen’s Golden Jubilee (both in 2002), the
Windsors found a coda to the Diana saga when her eldest son, Prince William, married a
commoner, Kate Middleton, in another blockbuster Royal Wedding. William and Kate’s 2011
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marriage seemed to symbolically renew Diana’s legacy of bringing a more down-to-earth
approach to monarchy. Meanwhile, the Queen was fast becoming a beloved grandmotherly
figure to the nation in her advancing years, which placed both her and her family in a very
favorable position as the state prepared to honor her sixty years of national service.56
Elizabeth II’s Diamond Jubilee, only the second in history after Victoria’s in 1897,
naturally took on a very different tone than the deliberately militant late-Victorian affair. Yet
while the emphasis and the scale of Elizabeth’s Jubilee did not match Victoria’s, the public
response to Elizabeth’s celebrations easily matched the emotional support lent to Victoria. Even
amongst some critical Republicans, recognition of the Queen’s sixty years of service seemed to
verify Elizabeth’s unique status:
In her duties, what she represents is not herself (because she has kept that to herself), but
the state. She is the symbol of her country because she is the symbol of nothing else, and
certainly not any personal hobby horses. This may seem to be damning her with faint
praise, but her insistent self-effacement in public is her greatest quality. It is hard, even
for a proto-republican, not to feel admiration, and even, in some absurd way, pride at a
job done so well for so long. As genetic accidents go, Elizabeth II has been for Britain
about as happy a one as the lottery of history is ever likely to allow. Can we be that lucky
again?57
While winning over such begrudging critical voices represented a major triumph for the Queen,
the genuine intention behind any massive public spectacle surely remains to involve not the
critics but the masses. On this account, Elizabeth’s Diamond Jubilee represented the culmination
of public acclaim for not only her life’s work but for the last leg of the triumphant return for the
Windsors to the heart of British national identity following the years of rupture with the public in
the late 1990s.
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As for the particulars of the Diamond Jubilee, for four days at the start of June, 2012
Britons enjoyed a prolonged national holiday in the Queen’s name. The highlights of Jubilee
weekend included a massive boating pageant along the Thames, a free pop concert and fireworks
on the Mall in front of Buckingham Palace, and a service of national thanksgiving in St. Paul’s
Cathedral.58 Of course, the customary parade through the streets of London and the Royal
Family’s appearance on the balcony of Buckingham Palace concluded the events, and the crowds
which gathered in front of the Palace affirmed the public outpouring of support for the Queen
(Fig. 6.5). Britons filled the Mall, stretching all the way from the gates of Buckingham Palace to
Admiralty Arch and then overflowing into the surrounding parks. A similar scene greeted the

Fig. 6.5. Crowds in front of Buckingham Palace for the Diamond Jubilee celebrations, June 4, 2012.59
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river pageant earlier in the week, with massive crowds lining the Thames. Breathless television
and newspaper commentary captured the occasion, providing the Royal Family with the kind of
free publicity that elected public officials spend their entire careers hoping to attain. Moreover,
the ceremonial aspects of the 2012 Diamond Jubilee reflected a transformed Monarchy in many
ways, which partly accounts for the popular response. The pre-Diana House of Windsor did not
happily tolerate pop concerts, boating pageants, and the like at the expense of time-honored
Royal ceremonial traditions. Indeed, the pre-Diana distance between the Queen and her subjects
reinforced an icy aloofness. The success of the Diamond Jubilee, and in fact the more muted
successes of Elizabeth II’s Golden Jubilee before it, showcased how the Royal ceremonial had
evolved to blend popular outreach with the historical pomp and ceremony of traditional Royal
spectacles. Gone was the aloofness. In its place, the Diamond Jubilee featured a smiling
grandmother celebrating the occasion with her extended family of subjects. It likely was not as
Elizabeth wished to celebrate the occasion; rather, it was as her subjects wished to celebrate it.60
In return, the satiated public doted on the Queen with nearly universal affection.
The importance of the House of Windsor’s return to prominence in the shaping of
popular imagination also signaled the return of the Royals as a conscious and unconscious force
for linking the past with the present in the popular memory. The workmanlike attitude of the
Queen demonstrated her deep devotion to duty, but it took the influence of Diana, and the
public’s reaction to her ways, to finally force the Royal Family, and the Queen in particular, to
60
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accept a more populist touch. By slowly accepting the lessons of Diana’s populism, the Queen
began ameliorating the hard divisions between duty and accessibility long present in the Royal
Family’s public role. More importantly, the Queen effectively bridged some of the class
divisions between the Monarchy and its subjects that had remained firmly in place even as the
old Victorian and imperial order gave way to the new modern and postmodern realities. Such a
shift enabled the Royal Family to return to its privileged position at the center of the popular
imagination. Consequently, their return to that position allowed them once again to resume their
function of bringing the past into the present as living embodiments of history. In turn, the
resumption of this role by the Monarch and her family gave new vitality to those timeless public
events on the Royal, and therefore national, calendar. The Diamond Jubilee, in particular, acted
as the focusing event in which the Royal Family’s “comeback” fully took root. It was a happy
and glorious occasion not just for Elizabeth II and her family but, indeed, for all those that stood
to benefit from the return of the Royal ceremonial to its central position among the bread and
circus events staged for popular consumption.
The Diamond Queen’s national party did not, however, singlehandedly complete the
restoration of the national spectacle to the core of British identity projection. A mere month
later, the continuing transformation of the British public spectacle into its blended formulation of
historically-rooted pomp and ceremony with limited aspects of postmodern popular
sensibilities—the same sensibilities that failed to carry the Millennium Dome to success—
arrived in the form of the 2012 London Summer Olympic Games. Whereas the Diamond Jubilee
served as a perfect precursor to the Games in that it helped to settle the formula for twenty-first
century national spectacles, the Summer Olympics perfected the formula even further. Born in
part out of ageless competition with the French, Britain’s main competitors to host the 2012
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Summer Olympics, the effort to secure and stage the Games also forced the British to reconcile
their post-imperial present circumstances with the rising tide of imperialism on display during
the 2008 Games in Beijing, China.61 As a nation emerging as a major global power, China
sought to use its games to project an aura of both a rising player on the global scene and to
reclaim its status as a historical power in the Asian-Pacific region. Thus, the Chinese Olympics,
especially the Opening Ceremonies, became a model for military precision and cultural
propaganda.62 Against the backdrop of these old and new rivals in the French and the Chinese,
the British had to make choices of their own about how to respond.63 Defeating the French in the
bidding process simplified matters on one front—the old enemy offered no more threat going
forward. Responding to China’s massive imperial Olympic spectacle, however, proved a more
pressing concern. Did Britain intend to set its own imperial past glories against the Chinese
spectacle?64 Wisely, Britain charted a different course. Once again, the gaze turned inward.
Unlike the Millennium Dome fiasco, however, this time the British got it right.
The Opening Ceremony of the Olympic Games did not singlehandedly define the 2012
London Olympics; however, it did serve to establish a thematic identity for the Games that
extended beyond the sporting competitions which the Games ostensibly present. In broad terms,
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the Opening Ceremony permits the host country to frame the Games as an extension of national
and cultural identity. Further, it gives the host city an opportunity to showcase itself to the
world. In certain cases, such as with the 2012 Games, the host city also acts as the national
capital of the host country. The overlap in these instances only serves to underscore further the
potential for the host city to influence the Games beyond the sporting field. The Games even
begin in a manner that highlights more than just sports. Indeed, if the Games themselves play a
dual structural role—sports and international cooperation combined—then it falls to the Opening
Ceremony to introduce both the national and international components of the Games.
Unsurprisingly, then, the linchpin of the 2012 Olympics, insofar as Britain’s national role in
presenting the Games as a showcase of modern Britishness was concerned, came in the form of
the Opening Ceremonies.
Directed by the Academy Award winning film and theater director, Danny Boyle, the
2012 London Opening Ceremonies presented a vision of the host country which one
commentator bluntly summarized thus: “So, Britain: two thousand years of deeply fucking odd
and a lot more socialist than some people would like. ‘Bout spot on.”65 Unlike the awkward
sentiments expressed with the Millennium Dome fiasco, the Opening Ceremony embraced a
droll understanding of how Britain’s contemporary, post-imperial culture juxtaposes with its
historical roots. As the New York Times attempted, with a resigned sense of futility, to
summarize the sheer unpredictable zaniness of the Opening Ceremony to Americans who had
not seen it, or even to those who had watched, bewildered:
The noisy, busy, witty, dizzying production somehow managed to feature a flock of
sheep (plus a busy sheepdog), the Sex Pistols, Lord Voldemort, the engineer Isambard
65
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Kingdom Brunel, a suggestion that the Olympic rings were forged by British foundries
during the Industrial Revolution, the seminal Partridge Family reference from “Four
Weddings and a Funeral,” a group of people dressed like so many members of Sgt.
Pepper’s band, some rustic hovels tended by rustic peasants, “(I Can’t Get No)
Satisfaction” and, in a paean to the National Health Service, a zany bunch of dancing
nurses and bouncing sick children on huge hospital beds.66
Also struggling to describe the event, the Washington Post settled on the statement that
“if the Opening Ceremonies of the London Games sometimes seemed like the world’s biggest
inside joke, the message from Britain resonated loud and clear: We may not always be your cup
of tea, but you know — and so often love — our culture nonetheless.”67 As such, the Ceremony
saw Britain welcoming the world with open arms, a vast departure from the days in which
British spectacles of empire overtly attempted to intimidate international participants. Perhaps
even more tellingly, the Opening Ceremonies also confidently presented a multifaceted image of
what being British meant in 2012. In doing so, the Opening Ceremony, ostensibly designed to
introduce the world to Britain, actually spoke of something substantial about contemporary
British life to Britons themselves.
If national spectacles operate on two levels regarding their internal audience—as either
reflections of shifting national issues or as deliberate attempts at shaping national discourse—
then the fact that the 2012 Opening Ceremony dealt specifically with the question of national
identity (i.e. how to introduce London to a global audience) opens the door to commentary on the
ways in which the event sought to define contemporary Britain. Several specific facets of the
ceremony offer clues, starting with Boyle’s own commentary. In a preview to media for the
event, Boyle declared that he wanted the Opening Ceremony to create a “picture of ourselves as
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a nation,” and that he hoped viewers would “find something of themselves” in the ceremony.68
Boyle, therefore, clearly intended to speak to an internal audience as much as a global one. To
start, the ceremony began with something more familiar to Britons than to outsiders: an
expansive sweep of British history.69 The historical survey relied upon the heavy symbolism of
fields, pastures, cottages, and animals before giving way to heavy machinery and furnaces, all in
the service of showing Britain’s shift from a largely pastoral, elegiac land to an industrial power
akin to what one commentator recognized as Milton’s concept of Pandemonium.70 Such a move
effectively served not to obliterate the memory of England’s “pleasant pastures (once) seen” but
to reflect on the lost countryside. Furthering the point, as the scene played out and the
transformation from fields to foundries began, discordant drumming drowned out even the
playing of Sir Hubert Parry’s hymn to social justice: “Jerusalem.”71 Then a final transformation:
the new industrial scene gave way to the forging of five flaming Olympic Rings, which were
then hoisted into the air over the Olympic Stadium (Fig. 6.6).72 Thus, Boyle ended the historical
segment by situating the Olympics within the present industrial, modern, and even postmodern
scene. From that point onwards, Boyle deliberately addressed the nature of contemporary
68
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Fig. 6.6. Olympic Rings, 2012 London Olympic Opening Ceremony, July 27, 201273

Britain, using British humor to represent some of the same shifts in contemporary British culture
that the Millennium Dome planners attempted, but failed, to recognize. Boyle’s efforts proved
much more successful, in large part because he got no less an institutional figure than the revered
Diamond Queen herself in on the joke. More significantly, however, the use of humor disarmed
the audience, allowing Britons to put aside the remaining tensions that exist in a nation still
trying to discover its own identity and purpose in a post-imperial world.
The Queen’s arrival at the Opening Ceremony demanded a spectacular entrance, but
Boyle chose not to employ one of the gilded coaches so familiar to Royal processions. Rather,
Boyle had James Bond, as played by Daniel Craig, to escort Her Majesty to the event via a
prepared spoof video and staged helicopter jump (Fig. 6.7). When the Queen greeted 007,
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“Good evening, Mr. Bond,” and then proceeded to accompany him with the Royal corgis in tow,
it became evident that even Her Majesty had not just relaxed protocol for the occasion but had
thrown it completely out the window.74 Britons cheered openly for the display.75 Yet Boyle then
proceeded to demythologize British ceremonial precedent even further by employing Mr. Bean
as a member of the London Symphony Orchestra and ending his performance with a rude
noise.76 In effect, the Queen of England, James Bond, and Mr. Bean staged a comedy double act
that ended with a fart joke. Cool Britannia had finally arrived.
The Opening Ceremony featured many other highlights of British culture past and

Fig. 6.7. Film of The Queen, James Bond (Daniel Craig), and the Royal corgis
for the Olympic Opening Ceremony, July 27, 2012.77
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present, always demonstrating the push and pull between the two with a nod and a wink that the
British were finally comfortable enough to joke about themselves even during serious state
occasions.78 At the same time, Boyle’s production managed to valorize British state institutions
as disparate as British literature, the National Health Service, and 1960s music. All of this took
on a vaguely left-wing, progressive air. Consequently, the further demythologizing of British
pomp and circumstance that began in earnest with the post-Diana national mourning and the
wayward Millennium Dome debacle continued, albeit much more successfully, with the Opening
Ceremony.
Yet whatever the particular politics of Danny Boyle and his Opening Ceremony
production, the spectacular success of the evening—a vibrant introduction for London and the
British state to the rest of the world, and a reintroduction of Britain to Britons themselves—
ultimately served to restore the British ceremonial, even with elements of postmodernity mixed
in, as something which could successfully reveal something about British identity and culture.
While the “Britishness” presented at the Opening Ceremony reflected a smaller vision of Britain
that virtually absented all of the old imperial trappings, and while it proceeded to offer up a
clear-eyed assessment of how empire had influenced the course of British history, the Opening
Ceremony also demonstrated how the continuity of the state and its history remained as
unconquered as ever. Finally, and as an interesting postlude to the event, fears that British
efforts could not surmount the Chinese spectacle of 2008 came to naught when the people of
Beijing responded positively to the 2012 Opening Ceremonies. Some citizens even expressed

78

Ibid. In astute fashion, Ms. Collins claims “the trick of this was that, by deflating the national myth of stoic
heroism, Boyle bolstered the national myth of the British sense of humor.”

153

polite envy of London’s efforts. "[I]t was more sincere [than the 2008 Opening Ceremonies],"
summarized one Chinese onlooker.79 Perhaps such praise represents a far cry from the types of
envy expressed at British events in 1851 or 1897, but once again the British ceremonial proved
its worth as a propaganda effort, both at home and abroad.
Taken together, the events of 2012 demonstrated the evolution of the British spectacle
from gatherings which had previously depended on their imperial roots to succeed to events that
now housed a more comfortable pairing between the institutions of the past and the social
concerns of the present. Effectively, this served as their broader purpose, at least beyond the
circumstances for which they were staged. Whether or not the unlikely pairing of the Queen and
Danny Boyle truly resurrected the British spectacle to its former glory remains an open question.
Surely future endeavors will determine the final evolution of the ceremonial in public life. For
now, however, the events of 2012 further reinforced the permanence of the great convocations in
the broader discourse associated with Britain and its role in history.
British history, and by extension the British ceremonial, often reveals an island nation
that resists the invasion of foreign elements, avoids social and political upheaval, and almost
never indulges in bloody revolution. Modern British historical development, and by extension
the modern British ceremonial, often successfully took this fundamentally conservative set of
core values and national practices a step further: the British way of life became outwardly
projecting and imperial in nature. Indeed, the British Empire project succeeded on so many
different levels that it became an integral part of British national identity. The legacy of midVictorian equipoise, the stability-driven apex of Britain’s ascendant influence in human affairs,
continues to underpin British self-reflection, even as Britain has seen its empire fall away and its
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international ambitions reduce. British convocations since 1851, therefore, always reaffirm
something about the fundamentally conservative nature of the British nation. Even in their
contemporary instantiations, British ceremonials still make room for the stability of the
Constitutional Monarchy, for a pastoral and elegiac national imagination tamed by Victorian
values and progress, and for the belief that Britain is a unique and special culture worthy of
displaying. One need look no further than Boyle’s progressive Opening Ceremony to see these
forces still in full effect. New cultural values, politics, and beliefs may influence life in
contemporary Britain, but millennia-old institutions remain entrenched fixtures of both the
popular imagination and the public spectacle.
Only the most wayward of moments tend to allow for drift away from the ceremonial as a
conservative force in British public life. The Millennium Dome fiasco occurred in large part
because of its lack of conservative British identity as a project. Without foundational British
institutions represented, as had become the norm for public convocations, the Dome lacked the
same kind of ceremonial definition the public had grown familiar with and understood. The
Dome became a temporary political vanity project. Boyle’s Opening Ceremony, combined with
the wildly popular Royal Wedding of 2011 and the Diamond Jubilee of 2012, effectively
restored traditional institutions to the public ceremonial, even as they wisely made room for a
new popular outlook on what those institutions should do. Put simply, Britons enjoyed them.
The 2012 events, therefore, presented a visual metaphor for the healing of the ruptures
between contemporary, post-imperial Britons and the historically significant institutions of state
and society. The post-Diana Royal Family, for example, no longer performs the removed and
symbolic role of religious and secular imperial figurehead at most public convocations. Instead,
the House of Windsor now seeks to perform as a somewhat populist, though still privileged and
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socially separate, family firm geared towards representing the British people as they are now:
inward-looking but still aware of their unique history, cultural legacy, and evolving values.
Hence, the reason why the typically stoic Queen Elizabeth deigns to entertain the notion of
James Bond as her escort to an occasion as important at the Opening Ceremony of the Olympic
Games. In return, the popular imagination more readily accepts the increasingly populist face of
the British Monarchy. By accepting the Monarchy in this way, the popular will continues to
accept implicitly the class-based social structures the Monarchy continues to validate. Thus, we
see a specific example of how contemporary British spectacles, even with their increasingly
postmodern overtones, remain largely conservative projects.
Contemporary British public convocations continue to trace the evolution of Modern
British history, even as they begin to reflect a new era of national devolution and political
autonomy from the imperial past. The fact that contemporary public events in Britain continue
to look backwards towards their imperial origins vis-à-vis their continuing reliance upon the
institutions of the British imperial past, however, means that the British grand spectacle remains,
at least in some form, a convocation of empire. Yet this does not necessarily connote a negative
or retrograde reading on the premise of British popular ceremonials in contemporary life. The
genius of Danny Boyle’s Opening Ceremony vision rested in its wide-eyed acceptance of all
facets, including both the good and the bad, of British history. The Opening Ceremony did not
seek to obscure or revise the circumstances of Britain’s past or present. Instead, the Opening
Ceremony revealed Britain for what it truly is: an old country, a historically significant
contributor to the course of human history, and a people willing to change, with measured
reserve, for the sake of continuing stability and in the service of progress. That same description
applies to the best of those values on display at the 1851 Great Exhibition, and at many of
156

ceremonial and popular occasions since. Through its grand public spectacles, be they imperial or
post-imperial in nature, Britain has always revealed something about itself to both Britons and
non-Britons alike. The events of 1997-2012, with their sometimes erratic undertones, still make
room for an ever-evolving formula for the practice and staging of spectacles. The inherent
meaning of those events remains unchanged, however. Each major British public spectacle
uniquely reflects the past, present, and future of Britain. In this way, British ceremonials, for
good or for ill, have become as much a part of British identity and practice as the myriad facets
of Britishness they seek to display. Public ceremony, even in contemporary life, is simply part
of ritually being and acting British, and it likely will be for some time to come.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion:
The Future of British Public Ceremony
The arrival of a new Royal baby, often an occasion for considerable media attention and
popular interest, also sometimes means the birth of a new heir to the British Throne. When
Queen Elizabeth II’s great-grandson was born on July 22, 2013, he automatically became the
third in line to the succeed her after the baby’s grandfather, Prince Charles, the heir apparent, and
the baby’s father, Prince William, Charles’ firstborn son and the second in the line of succession.
While considerable attention focused on the birth announcements of both Charles and William,
the arrival of the little prince, still unnamed at the time of his birth, generated a massive popular
media spectacle. British tabloids breathlessly reported the news that the social media website
Twitter had more than 487 million users viewing postings about the Duchess of Cambridge, the
new Royal baby’s mother, going into labor. 1 The instantaneous sharing of the news meant that
Britons and non-Britons alike experienced the announcement very near to real time. Clarence
House, which housed the official offices of the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge, used its Twitter
account to broadcast the news of the occasion at 8:29 p.m., nineteen minutes ahead of the
traditional posting of the announcement on a gilded easel by the gates of Buckingham Palace.
(Figs. 7.1, 7.2).2
While the use of Twitter represented a deviation from traditional Royal protocol, it fell in
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Fig 7.1. Clarence House, Twitter Post, July 22, 2013, 12:35 p.m., http://twitter.com/ClarenceHouse

Fig. 7.2, The Official Announcement of Prince George’s Birth, July 22, 2013.3

Jaymi Mccann and Amanda Williams, “Euphoria outside Buckingham Palace as letter is placed on easel to
announce arrival of bouncing baby prince,” The Daily Mail, July 22, 2013, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article3
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line with the general trend towards the modernization of the Monarchy’s public affairs in the
aftermath of Diana’s death and the public backlash towards the House of Windsor that emerged
from it. Indeed, the official embrace of social media helped to fuel the public’s attention, as
evidenced by the extraordinary amount of chatter on Twitter in the run up to the baby’s delivery.
Crucially, however, the participation by official accounts on social media helped to control the
dissemination of information about the Royal birth. After all, if hundreds of millions of people
around the globe simultaneously learned of the information at the same time, then the purveyors
of that information, especially by using social media in conjunction with traditional media
outlets, exercised a great deal of controlling influence over the story. The Royal birth provided a
case study in how an ancient institution managed to exercise this controlling authority.
First came the long buildup and anticipation associated with the nine-month pregnancy,
made all the more interesting to the public because of the question of how the Duchess of
Cambridge, an oft-discussed style icon, would manage her image during her pregnancy. As the
expected delivery date grew closer, questions abounded about the sex of the child, the child’s
name, and the exact date of the impending birth. Once the Royal Household announced the
birth, they held both public and media attention by delaying on naming the child. As bookies at
the various British betting shops placed odds on the likely names, punters collected their
winnings from previous bets about the timing of the birth. Then, finally, the announcement of
the baby’s name came: George Alexander Louis. All that remained, the introduction of the new
baby to the public, came on the day after the birth when his parents took him home.4 Before
leaving the hospital, the doting parents allowed the cameras to get a look at the little prince and
2374212/Party-palace-Euphoria-thousands-delighted-wellwishers-gather-The-Mall-celebrate-news-birth-Britainsnew-prince.html#ixzz3MBrq0LaC. The photograph is included in the article.
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even answered a few questions about him.5 The public fixated on the story, while the media,
undoubtedly, loved the ratings generated by the story. Indeed, every aspect of the Royal birth
represented a carefully controlled, meticulously planned, savvy media operation. Therefore the
operation unfolded until Prince George of Cambridge, the future King of England, became a
household name in countless homes around the world. The plan all along, as one sympathetic
commentator put it, was to rejuvenate the Monarchy: “The great-grandmother in this story has
not been a passive observer. Now the Duchess of Cambridge has had her son, the Queen will
know that she has secured her dynasty, and the Monarchy, up to three generations into the
future—perhaps into the 22nd century.”6 Thus, the public spectacle, as had so often happened in
the 150 years of British history preceding it, served to aid in the conservation and perpetuation of
a powerful national institution.
Of course, very little about the birth of Prince George actually suggested anything new.
While the deft use of social media marked an awareness on the part of the House of Windsor that
it now had to communicate in decidedly twenty-first century ways, the narrative surrounding the
Royal birth still slotted into the broader, ever-evolving historical metanarrative of British
convocations. In other words, the contemporary Royal spectacle, while stage-managed
differently than Royal events during previous eras, remains a fundamentally conservative
occasion. The same applies to other public spectacles of state, as many of them aim to bolster
standing governmental, commercial, or charitable interests all in need of public support (e.g.
Remembrance Day, national sporting events, various charity schemes). The trend towards
integrating social media, while simultaneously retaining the time-tested fundamental structures
5
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concerning what a spectacle does and how it does it, means that so long as institutions
demonstrate a willingness to adapt to new models of operation, they will effectively retain the
ability to conserve the public spectacle as an institution of authority and power in its own right.
The British public spectacle as an institution, at least in its modern incarnations,
ultimately aims to advance productive formulations of authority and power. No longer does the
public spectacle involve beheadings at the Tower of London. Rather, the institution of
Monarchy, for example, experiences revitalization by turning the happy occasion of weddings,
births, and coronations into events designed to generate sympathetic sentiment. Such benevolent
measures of control fit the framework for one formulation of what Michel Foucault discussed in
terms of power discourses. As Foucault explained:
[I]t seems to me that the notion of repression is quite inadequate for capturing what is
precisely the productive aspect of power. In defining the effects of power as repression,
one adopts a purely juridical conception of such power, one identifies power with a law
which says no, power is taken above all as carrying the force of prohibition. Now I
believe that this is a wholly negative, narrow, skeletal conception of power, one which
has been curiously widespread. If power were never anything but repressive, if it never
did anything but to say no, do you really think one would be brought to obey it? What
makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t only
weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces
pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive
network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative
instance whose function is repression.7
The modern British spectacle certainly supplies plenty of Foucault’s “productive network.” One
needs look no further than the use of hundreds of millions of people simultaneously celebrating
through social media not just the birth of a new baby but the periodic renewal of the body politic
to see how the modern British spectacle shapes productive power in the service of existing
institutions.
7
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Because the shaping of power through spectacles almost invariably serves to enhance the
status of existing institutions—Monarchy, the government, commercial interests—the modern
British spectacle, especially as determined by the sort of imperial and post-imperial
metanarrative underpinning convocations from 1851-2012, remains a largely conservative force
in contemporary British life. Unsurprisingly, then, the political use of public spectacles has
emerged over time between conservative and progressive political forces; the propaganda value
of spectacles in helping to shape public opinion and the broader discourse has proven too great
for either the Tories or Labour to resist taking up the planning of wide-scale events. Yet because
of the fundamentally conservative shaping of most spectacles, right-leaning political support for
the staging of events, especially imperial events, tends to occur more enthusiastically. For
example, the Great Exhibition of 1851, while “progressive” in theme, featured a great deal of
establishment support, especially from the Royal Family.8 The Jubilees of Victoria witnessed
the enthusiastic support of a true champion of British imperialism, the Conservative Prime
Minister, the Marquess of Salisbury.9 The Coronation of Elizabeth II saw the heavy involvement
of Sir Winston Churchill, another imperialist Tory awash in late-Victorian sentiment.10 While
more recently, the Diamond Jubilee of Elizabeth II and the 2012 London Summer Olympic
Games received the enthusiastic backing of the Conservative Prime Minister, David Cameron.11
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After all, these spectacles supported causes closely aligned with the politics of the British right:
Empire, industry, Monarchy. Even sports, with its valorization of rules, fair play, hard work,
competition, teamwork, community building, and national unity, appeals to many of the
sentiments of the right.
The alignment between conservative values and the Conservative Party reinforces the
claim that public spectacles act to validate certain aspects of British state and society that remain
largely absent from left-leaning politics. Indeed, attempts made by the Labour Party to influence
spectacles tend towards less successful outcomes. The Millennium Dome fiasco, personally
championed by Labour’s Tony Blair, stood as an example of how not to turn various postmodern
ideals—inclusiveness, diversity, multiculturalism—into a national event. The diffuse nature of
the values at play simply did not form any sort of cohesive purpose, other than to speak to some
sense of new politics. In fact, the Millennium Dome, with its new attempt to convey something
post-imperial to the British public, effectively undercut 150 years of metanarrative development
about the nature of spectacles in British life. It did not, however, successfully sever that
metanarrative. When Danny Boyle, for instance, also sought to champion certain progressive
ideals in his production of the Opening Ceremony of the London Summer Olympics, he found a
great deal more success by blending a left-of-center conceptualization of British history and
identity with the same kinds of traditional institutions of British state and society which
spectacles traditionally support. Effectively, Boyle managed to reshape a grand national
convocation into a reflection of Britain both past and present, all without undermining the event
itself. Ultimately, however, Boyle’s best of both worlds approach proved that the true nature of
the spectacle remains conservative in nature. British public ceremonies look to the past, they
buildings, it’s about people, it’s about sport, it’s about the economy, it’s about legacy, it’s about inspiration for the
future - and frankly I want us to break records on every single one of them.”
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support deep-seated institutions of power, and they actively reinforce social conceptions of
historically informed Britishness.
One major exception to the general rule that British spectacles affirm a conservative
vision of Britain comes about when occasional public reappropriations of the meaning and
message of popular events take place. The postwar war memorial movement and the public
outcry after Princess Diana’s death both stand as good examples of the popular will dictating to
the institutions of state how the performative aspects of public events will occur. In the case of
the postwar memorial movements that sprung up in towns and cities all across Britain, ordinary
people organized public grieving and memory in accordance with their own wishes. For once,
the government followed the lead of the people, responding supportively for the most part. The
hue and cry that followed Diana’s death resulted in nothing less than the abandonment of
centuries of ceremonial protocol for large, semi-state funerals. In both cases, the institutions of
power reacted to the spectacle of the people, rather than the people reacting to the spectacles of
the institutions.
The sorts of “ground up” mass movements in which the popular will asserts itself tend to
occur only rarely in modern British history; nevertheless, they represent something akin to
authentic social expression. In the instance of the war memorial movement, Britons responded
to the horrors of war with solemn but concerted effort; the response signaled a growing
weariness of the costs of war and Empire. The public outpouring over Diana’s death indicated a
sense of growing discontent with the perceived stagnancy of the Monarchy. In both cases, the
institutions of state responded to the popular will. The government grew increasingly reluctant
to engage in the sorts of military games so common in the late-Victorian era in the aftermath of
the new postwar sentiment, only rallying behind the militant Churchill in the dark hours of the
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Second World War. The Monarchy, meanwhile, responded to the public reaction against them in
the wake of Diana’s death with a new spirit of openness and transparency. While these are small
concessions on the part of the powerful to the people, they do suggest that public spectacles can,
under the right circumstances, work as “bottom up” affairs.
Overall, however, the willingness of the institutions most commonly responsible for the
staging of national convocations to adapt to the contemporary post-imperial scene has meant that
public spectacles remain a viable force in British social and political life. Danny Boyle’s
Olympic Opening Ceremony, with its politely socialist politics and its open recognition of the
limitations of the Victorian worldview, demonstrated that room remains for even some limited
progressive ideals in the modern instantiation of the national convocation. Even still, the
formula for mass public events retains much from its Victorian origins. Each new spectacle
renews and reaffirms the formula ensconced by the century-long imperial metanarrative arc that
dominated popular gatherings: British mass convocations serve to reveal essential components of
Britishness, both at home and abroad. In the Foucauldian sense, however, such revelations
deserve a skeptical eye. Foucault once questioned: “what does it matter who is speaking?”
When investigating events that speak to wide audiences, discovering those who establish,
present, and underwrite those events matters a great deal, for it is the backers of those events
who “speak.” In turn, it is those backers who strive to establish the sort of Britishness—the
values, beliefs, practices—each event reveals. Mass public spectacles, therefore, help to define
the British nation and its people. Tracing those spectacles over a period of time means not only
identifying the historical evolution from imperial Britain to post-imperial Britain, it means
identifying the significant power structures at work that drove that historical evolution.
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Ultimately, each major British public event merits consideration from both a broad and
narrow historical lens. In a broad sense, the placement of each gathering within the historical
context of its time deserves ample consideration. So do the social and political forces present
within that context. Further, the idea of each event representing some link in a broader
metanarrative chain also requires consideration, and, perhaps, a good deal of critical
investigation in the Foucauldian tradition. In a narrower sense, the particular arrangements
associated with each event—who, what, when, where, why—require careful analysis. According
to the Geertzian tradition, so does the symbolism inherent in each spectacle. Finally, there stands
a need for analysis on the influence of each event in its immediate aftermath. Taken together,
both the wide and narrow examination presents an overview of modern British convocations that
demonstrates their importance to recent history. Going forward, further wide-angle and narrow
perspective foci on public spectacles will undoubtedly continue to reveal them as significant
benchmarks to the story of contemporary British life.
From the moment Britons gathered to watch the Houses of Parliament burn in 1834 until
the tweets heard around the world went out about the birth of Prince George in 2013, the British
spectacle has marked the rise and fall of an empire, the economic transformation from
industrialization to globalization, and the shifts in society from the Victorian to the postmodern.
The great convocations of public life provide a means of measuring key moments of those
changes in British history. Little reason exists, therefore, to think that the public spectacle will
not in some way continue as occasional historical, social, and political benchmarks well into the
future. In the coming decades alone, state funerals and coronations will occur. The cry will
inevitably ring out: “the Queen is dead, long live the King!” The people will gather to mourn
and to remember the passage of one Sovereign, and then they will gather again to celebrate the
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crowing of their new Sovereign. In the process, new public practices will emerge while ancient
traditions are upheld. Those practices and traditions will serve to aid in the conservation of the
institutions of state. They will aid political goals and satisfy media demand. They will generate
debate about the purpose of Monarchy in a changing world. Above all, however, future state
occasions, both Royal and non-Royal alike, will reveal a defining sense of Britishness to Britons
and the rest of the world. Indeed, no matter the particular event, that is what British public
gatherings ultimately do.
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